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In this report, the term “recruitment agency” has been used to describe private 
companies licensed to place workers in overseas positions, although it is understood 
that in Nepal the terms “manpower agency,” “foreign employment business,” and “for-
eign employment entrepreneur” are more commonly used.
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Similarly, individual actors that connect migrant workers with recruitment agen-
cies are referred to in this report as “individual agents.” Other terms commonly used in 
Nepal and abroad include “agent,” “sub-agent,” “broker,” “middleman” or “intermediary.”
Dates in Nepal are based on the Bikram Sambat (BS), Nepali calendar which is 
approximately 56 years and eight months ahead of the Gregorian calendar. The year 
of publication, 2014, is fiscal year 2070/71 BS. In this report, the BS year is given in 
the first reference to a law and then the Gregorian year is used thereafter. The BS new 
year starts in mid-April, so years do not align with Gregorian years. Where a BS year is 
referred to as a time period, both relevant Gregorian years are included—for example, 
data from the year 2070 BS is written as 2013/2014.
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Executive Summary
I. Overview 
Every month, nearly 16,000 Nepalis travel to the Gulf States for temporary work, and 
thousands more go to other countries in the Middle East. Much attention has been 
directed to the exploitation of low-wage migrant workers in the Middle East, where 
harms are commonplace and severe, and access to justice is limited. But the story of 
labor migration also begins and ends at home. Migrant workers commonly encounter a 
range of abuses during their recruitment in Nepal which makes them more vulnerable 
to exploitation abroad. 
Based on a two-year empirical study, this report provides the first comprehensive 
analysis of the Nepali mechanisms that regulate labor migration, and provide redress to 
migrant workers who experience harms during recruitment and throughout the migra-
tion process. The study finds that despite Nepal’s efforts to protect migrant workers, it 
is generally failing to hold private recruitment companies and agents accountable, and 
the vast majority of migrant workers are unable to access justice in Nepal or abroad. 
The report reveals that, with some notable exceptions, the law that governs recruit-
ment and placement of Nepali migrant workers is relatively robust, but its implementa-
tion and enforcement are weak. The report examines in detail each of the mechanisms 
that Nepal has established to enable workers to access compensation and other forms of 
justice when their rights are violated, and makes findings on the governance, operation, 
and effectiveness of each mechanism. The report also provides detailed recommendations 
for improvement, many of which could be implemented in the short to medium term.
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This report is the second in the Open Society Foundations’ Migrant Workers’ 
Access to Justice Series. The first report, Migrant Workers’ Access to Justice at Home: 
Indonesia, was published in 2013.1 
II. Nepali Workers to the Middle East and the
 Importance of Access to Justice at Home
The past decade has seen an exponential increase in the number of Nepali migrant 
workers abroad and Nepal now sends the most workers abroad per capita in Asia. Labor 
migration is central to the economy of Nepal; remittances account for over 25 percent of 
Nepal’s GDP,2 and almost half of all households have at least one family member who 
is currently working or has previously worked abroad. In 2011, there were an estimated 
722,000 Nepali migrant workers in the Middle East.  The majority of Nepalis traveling 
to the Middle East for work are male, due in part to restrictions on migration of young 
women to the region. However, women continue to travel to the Middle East in sig-
nificant numbers, primarily for domestic work, and often through irregular channels. 
Nepali migrants, as with other migrant workers in the region, suffer particu-
larly high levels of abuse and exploitation. Routine harms include contract substitution 
and fundamental changes in the nature or conditions of work, non-payment of wages, 
unsafe work conditions, inadequate rest, inhumane housing conditions, and confis-
cation of identity documents. In more serious cases, migrant workers suffer verbal, 
physical and sexual abuse. Hundreds of workers die while working abroad each year, 
often from work-related causes. Women are particularly vulnerable to serious abuse for 
reasons of gender discrimination, the isolated nature of their work in private homes, 
and irregular status. In some cases, abuses amount to labor trafficking, forced labor, 
and debt bondage.  Few low-wage migrant workers can access compensation or other 
remedies for these violations while working in the Middle East.
Vulnerability to exploitation abroad is often heightened by routine violations com-
mitted in Nepal during the pre-departure phase by individual agents, recruitment agen-
cies, and other private actors. These include misrepresenting the nature and terms of 
work available, overcharging on recruitment fees, delaying or cancelling departures, 
and failing to provide workers with correct pre-departure documents, including receipts 
and contracts of employment and recruitment. These abuses persist due to a lack of 
transparency, government oversight, and accountability in the private recruitment and 
placement of migrant workers—which also undermine workers’ ability to access justice 
for these harms.  
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III. Improving Migrant Workers’ Access to Justice 
 in Nepal 
Nepal has significantly strengthened its governance of labor migration with the intro-
duction of a new Foreign Employment Act in 2007 and Rules in 2008, and recently, the 
Foreign Employment Policy 2012. The act also established two mechanisms through 
which migrant workers can file criminal complaints against recruitment agencies and 
individual agents: a complaints investigation unit within the Department of Foreign 
Employment (DoFE), and a Foreign Employment Tribunal. These mechanisms operate 
alongside compensation schemes for death and permanent disability (under private 
insurance and the state-administered Foreign Employment Welfare Fund), the Nepali 
courts, support from civil society groups, and informal local justice mechanisms. 
Nepal’s embassies also assist workers abroad.
DoFE and the tribunal have the potential to enable significant numbers of migrant 
workers to obtain compensation from recruitment companies and agents, but are fail-
ing to do so. Of the 54 migrant workers interviewed for this study, none had obtained 
full redress through these mechanisms. This is partly due to structural and operational 
challenges discussed in detail in the report, and partly to barriers to access common to 
many justice mechanisms in Nepal: centralization of institutions in Kathmandu; inad-
equate resourcing and training of officials; failure to accommodate the socio-economic 
realities of Nepali migrant workers, particularly of women, irregular migrant workers 
and minorities; lack of awareness and understanding of legal rights and redress pro-
cesses among workers and their families; lack of documentation to support claims; 
threats to workers and fear of retaliation by recruitment agencies and other defendants 
for filing cases; and weak governance and accountability. 
The Nepali government and legislature can improve governance and oversight of 
labor migration and migrant workers’ access to justice by: 
• Recognizing prospective, current and former migrant workers as rights hold-
ers, with defined enforceable rights and associated remedies (a ‘rights-based 
approach’).
• Improving oversight of the pre-departure phase of labor migration, particularly 
provision of appropriate contracts to workers.
• Improving monitoring, transparency and accountability in the regulation of 
recruitment agencies and individual agents.
• Providing stronger protections and remedies for migrant workers who suffer 
severe abuse, exploitation, debt bondage or trafficking. 
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• Ensuring enforceable rights and remedies for workers in an irregular status.
• Improving protections and rights enforceability for female migrant workers.
The Nepali government can improve the operation and effectiveness of redress 
mechanisms through: 
• Decentralizing redress mechanisms and other essential labor migration services.
• Increasing resources, expertise, transparency, accountability, and efficiency within 
DoFE and the tribunal.
• Streamlining the handling of cases against individual agents to achieve more 
timely adjudication and payment of compensation.
• Improving inter-agency and civil society coordination and data-sharing.
• Improving embassy support for migrant worker rights enforcement in destination 
countries.
• Expanding access to the Foreign Employment Welfare Fund for all migrant work-
ers, including those in an irregular status, and for harms beyond death and per-
manent disability.
• Improving the reach of pre-departure orienta tion programs and the scope of infor-
mation provided to include coverage of legal rights and processes for seeking 
redress. 
Nongovernmental actors can play a significant role in the development of pro-
grams, services, and strategies to improve migrant workers’ access to justice. The donor 
community can also support reform and access to justice for migrant workers by fund-
ing and providing technical expertise in the development and implementation of data-
collection, record keeping, case management systems, and related IT infrastructure, for 
example, as well as further targeted studies. 
IV. Conclusion
Nepal has taken significant steps toward improving governance of labor migration and 
migrant workers’ access to justice, but justice still remains elusive for the vast majority 
of Nepali migrant workers who encounter harms pre-departure and while abroad. Con-
crete reforms can be made to the content, implementation, and enforcement of Nepali 
laws and procedures that will improve both migrant worker protection and access to 
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justice in the short and long term. Reform initiatives should be developed in close 
consultation with civil society representatives and migrant workers, and implemented 
with the goals of furthering transparency and accountability and ameliorating barriers 
to accessing justice. 
Countries of origin, and the various stakeholders within them, have much to learn 
from each other’s efforts (and failures) to address these challenges. It is hoped that this 
report on Nepal, as with the earlier report on Indonesia, provides an empirical basis 
for those discussions, as well as an evidence-based foundation for advocacy, changes 
to policies and procedures, and legal reform within Nepal. It should also prove useful 
as a manual to enable Nepali civil society to better understand, use, and test existing 
justice mechanisms.

2 3
1. Introduction
1.1 Overview
Millions of migrant workers provide essential services in low-wage industries through-
out the world, including domestic work, care giving, construction, agriculture, fisheries, 
manufacturing, and the service industry.3 In 2012, global remittances from migrant 
workers to their origin countries amounted to $534 billion—triple the amount of global 
development aid.4 Despite increasing recognition of the critical role low-wage migrant 
workers play in destination countries and the contributions they make to their countries 
of origin, these workers continue to routinely encounter harms throughout the migra-
tion process.
While governments have set up systems for facilitating and regulating labor 
migration, protection of migrant workers and regulation and oversight of private actors 
that send workers abroad have not kept pace with the expansion of labor migration 
programs. This is especially true in Nepal, where the number of Nepalis seeking and 
engaging in foreign employment has dramatically increased over the past two decades, 
making Nepal the largest sender of migrant labor per capita in Asia. 
Labor migration has since come to play a defining role in the economy of Nepal 
and in the fabric of Nepali society. Remittances from abroad are believed to total more 
than 25 percent of Nepal’s GDP5 and, at $5 billion in 2013, more than 50 percent of its 
imports.6 Recent studies indicate that almost half of all households have at least one 
family member who is currently working or has previously worked abroad.7 By some 
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estimates, more than a third (37 percent) of 15- to 29-year-old Nepalis and more than a 
quarter (28 percent) of 30- to 44-year-old Nepalis are working outside of Nepal to sup-
port their families—a striking proportion of the working age population.8
The treatment of Nepalis contracting to work, or indeed working, abroad, has 
become a priority concern for Nepali policymakers. In recent years, the government 
has taken numerous steps to strengthen the foreign employment system, including 
passing a new comprehensive labor migration law in 2007, adopting a foreign employ-
ment policy in 2012, signing bilateral agreements with select destination countries, and 
developing directives intended to protect migrant workers. 
The knowledge base about the foreign employment industry in Nepal and the 
treatment of Nepali migrant workers has also increased through the research contri-
butions of both national and international organizations. Few studies, however, have 
addressed enforcement of existing laws, and access to justice for migrant workers for 
the harms they encounter throughout the migration process.9 
Access to justice is essential not only for the individuals involved, but also their 
families, their communities and society as a whole. Access to justice is essential for 
enforcement of the contractual, statutory, and treaty rights that migrant workers possess. 
It strengthens the rule of law by increasing transparency and ensuring accountability of 
private and government actors, often addressing systemic gaps in rights protections. It 
can encourage future good behavior by state and private actors, and increase individu-
als’ faith and participation in public life and institutions. Financial redress can enable 
workers to escape the cycle of debt and poverty that makes them vulnerable to further 
exploitation and abuse. And, of course, it achieves the ultimate aim of providing justice 
to individuals who have been wronged.
This report seeks to fill a gap in existing literature and studies on Nepali labor 
migration, and indeed labor migration in general, by examining access to justice for 
Nepali labor migrants. It focuses specifically on redress options in Nepal or through 
Nepali institutions for Nepalis who have traveled to the Middle East (see below). 
The study includes an examination of available remedies for rights violations 
that occur in Nepal and abroad, and assesses the accessibility and effectiveness of the 
mechanisms established to provide redress under the existing legal framework. It is 
the second in a series funded by the Open Society Foundations and others to compre-
hensively examine, for the first time, access to justice for migrant workers in the Arab 
region, with a focus on workers’ country of origin. The first study on Indonesia was 
published in late 2013.10 It is hoped that the detailed analysis and recommendations 
set forth in this report will contribute to the ongoing strengthening of the Nepali labor 
migration system.
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1.2 Labor Migration from Nepal to the Middle East
This study has concentrated on migrants who travel to Middle East destinations for 
a number of reasons. First is the rapid growth in the Middle East as a destination of 
choice. Migration for work is not a recent development in Nepal; Nepali citizens have 
long traveled across the open border with India to work in India’s cities, and many 
continue to do so. What is new is the dramatic increase in numbers traveling to newer 
markets in the Middle East (and also Malaysia) in the past two decades.11 
As of 2011, over 700,000 Nepalis were recorded as working in Bahrain, Kuwait, 
Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, from fewer than 10,000 
in 1991, as Table 1 demonstrates.12 Nepali migrants to the Middle East are predomi-
nantly men, working in manufacturing and construction, but women also migrate to 
the region, primarily as domestic workers.
 TABLE 1: Migration to the GCC Countries and Middle East13
Census Year Relevant Absentee Population Destination 
1991 6,345 Arab Countries
2001 110,810 GCC Countries (except Oman)
2011 721,791 Middle East Countries
Note: Country-wise disaggregated data for the years 1991 and 2011 are not available as of the time of writing. 
Source: National census from relevant years.
Second, as with migrants from all countries performing low-wage work in the 
Middle East, Nepali workers suffer particularly high levels of abuse and exploitation 
in the region. Nepali migrant workers routinely report problems including contract 
violations or substitution, unpaid wages, unsafe work conditions, inadequate rest, inhu-
mane housing conditions, and confiscation of the worker’s identity documents. Workers 
employed in domestic service may be confined to the home and subjected to physical 
or sexual abuse. The International Labour Organization estimated that approximately 
600,000 individuals (from all countries) working in the Middle East in 2013 could be 
classified as victims of forced labor.14 In that same year, significant media attention 
within Nepal and globally has focused on deaths of Nepali migrants working in Qatar,15 
raising important issues of workplace safety for migrant workers. Gender and irregu-
lar status compound the abuse and exploitation to which female migrant workers are 
subject throughout the region, as well as in transit.
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Third, challenges associated with obtaining redress in the Middle East are par-
ticularly acute, and the power differentials between Nepal and the countries in the Gulf 
make it difficult for the government to bargain on behalf of its workers on an equal 
footing. The supply of migrant labor is greater than the demand, and many destina-
tion countries see little incentive to better regulate and enforce regulations protecting 
migrant workers, particularly those with limited social and political capital. Further, 
numerous legal and cultural barriers prevent migrant workers from using the justice 
system of destination states. These include the simple fact that in many Gulf coun-
tries a worker is considered “illegal” and liable to detention once he or she has left the 
employer—thus leaving the worker with few enforceable protections under the domes-
tic legal regime. 
Understanding actions that Nepal can take to protect its workers and provide 
redress is, therefore, particularly important.
1.3 Origin Countries and Access to Justice for Migrant
 Workers
Origin countries are often overlooked in public discussions on protecting migrant 
rights, with greater media and public interest on the treatment of migrant workers in 
the destination country. The studies that do examine countries of origin tend to focus 
exclusively on the intersection between labor migration and development, and not on 
prevention and mitigation of harms, or migrant workers’ access to justice when harms 
are perpetrated against them.
Nevertheless, as noted above, the role of origin countries such as Nepal is particu-
larly important when a dearth of redress options exist in destination countries. This is 
not to diminish the need for action in key destination states, but rather point out the 
many possible and important steps that origin countries can take to both reduce vulner-
ability to harm and provide access to justice when harms occur. 
The conditions that give rise to exploitation often begin at home.16 This study 
confirms findings from other research that workers in Nepal who intend on migrating 
are commonly subjected to numerous harms prior to departure. Fraud, misinformation 
about the nature and terms of work, overcharging or theft of recruitment fees, delays in 
departure or failure to depart altogether all make migrant workers more vulnerable to 
abuse abroad and less able to change their situations. Combined with exorbitant inter-
est rates on many loans taken out by migrant workers, these circumstances create the 
conditions for debt bondage and labor trafficking to occur. 
Conversely, increased information and education pre-departure, and more effi-
cient and effective checks on migrant worker documents, are just two examples of steps 
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origin countries can take to significantly decrease vulnerability. Access to affordable 
and efficient redress mechanisms to hold private actors accountable can strengthen the 
labor migration system overall.
There are also ethical reasons for countries of origin to play a greater role in 
migrant worker protection. Countries of origin and the private actors, operating within 
them profit significantly from workers’ remittances, recruitment, and insurance costs. 
Arguably origin country governments have corresponding obligations to protect and 
promote the rights of their nationals engaged in foreign labor migration, to ensure that 
labor migration is effectively regulated, and to ensure that workers can access justice 
when their rights are violated, by Nepali actors or actors abroad. 
1.4 Objectives and Structure of this Study
Given the above, strengthening the redress mechanisms for migrant workers in coun-
tries of origin should be a priority of individual governments and international orga-
nizations. Yet, little is known about the mechanisms that exist already in many origin 
countries, including Nepal, the gaps in existing frameworks, and the challenges or 
barriers to their implementation. 
Accordingly, as with the earlier Indonesia case study, this study has as its objec-
tives to:
• Map the legal framework and mechanisms established in specific countries of 
origin to provide redress to migrant workers who have suffered a harm or loss;
• Assess the effectiveness of each mechanism, and the extent to which migrant 
workers are or are not accessing remedies or other forms of justice;
• Identify cross-cutting obstacles to accessing justice in particular countries; and
• Make recommendations for improving access to justice for migrant workers.
This study of access to justice in Nepal is divided into four parts. The first part, 
Chapters 1–3, lays the framework for the report including both the theoretical founda-
tions and research methods. Part 2, comprising Chapters 4–7, provides an overview of 
the migrant labor system including the principal actors, procedures and laws, as well as 
the common harms experienced by migrant workers. Part 3, Chapters 8–9, is the core 
of the report describing and assessing the pathways used by migrant workers to access 
justice, as well as the cross-cutting obstacles that deny access to justice. Finally, Part 4 
summarizes the findings of the report and sets out detailed policy and implementation 
recommendations for improving access to justice for Nepali migrant workers.
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2. Theoretical Framework
2.1 A Rights-Based Approach
This report takes a human rights-based approach to its assessment of access to justice 
for migrant workers. In doing so, it recognizes migrant workers as rights-holders and 
examines Nepal’s laws and mechanisms in terms of their effectiveness for holding duty-
bearers accountable and promoting and protecting the rights of migrant workers. This 
includes workers’ access to remedies when their rights are violated. In understanding 
the standards that should be applied to international migration and access to remedies, 
it draws on the human rights norms set out in international law, as described below. 
International Human Rights Instruments and Labor Migration
As the international community has grown increasingly aware of the special vulnerabili-
ties of migrant workers, it has both developed new instruments for protecting and pro-
moting migrant worker rights,17 and emphasized that existing instruments also apply 
to migrant workers. For example, in 1990 states adopted the United Nations (UN) Con-
vention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their 
Families (CMW),18 which in turn builds on the rights contained in existing UN and 
International Labour Organization (ILO) treaties. It “reaffirm[s] and establish[es]” the 
basic human rights norms that it considers necessary for migrant workers to have free 
and equal enjoyment of rights and dignity throughout all stages of labor migration.19
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The mechanisms charged with overseeing UN human rights treaties have also 
elaborated on and given guidance regarding how specific treaty provisions apply to 
migrant workers. For example, the UN Committee overseeing the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (the CEDAW Committee) 
has addressed the human rights concerns of women migrants through General Rec-
ommendation 26 on Women Migrant Workers. This recommendation recognizes both 
that women experience human rights violations during all stages of migration and that 
CEDAW can address some of those violations. The UN Human Rights Committee and 
the ILO have also addressed obligations of origin countries under the core human rights 
and labor rights conventions to protect migrants from illegal practices of discrimina-
tion, forced labor, exploitation, and abuse.
Regional organizations have created their own normative frameworks relevant to 
migrant workers. For example, in 2002 the South Asian Association for Regional Coop-
eration (SAARC) adopted and signed the SAARC Convention on Preventing and Com-
bating Trafficking in Women and Children,20 and created a regional taskforce to monitor 
and assess the convention’s implementation. The Dhaka Declaration of Colombo Process 
Member Countries was drafted in 2011 within the Colombo Process, a regional ministe-
rial consultation process on labor migration for countries of origins in Asia.21 It includes 
recommendations to promote the rights, welfare, and dignity of migrant workers.
Obligations of Origin Countries Regarding Access to Justice and Related 
Rights
A number of international conventions (see Annex 3) impose obligations to respect, 
protect, and fulfill the human rights of all persons within their jurisdiction without 
discrimination, which includes migrant workers. Countries of origin have obligations 
to their citizens traveling abroad for work that include taking affirmative protective 
measures at the outset of the migration process. For example, countries of origin must 
effectively regulate the recruitment process, and ensure redress when migrant workers’ 
rights are violated. Access to justice is not only critical to ensuring transparency and 
accountability within the labor migration system, but also to the ultimate fulfillment of 
the rights of the individual worker and her family members.
Access to justice, or access to redress, is a basic human right across all of the 
core international human rights treaties. It is reiterated in the CMW, which provides: 
Art. 83. Each State Party to the present Convention undertakes:
 (a) To ensure that any person whose rights or freedoms as herein recognized are violated 
shall have an effective remedy, notwithstanding that the violation has been committed 
by persons acting in an official capacity;
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 (b) To ensure that any persons seeking such a remedy shall have his or her claim reviewed 
and decided by competent judicial, administrative or legislative authorities, or by any 
other competent authority provided for by the legal system of the State, and to develop 
the possibilities of judicial remedy;
 (c) To ensure that the competent authorities shall enforce such remedies when granted.
Victims of human rights violations have a right to equal access to the courts and 
to an effective remedy as determined by a competent and independent tribunal for 
rights violations. Furthermore, those rights must be enjoyed equally among all people 
without discrimination. 
In addition to the specific obligation to ensure access to redress, origin countries 
have obligations to provide information and documentation to migrant workers. As this 
study of Nepal reveals, lack of information and lack of documents are frequent barriers 
to migrant workers accessing justice and also contribute to other rights violations. The 
CEDAW Committee has criticized the failure to provide information on migration and 
other practices common in origin countries, including detention of women by recruit-
ment agencies during training, exploitative fees, and bans or restrictions on women’s 
out-migration, which contribute to the abuses endured by migrant women throughout 
the migration process.22 It specifically recommends that countries of origin:
• Provide comprehensive education on the migration process, including education 
specific to the contents of the labor contracts, legal rights, and entitlements within 
the countries of work, and procedures for accessing formal and informal justice 
mechanisms; 
• Require recruitment agencies to participate in training programs on women 
migrant workers’ rights and recruitment agency obligations toward women 
migrant workers; 
• Provide a list of reliable recruitment agencies, and implement accreditation pro-
grams to ensure good practices among recruitment agencies; 
• Establish clear regulations and monitoring systems to protect women migrants, 
including to ensure that recruitment agencies protect women migrant workers’ 
rights, as well as legal sanctions for breaches of the law by recruitment agencies; 
• Safeguard the remittances of women migrant workers; and, 
• Facilitate and ensure the right to return, services to women upon return, and 
other protections.23
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While those rights are specific to female migrants, they arise out of common 
principles also found in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and the Convention 
on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, all ratified by Nepal, as well 
as provisions found in core conventions of the ILO. The ICCPR, for example, explicitly 
prohibits slavery, the holding of persons in servitude or forced or compulsory labor 
(Article 7), as well as prohibits cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment of any person 
(Article 6). The ICCPR also obligates all member countries to provide access to justice, 
namely to ensure an effective remedy when rights are violated, to ensure a determina-
tion of that remedy by a competent adjudicatory body, and to ensure the enforcement 
of any remedies awarded (Article 2(3)).
2.2 Defining and Assessing Access to Justice
“Access to justice” is a large field of inquiry, with numerous competing definitions and 
frameworks. The American Bar Association Rule of Law Initiative, for example, empha-
sizes the importance of institutions in its definition of the concept:
 Access to justice means that citizens are able to use justice institutions to obtain solutions 
to their common justice problems. For access to justice to exist, justice institutions must 
function effectively to provide fair solutions to citizens’ justice problems.24
The World Bank takes a broader development-based view that recognizes social 
and economic injustice. It considers equality, access to decision-makers, and both for-
mal and informal “systems” (rather than institutions) for accessing justice. It defines 
access to justice as: 
 Access by people, in particular from poor and disadvantaged groups to fair, effective and 
accountable mechanisms for the protection of rights, control of abuse of power and resolu-
tion of conflicts. This includes the ability of people to seek and obtain a remedy through 
formal and informal justice systems, and the ability to seek and exercise influence on law-
making and law-implementing processes and institutions.25
This report takes an intermediate position. It reviews both formal and informal 
avenues for accessing justice but pays particular attention to the laws and institutions 
that enable and implement these pathways, as well as to their place in the overall legal 
and institutional frameworks governing migrant labor in Nepal. In addition, it considers 
perceptions regarding the implementation operation of the mechanisms or processes. 
Formal justice systems in this context are defined as civil and criminal justice processes 
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through state-based procedures and institutions. Informal justice systems are mecha-
nisms for resolving disputes that operate outside of state institutions, but not including 
direct negotiation between parties.26
To assess the effectiveness of these mechanisms, the study draws on lists of indi-
cators created by various international institutions to identify a set of core indicators.27 
It then assesses the legal framework and the perspectives of users of each mechanism 
against these indicators. These indicators include:
1) The clarity of the legal framework; 
2) Citizen and institutional actors’ awareness of the mechanism(s) and its proce-
dures; 
3) The accessibility of those mechanisms, in terms of geography, cost, language, 
duration, complexity, need for representation, and other potential barriers; 
4) The fairness of procedures governing access to those mechanisms and due pro-
cess; and, 
5) The perceived justness of outcomes that the mechanism provides. 
As UNDP has outlined, efforts to increase access to justice should focus on 
removing impediments to access, with clear identification of “claims holders” or ben-
eficiaries, and “duty bearers,” as well as an assessment of capacity gaps. It also notes, 
though, that access to justice is, “much more than improving an individual’s access to 
courts, or guaranteeing legal representation. It must be defined in terms of ensuring 
that legal and judicial outcomes are just and equitable.”28 As far as possible, this report 
also highlights the duty bearers of particular rights, the extent to which those actors are 
held accountable by particular mechanisms, and ultimately whether just and equitable 
outcomes are achieved.
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3. Research Methods
3.1 Assessment Locations
The primary research for this study was carried out by the Nepal-based Centre for the 
Study of Labour and Mobility (CESLAM) in 2012 in three districts: Dhanusha, Kath-
mandu, and Tanahun. Additional interviews with key informants were conducted in 
December 2013 and January 2014 to take account of recent policy developments.
Kathmandu is the capital of Nepal and the center for government institutions, as 
well as for most private actors in the field of foreign employment. It is home to almost 
10 percent of Nepal’s population and sends a significant number of migrant work-
ers abroad. It was also a convenient location for conducting interviews because many 
returned migrant workers stay for a period in Kathmandu if they are looking for further 
work or seeking to file a claim.
Dhanusha and Tanahun districts were selected because they sent the most migrant 
workers of all districts in their regions, the Tarai and hills regions respectively, between 
the Nepali years 2063 (2006/07) and 2070 (2010/11). Nepal is commonly divided into 
tarai or flatlands, hill and mountain regions. The Tarai is the most populous and densely 
populated region of Nepal.29 Approximately 6 percent of labor permits were issued to 
workers from Dhanusha district between 2006/7 and 2010/11, although the district 
comprises only 3 percent of Nepal’s population.30 Dhanusha is also an important site 
because, even though it is relatively close to Kathmandu, its largely Madhesi population 
has been historically excluded in respect to political power, economic development, and 
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control of resources. As a result, central government presence is weak and the region 
maintains an active traditional dispute resolution mechanism.
Tanahun district is in the hills region of Nepal (between the Tarai and the Hima-
laya mountain range) and has a long history of migration, including migration for work 
as mercenaries in the Indian and British armies. Tanahun accounts for 2.6 percent 
of the total labor permits issued by the Department of Foreign Employment (DoFE) 
between 2006/7 and 2010/11, though, it constitutes only 1.2 percent of the total popu-
lation.
3.2 Methods
This study primarily relies on qualitative data, examining and seeking to understand 
perceptions of, and experiences with, various justice mechanisms for migrant workers 
in Nepal. It explores common themes emerging from the experiences of participants 
and does not seek to provide comprehensive and definitive quantitative data regarding 
the operation of each of the mechanisms. Such quantitative data is not available and is 
beyond the scope of this study.
Nevertheless, a small component of quantitative research was conducted on a 
sample of claims filed with DoFE and the Foreign Employment Tribunal. In addition, 
the research team conducted extensive desk research into the relevant laws and poli-
cies affecting migrant workers, data on migrant work and migrant workers to the Gulf 
region, and the various justice institutions of Nepal. These sources include laws and 
policies, academic and other secondary literature, and media reports.
Qualitative Methods
The research began with a one-day roundtable held in Kathmandu in April 2012 with 
various experts and stakeholders. The roundtable introduced the project to the partici-
pants and allowed participants to share initial perceptions of both the main pathways 
to justice used by migrant workers and the principal barriers that migrant workers 
faced when seeking redress. The results of the roundtable were used to develop detailed 
interview guides for key informants and migrant workers.
In the following months, the CESLAM research team visited the three locations 
and conducted interviews and focus groups with migrant workers, prospective migrant 
workers, and key informants. In total, 85 people, including 54 migrant workers and 31 
key informants, were interviewed (see T able 2).
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TABLE 2: Categories of Persons Interviewed in Nepal
Category Number
Migrant workers 54
Civil society organization representatives 9
Government officials 12
Recruitment agency staff 5
Lawyers 4
Insurance company staff 1
Total 85
Migrant workers or prospective migrants were limited to those who had:
• Entered the migration process to travel to a Middle East country; and
• Experienced a problem either before departure, in transit or while abroad.
In the three locations, the authors conducted in-depth interviews with 31 migrant 
workers and held focus groups with an additional 27 (4 of whom had also been inter-
viewed). One participant described two separate experiences of her 2 brothers, cre-
ating one additional case. In the interviews, the researchers explored the experience 
of migrant workers while abroad, and actions taken after return. The focus groups 
gave greater attention to pre-departure preparation and workers’ understanding of legal 
rights, including access to justice. 
More than half of the migrants who were interviewed or participated in a focus 
group were based in Dhanusha (36), a quarter in Kathmandu (19), and 3 in Tanahun 
(this number includes the four participants who were repeated in both the in-depth 
interviews and focus groups).31 All individual interviewees were male migrant workers 
(except for 1 female family member of 2 male migrants) as were 18 of the focus group 
participants. Nine female returned migrant workers took part in two focus groups in 
Kathmandu. 
Key informants were heavily concentrated in Kathmandu, where most of the insti-
tutions and agencies associated with migrant labor, and the justice sector, are based. 
They included representatives of civil society organizations who work with migrants, 
lawyers, representatives of government institutions, and representatives of recruitment 
agencies.
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Quantitative Methods
The study includes an examination of a database of 214 cases registered with DoFE. In 
2012, the research team was permitted by DoFE to visit its offices and choose at random 
202 case files, which were then copied and the details entered into a spreadsheet. Since 
the case files at DoFE were not clearly filed or organized, it was not clear whether the 
files pertained to a particular period of time or what proportion of the total number of 
case files they represented. Random selection was accomplished simply by picking up 
files from around the room.
While not necessarily representative of the types of harms suffered by migrant 
workers or prospective migrant workers, the case files provide insight into the types of 
claims filed with DoFE, details of complainants and accused, procedures for processing 
claims, the outcomes of cases, and the functioning and efficacy of DoFE investigation 
and dispute resolution processes. 
The research team was also permitted by the Foreign Employment Tribunal to 
select 12 cases at random, in a similar manner to selection at DoFE. These cases had 
already passed through DoFE investigation so the results are also included with DoFE 
cases (leading to a total of 214 DoFE cases). Though not necessarily representative of all 
cases, the 12 tribunal cases provide a snapshot of the types of cases filed and resolved 
at the tribunal and the types of decisions it makes. 
3.3 Limitations
The data in this study is subject to several limitations. First and foremost, many migrant 
workers perceived the problems they experienced during the migration process as a 
matter of shame for themselves and their families, and thus many were reluctant to go 
into detail. This is particularly the case for women migrant workers, many of whom 
traveled via irregular means, and for whom labor migration itself may be stigmatized. 
Since the focus of the study was more on redress than on the harms experienced by 
migrant workers (so as not to repeat other studies, and to avoid unnecessarily re-trauma-
tizing victims), the researchers did not press questions related to harms. It is therefore 
likely that migrant workers did not share all of the harms they had experienced. Very 
few, for example, mentioned serious abuses involving violence or extreme labor exploi-
tation commonly identified in the media and human rights reports.
Second, the field research was conducted primarily in Nepali and in some cases 
in Maithili, and then translated into English for other members of the research team 
to review. Similarly, English translations of the laws made available at the Nepal law 
commission’s website (lawcommission.gov.np) were used. While all efforts were made 
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to ensure that translations were accurate and complete,32 it is possible that the nuance 
and detail of some accounts were lost. 
Third, factors such as geographical barriers, discrimination based on caste, eth-
nicity, region and religion, and other social and economic considerations continue to 
prevent victims from accessing the justice system.33 The research sites for this study 
were selected in order to reach a cross-section of the population across these factors, 
however it did not analyze the differential impacts of these factors on access to justice. 
This warrants examination in future studies. 
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4. Who Are Nepali Migrant 
 Workers to the Middle East?34
Eligibility to Be a Migrant Worker
According to the Foreign Employment Act 2007:
• Only nationals of Nepal can be registered as “Foreign Workers” (Section 2).
• Migrant workers must be aged 18 or older. It is an offense for a recruit-
ment agency or the government to send a minor abroad for foreign 
employment (Section 7).
• Discrimination on the basis of gender is prohibited when sending workers 
abroad unless an employer requests workers of a particular gender (Sec-
tion 8). Nevertheless, women below the age of 30 are currently prohibited 
from traveling to the Gulf to work as domestic workers, pursuant to a 
decision of the Minister of Labor.35
• The Government of Nepal may make “special facility” for minority and 
disadvantaged groups who “go for foreign employment.” These groups 
include women, Dalits, indigenous groups, “oppressed” persons, victims 
of natural disasters, and those living in remote areas (Section 9(1)). Any 
institution must “provide reservation” to these groups in the numbers 
prescribed by the government (Section 9(2)). 
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4.1 Demographics of Nepali Labor Migrants to the
 Middle East
According to the National Population and Housing Census 2011, the absentee popula-
tion of Nepal is 1,921,494, approximately 7.3 percent of the total population.36 Of those, 
721,791–37.6 percent of the total absentee population—were in the Middle East.37 In 
fiscal year 2012/13, DoFE issued 453,543 labor permits to work abroad (excluding India) 
(see Figure 1), out of which about 63 percent were issued for employment in the Gulf 
States, particularly Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates.38 The remaining 
permits were issued for employment in Malaysia, South Korea, and other countries. 
These official figures do not include the unknown number of individuals who migrate 
for work outside of the official government process (see Irregular Migration be low).
FIGURE 1: Labor Permits Issued in Nepal 2008/09–2012/13
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Based on the 2011 census, the seven districts of Nepal with the highest number of 
absentees are, in descending order: Kathmandu, Jhapa, Morang, Nawalparasi, Rupandehi, 
Kailali and Dhanusa (see Figure 2: Numbers of Persons Absent per District in 2011).39 
Most (six of the seven) districts are located in Tarai. In the aggregate, however, the Tarai 
and Hill regions contribute equally to the total number of labor migrants (about 1.4 
million ea ch).40
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FIGURE 2: Numbers of Persons Absent per District in 2011
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Nepali men are much more likely to travel to a Middle Eastern country than 
women. The national census of 2011 found that 5.2 percent of Nepali men were working 
in a Middle Eastern country compared to only 0.3 percent of women.41 Another study in 
2011 found that migrant workers to the Gulf were primarily from rural areas, and came 
from traditionally excluded populations, including the Tarai Dalits (formerly, considered 
“untouchables”), the Janajatis (indigenous peoples) from the Hill and Tarai regions, or 
from Muslim and other minority communities.42
Nepali labor migrants to the Gulf are not the poorest of the poor; many come 
from the middle class. Migrants to the Gulf are more likely to come from the Eastern 
and Central regions of Nepal, which have the lowest levels of poverty among the various 
regions in the country.43 Migrants from the mid-western and the far-western regions, 
much poorer parts of the country, have overwhelmingly preferred India.44
The World Bank has also found that the second and third richest wealth quintiles 
had the highest proportion of households with a family member working in the Gulf 
(22.1 percent and 17.2 percent, respectively).45 Similarly, Nepalis who travel to the Gulf 
region are more literate than the population as a whole, with the largest proportion hav-
ing at least a secondary education.46 Individuals with minimal education have a higher 
probability of going to India, whereas those with bachelor’s degrees or higher tend to 
migrate to developed countries.47
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Not all labor migrants to the Gulf are comparatively wealthy and well-educated. 
Between 5 and 10 percent of households in the poorest two income and wealth groups 
also send family members to work in Gulf countries.48 Those with lower education and 
income levels are more likely to work in low-wage and poorly protected industries, such 
as manufacturing, construction or domestic work, rather than the service and hospi-
tality sectors.49 Notably, most of the male migrant workers interviewed for this study 
had worked in the construction sector and all of the female migrant workers had been 
domestic workers.
4.2 Female Migrant Workers
As noted above, far fewer Nepali women travel to work abroad than men, including to 
the Gulf. Among registered workers, DoFE issued just 27,713 labor permits to female 
migrants (6.1 percent of all permits) compared to 425,830 permits to male migrants, 
during 2012/13.50 These registered migrants came primarily from the eastern Tarai 
region of Nepal, namely Jhapa district, followed by Sindhupalchowk and Morang.51
Given that many women travel irregularly (see below), the actual number of 
female migrant workers is likely much higher. Nevertheless, census data that tracks 
“absentees” still point to comparatively few women migrating.52 In 2011, 721,791 Nepalis 
were reported by their families as absent from Nepal and working in the Middle East, 
out of which 673,104 were males and only 48,656 (6.7 percent) were females.53
India remains the top destination for women, with Kuwait and the UAE in sec-
ond and third places respectively.54 However, proportionally, women constitute about 
94 percent of the Nepali labor force working in Lebanon.55 Women in countries other 
than India are believed to work in hotels, catering, domestic work and care giving (19 
percent), followed by manufacturing (13 percent) and health and medical services (12 
percent).56
Other studies have suggested a number of reasons for the disparity between 
women and men’s labor migration from Nepal.57 The first is historical, namely that 
men have traditionally migrated for work, for example to British India or into the Brit-
ish armed services, at far greater rates than women. This began to change in the 1990s 
due to democratic changes and a more positive perception of international migration as 
a route to economic development. However, women have significantly fewer resources 
than men (it is estimated that women own land in only 9 percent of Nepali households, 
and only 11 percent of those own both land and house)58 and so have less means to pay, 
or obtain a loan to pay, to migrate. Further, women have significantly lower literacy 
rates and education levels than men in Nepal and, therefore, far fewer have access to 
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skilled or semi-skilled professions.59 Overseas migration of Nepali women also remains 
stigmatized due to clearly defined gender roles and patriarchal perceptions that only 
men should be breadwinners for their families.60
Intensifying these historical and social barriers, legal and policy restrictions on 
women’s migration have contributed to the relatively small number of women migrat-
ing for work, by disincentivizing movement and by excluding women from accessing 
regular migration channels. Until 1998, for example, women were required to obtain 
the consent of their guardian (whether parent, husband or other relative) to travel 
abroad.61 More recently, women’s migration has been banned entirely, or restricted 
to certain women or certain destination countries.62 In 1998, public protest over the 
alleged sexual abuse and death of a Nepali domestic worker in Kuwait resulted in a 
cabinet decision to ban all female migration for work to all Gulf countries as a protec-
tive measure.63 This ban was partially lifted in 2003, and completely lifted in 2010. 
However, two years later in August 2012, the government reinstated restrictions pro-
hibiting women under 30 years of age from working in the Gulf as domestic workers.64 
Other bans on foreign employment in individual countries have also been imposed, for 
example, in 2009 (January to May), the government banned women from travelling to 
Lebanon for domestic work due to the number of reported suicides of Nepali domestic 
workers in that country.65 The Foreign Employment Act 2007 provides for prosecution 
of recruitment agencies that send migrant workers to countries that are not approved 
by the government.66
Migration restrictions have been controversial in Nepal, and while they reduce 
female migration, they do not prevent it.67 A government spokesperson recently justified 
them as necessary to protect women and prevent physical, sexual, and psychological 
abuse of young Nepali female migrant workers in the Gulf countries.68 A number of 
local and international organizations, however, view them as a violation of women’s 
right to freedom of movement. They argue that the bans discriminate against women, 
and rather than offer protection, they in fact stigmatize women’s migration and encour-
age irregular and risky travel via third countries.69
4.3 Irregular Migration
The Government of Nepal regards a “regular” worker as a person with a stamped gov-
ernment-approval labor sticker in his or her passport (see Section 5.2—The Migration 
Process).
Migrant workers who travel outside of the government-mandated system and thus 
do not receive a sticker are considered irregular migrant workers. Common ways of 
becoming irregular include: failing to obtain the required documents and permissions 
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before departure; not leaving through Nepal’s national airport, for example, travelling 
overland to India and then from an Indian airport to the Middle East;70 or using a non-
work visa, such as a tourist visa, to go abroad and then overstaying. 
UN Women estimated in 2013 that of the approximately 3.2 million Nepali work-
ers in countries other than India, half were undocumented.71 Of those, approximately 
90 percent were women,72 and as many as 80 percent of Nepal’s total female migrant 
workers are in an irregular status.73 Scholars have speculated that about 30–40 Nepali 
women travel to the Gulf region daily to work as domestic workers; and most of the 
approximate 20,000–25,000 working in Saudi Arabia alone are working there “ille-
gally”.74 In 2012, DoFE introduced an initiative to register irregular workers when they 
re-entered Nepal while on leave from their foreign employment. In the seven months 
from September 2012 to April 2013, 23,817 individuals, 22,044 males and 1,773 females, 
took advantage of this initiative and regularized their status by obtaining a labor permit 
from DoFE before departing once again.75
Several factors account for the prevalence of irregular labor migration from Nepal. 
For some workers, government requirements, as well as travel to and accommoda-
tion in Kathmandu to meet these requirements, is too expensive. Others believe they 
are traveling regularly, only to find out later that their agent provided them with false 
documents or obtained an incorrect visa. Recruitment agencies may deliberately send 
workers irregularly if the job or worker would be ineligible for government approval 
under Nepali law—for example, if the job pays below the threshold required by the 
Government of Nepal,76 or if the individual is below the age of 18. A male returnee from 
Sinurjoda in Dhanusha district,77 said:
 I first went abroad in 2004, when I was not yet 17 years old. My family was indebted and 
we were struggling to pay the loan back. An agent approached us and said that he would 
help me go abroad. I did not even have my citizenship certificate then. The agent helped me 
prepare one that falsely stated that I was 18 years old. I applied for a passport based on the 
date of birth given in the citizenship certificate.
Migration bans and restrictions, such as those applied to female migrants dis-
cussed in the previous section, restrict the availability of regular pathways and contrib-
ute to the number of irregular migrant workers. 
Workers, particularly women, are exposed to significant risks in transit, as well 
as, in the destination country. Their irregular status then limits their ability to seek 
redress once in the destination country. Two of the nine women who participated in 
focus groups had travelled to the Gulf via India. One travelled to India with her husband 
and arranged all of her documents herself. The other used the services of an agent (see 
Box—Kamala’s Experience).
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Kamala’s Experience of Traveling to Saudi Arabia via India78
A common route for irregular Nepali migrant workers is through India, 
where workers arrange a work permit and visa in a major Indian city such 
as Mumbai. Both, Nepali and Indian, agents appear to provide this service, 
in defiance of government restrictions. Despite the significant risks involved, 
many women migrant workers choose this route because it allows them to 
circumvent migration bans, and may cost less than migrating regularly.
Kamala, a participant in one focus group, shared her experience of traveling 
through India in 2008, a period during which female migration to the Gulf 
was prohibited. At the time, she was 22 years old, and had been a widow 
and mother for seven years. 
I was 22 years old when I decided to go abroad. I thought since two of my older 
brothers had been working in Saudi for the past 12 or 13 years, I would have 
someone there if I ever encountered any trouble. I told no one in my family that 
I was going to Saudi Arabia through India. I set off for Saudi Arabia with my 
agent and three other women from my village. 
My agent had arranged my passport for me, but I did not have any contract 
or any other documents. I was told only verbally that I would be receiving 700 
[Riyal] per month. We went to Pokhara first and then across the border to Dar-
jeeling, in India, and then to Siliguri. We spent two days on a bus and three days 
on a train. At the border the agent pretended he was my brother and I was his 
little sister. He said that the other women were also his relatives and made one 
of the women claim to be my mother. In addition, women who wore traditional 
lungis were made to wear pants. Women, who did not even wear kurtas, were 
made to wear pants and all of us had a good laugh over it.
When we reached Mumbai, we stayed for eight days and were not allowed to go 
anywhere. The agent’s wife was Indian and we stayed with her. We did not speak 
Hindi, and did not understand what was happening around us—when they spoke 
to us we were afraid and hid. We thought we were going to die. I was the only 
one who understood a little bit, but only a little. 
I was able to call my brother, who was already in Saudi Arabia, from Mumbai. 
He was very angry to find out I was in India and was going to Saudi Arabia. 
He said, “I will send you 10,000 rupees and you should go back home at once. 
You don’t have to go abroad.” He told me that many Nepali sisters had faced
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problems in Saudi Arabia and that he, along with his friends, had helped them 
by collecting money to send them back to Nepal. Even after hearing all this, I 
refused to change my mind. I said, “Brother, the whole world is going [to the 
Gulf ]. If I’ll die, I’ll die. If I’ll live, I’ll live. What can I do?”
I worked in Saudi Arabia for two-and-a-half years, but I only received my sal-
ary for the first two months, and just 1000 Riyal, not the 1,400 Riyal promised. 
They gave me very little food and once I did not eat for three days, just stayed 
in my room. Whenever I asked for money to send to my child or my mother my 
employers would tell me that I would be given my pay at the end. They also 
held my passport, did not let me make phone calls, and I was not allowed to 
go anywhere. It was like living inside a prison. My brothers would call and my 
employer would either not pick up the phone or tell them that I was busy and 
could not talk to them.
My agent called once and asked me to send him money I owed him after I 
received my salary. I told him I was not even getting enough food, let alone 
being paid, and that I would put him in jail when I returned. He did not call 
me again. Eventually I was able to call my brothers in secret and they arranged 
for me to return home and paid for my ticket themselves. I never received my 
wages. When I came back, I heard the agent had moved to India with his wife, 
so I could not do anything.
Another factor that contributes to the prevalence of irregular migration is the 
kafala—or sponsorship—system that operates in countries in the Gulf. The kafala system 
links an individual’s immigration status directly to a sponsoring employment agency or 
employer, such that if a migrant worker loses her employment—either because she flees 
the employer or because the employer terminates the contract, closes down or for some 
other reason—she will instantly become irregular in the destination country.79 Migrants 
can also become irregular if they overstay the period of their approved employment and 
their visa and labor permit expire. 
Migrants who fall into an irregular status often face considerable exploitation and 
risk arrest and deportation. Nonetheless, despite their irregular status workers usually 
retain the right to seek redress in the destination country for claims arising from their 
employment. They may be required to stay at the embassy or in an immigration deten-
tion center while pursuing redress, a significant deterrent for many workers. Migrant 
workers who fall into irregular status abroad are also entitled to seek redress upon 
return to Nepal so long as they are able to provide documents such as their contract 
and visa as evidence to support a claim. This evidentiary requirement poses significant 
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practical challenges for many workers who fall into irregular status because employ-
ers confiscate personal documents and workers who leave their employers in distress 
or due to a dispute find it hard to recover their papers. It is also a significant obstacle 
for workers who do not travel abroad through regular channels and do not have the 
required contracts or receipts for payment of fees.

5 1
5. Migration Actors and the
 Migration Process in Nepal
5.1 Key Actors in Nepal’s Foreign Employment Sector
Foreign employment from Nepal is managed by a combination of public and private 
sector actors within Nepal as well as abroad. Public institutions create and oversee the 
regulatory and administrative frameworks, while private businesses and individuals 
are primarily responsible for implementation. Unlike some other countries, Nepal’s 
government does not place migrant workers directly, except to South Korea. It also 
does not directly impart training or orientation to migrant workers, though the gov-
ernment designs the curriculum and licenses the orientation training centers.80 This 
section provides a brief overview of the functions of each main actor in Nepal’s foreign 
employment industry.
Public Institutions
The lead agency on migration for work in Nepal is the Department of Foreign Employ-
ment (DoFE), within the Ministry of Labor and Employment (MoLE) (formerly known 
as the Ministry of Labor and Transport Management (MoLTM), based in Kathmandu. 
DoFE was established by the Foreign Employment Act (FEA) of 2064 (2007) as the gov-
ernment agency responsible for “carrying out functions related to foreign employment” 
(Section 67). This includes licensing of private actors to undertake foreign employment-
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related business, approving recruitment agencies’ applications to recruit workers for 
specific job orders, and approving the departure of each prospective migrant worker. 
It also has an investigations office tasked with receiving complaints against recruit-
ment agencies and agents and for registering eligible cases at the Foreign Employ-
ment Tribunal. The case-handling functions of DoFE and the tribunal are discussed in 
Chapter 8.
In addition to DoFE, the Foreign Employment and Promotion Board (FEPB), is 
charged with promoting foreign employment, and protecting the “rights and interests of 
workers going for foreign employment and [recruitment agencies].”81  The FEPB, estab-
lished under the FEA 2007, is an interagency body chaired by the Minister for Labor 
and Employment. The other members include representatives from related ministries, 
the National Planning Commission, Department of Foreign Employment, Nepal Rastra 
Bank (Central Bank), as well as foreign employment experts, recruitment agency asso-
ciations, skill-orientation training providers, health institutes, trade unions, the Cham-
ber of Commerce, and the Council for Technical Education and Vocational Training.82
To date, the FEPB has assisted the repatriation of stranded workers or workers 
who are deceased or have been injured abroad; instituted a program to compensate dis-
abled workers or the families of deceased workers (discussed in Chapter 8); undertaken 
some safe migration awareness programs; and provided social security and reintegra-
tion services to migrant workers. The FEPB also suggests policy changes to reduce 
foreign employment related fraud. The law sets out a number of other functions and 
programs that come under the authority of the FEPB but most of these have not yet 
commenced, for example broad dissemination of pre-departure information at the vil-
lage level, reducing irregularities in the foreign employment system and conducting 
promotional activities.83
Public institutions in charge of migrant labor are centralized national agencies 
based in Kathmandu. These institutions do not have local branches at either regional or 
district levels. Local government, including District Administration Offices and Village 
Development Committees, do not have any role in the regulation or management of 
foreign employment under the FEA 2007 or 2008 Rules. 
Private Actors
Foreign Employment Businesses (Recruitment Agencies)
Private recruitment agencies facilitate most foreign employment from Nepal, though 
the use of a recruitment agency is not mandatory. For those job seekers who use a 
recruitment agency to find a position, the agency oversees the entire recruitment pro-
cess. In return, the intending migrant worker pays a fee to the agency before departure, 
which is regulated by DoFE. For migrant workers to the Middle East, the maximum fee 
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that can be charged by a recruitment agency is NPR 70,000 (approximately US$ 700).84
Private recruitment agencies are regulated by the FEA 2007 and 2008 Rules. 
The FEA requires recruitment agencies intending to carry out a “foreign employment 
business” to obtain a license from DoFE (Section 11). This requires submission of 
a business plan, evidence that the agency director has at least two years of experi-
ence in foreign employment, and payment of a NPR 3,000,000 (approximately US$ 
30,000) deposit and NPR 20,000 (approximately US$ 200) license fee.85 The 2008 
Rules require the person seeking a license to demonstrate that he or she has not been 
punished for a criminal offense “involving moral turpitude,” and has not been the direc-
tor of an agency whose license was cancelled, but do not require evidence of a clean 
record in recruiting for domestic or foreign employment.
As of April 2013, a total of 769 recruitment agencies were registered in Nepal.86 
Most were headquartered in Kathmandu, although the law permits branch offices 
outside the capital with prior DoFE permission.87 Due to widespread breaches of the 
law (namely recruitment agencies opening branch offices without permission), in late 
2012 the government halted approval of branches. At that time, only 47 branch offices 
belonging to 35 recruitment agencies had been approved and these remain the only 
“legal” branches today.88 DoFE has the power to fine recruitment agencies that open 
unauthorized branch offices and close down those offices, and carries out crackdowns 
from time to time.89
DoFE is also responsible for monitoring recruitment agency conduct and revoking 
or suspending licenses. Suspension may occur following a DoFE finding that an offense 
has been committed under the FEA 2007 and may be for a maximum of six months 
(Section 61(7)). DoFE may revoke a license if it finds that the license was obtained 
fraudulently or the fees or deposit were not paid, or for doing “any act contrary to” the 
FEA 2007 (Section 13), including specific offenses discussed later in this report. The 
revocation of licenses must be made public (Section 78). After a license is revoked it 
cannot be reissued to the same operator (Section 58), and the director of a delicensed 
agency cannot subsequently file for a new license under a different name—but there is 
nothing to stop an agency representative or former director from joining another agency 
in a capacity other than director. The law also does not set up a timetable or procedure 
for conducting monitoring visits.
Employer Institutions
Outside of Nepal, key private actors are placement agencies in the destination coun-
try, referred to under the FEA 2007 as “employer institutions.” The employer institu-
tions are authorized to solicit and place migrant workers for employment, and it is the 
employer institution with whom the migrant worker enters into contracts. The employer 
institution must be “based abroad” and must be “established under the prevailing com-
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panies act to carry on the foreign employment business” (Section 2). This means that 
the employer of a Nepali migrant worker must be overseas and be a registered company 
under the relevant law; individuals cannot act as employment institutions. 
There is very little check or oversight of employer institutions under Nepal’s law. 
For example, it is possible for a Nepali embassy to send information to DoFE that it 
is not appropriate to send workers to a particular employer institution, and such a let-
ter can be grounds for refusing prior approval.90 However, the law does not mandate 
the embassy to verify the existence or reputation of the employer institution, to gather 
information on problematic employers, or to provide such information to DoFE.
Orientation Training Centers
Privately operated training centers provide migrant workers with a government-mandated 
two-day pre-departure orientation program.91 Orientation training centers are licensed to 
give this orientation by DoFE, following a licensing assessment by the FEPB.92 The Direc-
tive on the Licensing and Renewal of Institutions Providing Orientation Training–2013 sets 
out the criteria for a license, including possession of a reasonably sized training space, 
internet access, restrooms, and other facilities.93 Content of the orientation is provided 
by the state (see Chapter 9). The cost of a training license includes a cash deposit of 
NPR 100,000 (approximately US$ 1,000), and license fee of NPR 10,000 (approximately 
US$ 100) for the first year, and NPR 5,000 (approximately US$ 50) each subsequent 
year the license is renewed.94 As of March 2014, 101 institutes were licensed to provide 
the orientation training to departing migrant workers, majority of which were based in 
Kathmandu.
Individual Agents
Private individuals, commonly called agents, also carry out many recruitment-related 
activities as intermediaries between recruitment agencies and potential workers (see 
Section 5.3—The Migration Process for Most Migrant Workers). Recruitment agencies 
interviewed for this report each spoke of working with between 20 and 50 individual 
agents at any one time who identify workers for recruitment and deliver them to the 
agency in Kathmandu for a commission. Individual agents are commonly linked to 
instances of fraud, misrepresentation, overcharging of fees, and other harms suffered 
by migrant workers (see Chapter 6–Harms). 
Nepal has sought to regulate the use of individual agents in two ways, with lim-
ited success. First, it has introduced a licensing and registration system in FEA 2007 
whereby recruitment agencies that wish to use an agent must register the agent with 
DoFE (Section 74(2)). An agent is only permitted to be registered with one recruitment 
agency at a time, and that recruitment agency is then liable for any actions by the 
individual agent.95 The registration process is expensive, however, requiring a deposit 
of NPR 200,000 (approximately US$ 2,000) for each individual agent.96 Registered 
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agents must also be able to read and write Nepali fluently, be able to “explain foreign 
employment related matters to others,” and have no criminal history.97
Second, the FEA 2007 makes acting as an unregistered agent a criminal offense. 
Section 10 categorically prohibits such individuals from “carrying on the foreign employ-
ment business,” and the act imposes punishment on an individual who does so (Section 
43). However, the act does not impose any concomitant penalty on recruitment agencies 
for using unregistered agents, limiting the effectiveness of this prohibition.98
Likely because of the expense of registration and the lack of consequences for 
using unregistered agents, as of June 2013, recruitment agencies had registered only 
290 individuals with DoFE.99 In March 2014, DoFE decided to halt registration because 
of the low numbers and reported fraud in the system—namely, instances of several 
recruitment agencies registering the same individual.100 It plans to recommence reg-
istration when a biometric identification system has been established to prevent such 
fraud.101 The prevalence of unregistered agents and the ability of recruitment agen-
cies to shield themselves from liability through the use of unregistered agents remain 
among the greatest obstacles to creating a transparent, accountable, and protective labor 
migration system. For further discussion of the use of individual agents, see Section 5.3, 
Common Migration Practice for Most Migrant Workers.
Other Private Actors
Other private businesses also operate in the foreign employment sector and interact 
with migrant workers before they depart. These include:
• “Health institutions,” namely companies that prepare required medical examina-
tions and certifications of good health (required per Section 72);
• Specialized skills-training providers that provide workers with particular skills 
required by employers abroad (usually for more specialized trades such as car-
pentry, scaffolding, and plumbing) or required by the government (namely for 
domestic work). 
• Nepali insurance companies that provide life insurance to workers for the period 
of their employment contract (mandatory for all migrant workers under the FEA 
2007).
• Private institutions and individuals that provide financial services to migrant 
workers, including commercial banks, money transfer agencies, savings and 
credit groups, and private moneylenders. Services range from loans to transmis-
sion and investment of remittances. 
Despite the central role each of these actors plays in the facilitation of labor migra-
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tion, other than insurers, none are directly regulated by DoFE under the FEA 2007. The 
law does, however, require that some be recognized and accredited in their field. Skills 
training, for example, must be provided by training centers with accreditation from the 
Council for Technical Education and Vocational Training.102
In respect to medical examinations, four of the Gulf countries namely Bahrain, 
Kuwait, Oman, and Saudi Arabia accept medical reports only from centers affiliated 
with the GCC Approved Medical Centres Association. The recruitment agencies send 
workers to the association-approved office from where they are referred to one of the 
12 medical centers working under it in Nepal.103 The FEA 2007 further requires that, 
if the migrant worker is provided a false medical report and is sent back from the des-
tination country, the medical office that prepared the report must “bear the expenses 
incurred in going for foreign employment and returning to Nepal” (Section 72(2)).
Insurance must be obtained from one of nine private insurance companies autho-
rized by DoFE to provide insurance services to migrant workers.104 For example, Baide-
shik Rojgar Jeevan Beema [Foreign Employment Life Insurance], an insurance scheme 
from National Life Insurance Co. Ltd., provides a minimum of NRS 500,000 in case 
of death of the worker, and covers a “disability risk and body transportation cost” of up 
to NRS 100,000. For more on insurance as a remedy to harms experienced by migrant 
workers see Section 8.4–Compensation in the Case of Death or Disability.
Financing of labor migration is provided to migrant workers by banks as well as 
by individuals. An estimated 74 percent of migrants need to take out loans to pay for 
recruitment fees.105 Migrants who do not own sufficient collateral to obtain a bank loan 
resort to informal channels for money, including family, friends, neighbors, and, in 
many cases, moneylenders.106 Informal moneylenders commonly charge exorbitantly 
high interest rates that place workers under significant and ever-increasing debt from 
the moment they pay recruitment fees in Nepal—a factor that prevents workers from 
leaving or seeking redress for exploitative work conditions, or from challenging pre-
departure irregularities. Amnesty International, for example, found that migrants paid 
anywhere from 15 to 60 percent in interest to moneylenders, as compared to the official 
bank rates of between 8 and 14 percent.107
5.2 Migration Under the FEA 2007
Under the FEA 2007, migrant workers may travel abroad through two pathways: inde-
pendently or with the assistance of a licensed foreign employment business (recruit-
ment agency). Those traveling independently, find their own work in the destination 
country, for example, through a family member or friend already working there. Two 
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of the migrant workers interviewed for this study had found their positions in this 
way. Independent travelers must still obtain DoFE approval for their travel and pay the 
required fees such as the Migrant Welfare Fund charges to the FEPB. The following 
section sets out the steps for placement by a recruitment agency under the FEA 2007.
FIGURE 3: Procedure for Foreign Labor Recruitment by Recruitment Agency, as Set Forth 
Under FEA 2007
Application for license from DoFE
Obtain demand for labor from overseas manpower agency or employer
for certain number and type of workers
Application to DoFE for pre- approval to recruit these workers
Advertisement of the positions
Selection of workers and preparation of documents
Application to DoFE for final approval
Approved workers depart
Recruitment Agency Obtains Overseas Order and DoFE Pre-Approval
Recruitment begins with a licensed recruitment agency in Nepal obtaining an order for 
labor (officially referred to as a “demand letter”) from an overseas employer or man-
power agency. This order requests a certain number and type of workers. The recruit-
ment agency then applies for DoFE “prior approval” to hire workers to fill the order. 
The agency must submit details of the positions, a copy of the demand letter certi-
fied by the Nepali embassy in the destination country, copies of the draft employment 
contract and the draft contract between the worker and the recruitment agency, a copy 
of the agency license, sample job advertisements, and details of the fees that the agency 
will be charging (Section 15(1)).108 Once all of the documents are received, DoFE must 
make a decision within four days (Section 15(2)). 
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Grounds for refusing prior approval include a mismatch between the type of 
workers sought and the nature of the position, a position that is deemed to pose a risk to 
the “dignity, prestige or health” of the workers, and security reasons. A DoFE officer can 
also refuse the application if the documents are inconsistent or if a Nepali diplomatic 
representative in the destination country notifies DoFE that the country or the employer 
is not appropriate to receive workers (Section 15(3)).109
Recruitment Agency Advertises Positions and Selects Workers
Once prior approval is received, the recruitment agency must advertise the positions 
in a national newspaper. The advertisements must be comprehensive, and include a 
description of the terms and conditions of the work, the number of positions, and 
the fees to be charged.110 Any person interested in filling the position must make an 
application to the recruitment agency.111 The recruitment agency must then select the 
applicants “on the grounds of qualification and experience.” Employers or their repre-
sentatives sometimes come to Nepal to interview and select workers.112 The successful 
applicants’ names are published in a list posted at the recruitment agency’s offices and 
submitted to DoFE (Section 17).
Pre-Departure Requirements and Final Approval
Selected workers must complete a number of steps before departure in order to obtain 
a “labor permission sticker,” which indicates final approval for departure. The law does 
not specify who is responsible for arranging these steps, but the recruitment agency 
must demonstrate to DoFE that all the steps have been completed. They include:
• Obtaining a valid work visa;
• Undertaking any required skills-oriented trainings. Individual employers may 
require specific skills, and the government requires a 21-day skills training for 
women planning to work as domestic workers;
• Attending a pre-departure orientation training;
• Receiving a full medical examination and obtaining a clean bill of health;
• Purchasing life insurance;
• Payment of NPR 1,000 (around US$ 10) into the Foreign Employment Welfare 
Fund;
• Signing of contracts between the recruitment agency and worker, and employer 
and worker;
• Paying any recruitment fees to the recruitment agency.113
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The recruitment agency must present to DoFE evidence of all of the above in the 
form of certificates, copies of the passport, visa, contracts, and receipts for insurance 
and recruitment fees (Section 19(1)). If all documents are in order and consistent with 
the information submitted during the pre-approval process, DoFE will place the labor 
permission sticker in the passport of the worker (Section 19(2)).
The number of approvals has been increasing each year since 2007. During the 
first nine months of the fiscal year until mid-April 2013/14, DoFE issued 699,209 pre-
approvals and granted 356,998 final labor permits to migrants to undertake foreign 
employment.114 As discussed in the subsequent chapter, however, it appears that DoFE 
has been granting pre-approval and issuing final labor permits in cases where the con-
tract and other requirements set forth in the act have not been met.
TABLE 3: Pre-approvals and Final Labor Permits Issued by DoFE
Approval/Year 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 
(first nine months)
Pre-approval 369,664 481,723  702,519 699,209
Final Labor Permit 354,716 384,665 453,453 356,998
Source: Department of Foreign Employment
Departure
Approved workers must be sent abroad within the time specified in their contracts, or if 
no time is specified, within three months of the sticker being affixed to their passports 
(Section 20). All migrant workers approved for departure must depart from the national 
airport in Kathmandu. It is illegal to depart from a foreign airport, for example from 
India, without the express permission of DoFE (Section 22). 
5.3 The Migration Process for Most Migrant Workers
Use of Individual Agents
In practice, experts believe that very few migrant workers are recruited via response 
to advertisements for existing positions, particularly those considering low-wage posi-
tions. Reasons given were that most recruitment agencies are based in Kathmandu, 
and potential migrant workers are scattered around the country with limited access 
to national newspapers to view advertisements, and they also do not have time and/or 
financial means to travel to Kathmandu for an interview. Instead, most use the services 
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of an individual agent or agents to identify possible positions and complete required 
documentation.
As a result, Nepal has a thriving and entrenched industry of foreign labor middle-
men and women.115 In this study, 34 out of 54 migrant worker participants reported 
using an individual agent to find their employment, at least on their first journey abroad. 
Another ten did not state whether an individual agent was involved or not. Most of those 
who clearly stated they did not use an individual agent traveled independently through a 
family member or friend already abroad, or they had worked abroad previously and so 
were acquainted with either a recruitment agency or an employer. Nobody mentioned 
using the official government process of applying for an advertised position.
For most participants, the individual agent was someone personally known to the 
migrant worker or someone close to the migrant worker—either a relative or neighbor. 
This is consistent with the findings of other studies, including a 2013 study by The Asia 
Foundation which found that 35 percent of Nepali migrant workers were personally 
acquainted with their individual agent and another 57 percent were introduced to their 
individual agent through a family member, neighbor or friend.116 Consequently, migrant 
workers have great trust in their agents to look after their interests. 
Individual agents inform the prospective migrant workers about potential destina-
tions and positions. Workers explained that they would hand over their passport and an 
amount of money to cover recruitment fees and in the best case scenarios, the agents 
returned with a job in hand and the visa obtained within three months. The migrant 
worker would then travel to Kathmandu for the medical check-up, potentially the ori-
entation and/or skills-training, and final departure. In some cases, a chain of individual 
agents was used, both a local agent and an agent in Kathmandu, and possible others 
in between.
Reasons for and Consequences of Using Individual Agents
Individual agents are able to simplify a complicated and time-consuming process for 
migrant workers by serving as intermediaries, informing potential migrants about avail-
able jobs in particular countries, explaining the terms and conditions of work, arranging 
necessary documentation, including obtaining travel documents, and applying for labor 
permits, and liaising with recruitment agencies in Kathmandu.
Recruitment agencies interviewed for this study also noted several benefits to 
using individual agents as intermediaries with workers. First, agents vouch for the abili-
ties of workers, reducing the risk that a migrant will be unable to perform the relevant 
position. As the director of one recruitment agency noted:117
 We mostly receive CVs through agents; a few also come directly to us. It is better for us if they 
come through agents because they usually know the workers. When an individual comes 
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directly, there is no guarantee of who he is or where he comes from. We have 15–18 agents, 
and we also have branch offices in two places in Jhapa.
Individual agents also attest to the reliability of the migrant worker, lessening 
the risk that the worker might decide against going abroad after the documentation is 
complete and paid for. As another recruitment agency director explained:118
 If workers come independently, it causes problems for us because we do not take any money 
initially. If such a worker does not arrive after his/her visa is approved, that would be prob-
lematic for us. If the worker has come through an agent, the agent is in charge and generally 
there are no cases of workers not going once the process is initiated.
Thus while the law is clear that the process of recruitment should be public and 
transparent, there are strong incentives for recruitment agencies, individual agents, and 
migrant workers to involve intermediaries in recruitment.
At the same time, the use of agents exposes migrant workers to a host of addi-
tional risks. For example, under the individual agent system, prospective migrants are 
required to pay up-front even if no position exists at that time—the agent may simply 
take the money, or may be unsuccessful in finding work for the worker and refuse to 
return the fee. Use of individual agents also leaves migrant workers with very little 
information and control over their migration experience—they have little information 
regarding the correct fees they should be paying, or choosing a reputable recruitment 
agency. The Asia Foundation found in 2013 that in fact half of Nepali returned migrant 
workers did not know if their agent worked for a recruitment agency.119 Each agent in 
the chain will also charge their own commission to the recruitment agency, and ulti-
mately inflate the fees charged to the worker.
Further, because migrant workers are highly dependent on their agents to liaise 
with recruitment agencies on their behalf, they have little opportunity to choose or 
negotiate the terms of their employment abroad, including the country of employment, 
the type of work or the salary. One respondent, a male returnee from Sinurjoda Village 
in Dhanusha District described his experience:120
 I really wanted to go to Malaysia because some of my friends had been working there for 
some years and said they earned very good money there. However, when my agent brought 
back my passport with the visa stamp, he informed me that the visa was for Saudi Arabia. I 
could not say no because the agent had already brought the visa and cancelling that would 
mean additional expense.
Individual agents may also provide workers with fake or forged documents, expos-
ing the worker to potential criminal charges and to all of the other problems associated 
with irregular status. 
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For all of these reasons, many of the stakeholders interviewed in this study viewed 
the individual agent system as an exacerbating factor or cause of many of the problems 
experienced by migrant workers throughout the migration cycle. 
5.4 Summary
Nepal’s foreign employment sector involves several public institutions and a broad 
range of individual and institutional private actors who profit from the recruitment 
and placement of workers abroad. The FEA 2007 regulates many of these private actors 
and allows for the imposition of sanctions, but the monitoring oversight provisions are 
relatively weak. This makes migrant workers, many of whom have little information 
or control during the recruitment process, vulnerable to a wide range of harms, as 
discussed in the next chapter. 
6 3
6. Abuses and Labor Violations
 Experienced by Nepali Migrant
 Workers
Labor migration from Nepal, especially for low-wage workers, is notoriously high-risk. 
Comprehensive information about the frequency of various types of harms is unavail-
able—the government does not collect this data and no large-scale quantitative studies 
have been conducted to examine the prevalence and frequency of harms. Nevertheless, a 
number of qualitative studies have documented the wide range of abuses and labor vio-
lations Nepali migrant workers regularly experience, particularly when migrating into 
low-wage and poorly regulated industries such as construction and domestic work.121 
These occur at all stages of the migration process, including before departure, in transit, 
and in the country of work.
While it is beyond the scope of this study to fully document the nature and extent 
of abuses that occur during the process of migration, the experiences reported by study 
participants reflect the range of harms Nepali migrant workers suffer more generally, 
and are broadly consistent with other studies in this field.122 Those harms are described 
here to provide context for evaluating the effectiveness of Nepal’s laws, policies, and 
practices in ensuring workers’ rights in relation to the common harms, and the mecha-
nisms in place to enforce laws and to provide redress.
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6.1 Harms Experienced Pre-Departure
Half (27) of the 54 migrant workers participating in this study reported experiencing a 
problem during the recruitment and placement process. Their experiences, supported 
by the opinions of other stakeholders, suggest that pre-departure harms, including 
fraud, misrepresentation and outright theft, are systematic and widespread in Nepal, 
as reflected across various studies by both Nepali and international human rights orga-
nizations. Other common pre-departure harms include: excessive fees; delayed or can-
celled departure; contracts and required documentation not provided in time or at all; 
or contracts not provided in Nepali.
Excessive Fees
One of the most common harmful practices reported by migrant workers was over-
charging of recruitment fees. Fourteen of the 54 migrant worker participants in this 
study were charged fees above the government mandated maximum amount of NPR 
70,000 (approximately US$ 700) for employment in the Gulf countries.123 Many other 
migrants believed they had paid more but could not be sure because they were asked 
to pay a number of smaller amounts over several months and did not receive receipts. 
Only four stated having paid less than the government stipulated maximum, though 
these workers had gone abroad prior to DoFE’s fee-setting notice in December 2010. 
The highest amount demanded by an agent was NPR 500,000124 (approximately 
US$ 5,000) and the highest amount paid by a migrant was NPR 400,000 (approxi-
mately US$ 4,000).125 In several cases, the migrant was forced to sign a receipt that 
stated that the worker paid only the amount allowed under law, which did not reflect 
the actual fees charged, making it difficult to prove the worker had been overcharged. 
Consistent with the experiences documented in this study, Amnesty International 
found in 2011 that 42 out of 57 workers interviewed had been charged fees above the 
maximum permitted by Nepali law.126 To pay these fees, many migrant workers take 
out loans, often from unapproved moneylenders as noted in the previous chapter, at 
exorbitant rates of interest.127
The illegal overcharging of fees, non-transparency of fees, and associated high-
interest debt places migrant workers in a particularly vulnerable position. The mag-
nitude of these debts leaves workers feeling trapped and unable to refuse a position 
pre-departure or demand a higher salary, ultimately contributing to situations of coerced 
employment.128 It also makes workers less likely to challenge exploitative or harmful 
working conditions or wages less than the agreed salary once abroad because of a fear 
of being terminated, creating conditions for debt bondage.129
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Delayed or Cancelled Departure and Theft of Fees
In most cases, the worker took out a loan and paid purported recruitment fees on the 
promise that a position would be arranged within a few months. However, in many 
cases the employment did not begin until much later than promised, in some cases up 
to a year later, if at all. During that time, interest was accruing on the debt the worker 
had assumed. As one interviewee from Sinurjoda, Dhanusha, recalled:
 I gave my passport to an agent. He said that he would give it to a recruitment agency and 
would inform me as soon as possible but he didn’t come back. Six months passed but I never 
heard back from him. I had also given him NPR 100,000 when I handed him my passport. 
The interest rate was 3 percent per month (36 percent per annum) and my debt was increasing 
day-by-day. One day I finally got hold of him and we had an argument. Then I was sent abroad.
Eight prospective migrant workers interviewed were never sent abroad at all and 
the agent never returned the fees they had paid.
Contracts and Other Required Documentation Not Provided or Provided 
Late
Written contracts notify prospective workers of the terms and conditions of employment 
to enable them to make an informed decision about whether to accept the position. 
Those contracts also subsequently serve as critical evidence of the parties to the agree-
ment, and the agreed terms of the employment, that enables workers to seek redress 
for work conditions or wages different from those agreed pre-departure. The contracts 
reviewed for this study, and the experiences recounted by the workers interviewed, 
revealed that contracts and other documentation were incomplete, provided late, or not 
provided to workers at all.
The FEA 2007 and the 2008 Rules are ambiguous regarding the contracts to 
be provided to the worker (discussed in greater detail in Chapter 7) but the authors 
of this report assume, based on legal advice, that two contracts are required for each 
worker—one between the migrant worker and her recruitment agency (the recruitment 
contract), and one between the migrant worker and her overseas employer (the employ-
ment contract). Not a single migrant worker, however, reported receiving a recruitment 
contract and experts were unaware of such contracts being provided. These migrant 
workers thus had no record of the recruitment agency’s identity and contact details or 
its obligations toward him or her.
Employment contracts were given more regularly, but still only 17 of the 54 work-
ers included in this study mentioned an employment contract. Those that did receive 
one were usually handed the contract by the individual agent at their hotel in Kath-
mandu or at the airport immediately before departure. Only five workers received their 
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employment contract several days before departure with enough time to read and con-
sider the contents, and only three received them at the recruitment agency where they 
could discuss the terms and conditions directly with the agency and ask questions. 
Most of the contracts received by workers were not in Nepali, as required, but in 
English and Arabic which many workers could not understand. A male returnee from 
Dhanusha, said:130 
 The agent and the recruitment agency told me that I would work in a Saudi hotel and the 
company would pay me 700 Riyals, including lodging and food. However, I saw my contract 
only at the airport gate and as I could not read in English, I did not know what it contained. 
Upon arrival, I found I was to work on a farm. I had to take care of a large number of animals 
including camels, dogs, donkeys, and goats. Also, the agent in Saudi Arabia handed me over 
to a kafeel [employer-sponsor], who said that I would get only 400 Riyals for working on the 
farm. My fellow workers who worked there for several years told me that the kafeel would 
pay the total sum at the end of 3 or 4 years. He never paid me anything. Therefore, after 
three months, I ran away to a different employer.
Note that even the Nepali requirement is insufficient for those workers who speak 
one of the 61 other languages in Nepal.
On reaching the destination country, other problems emerged with documents 
obtained in Nepal. Some found that their visa and work permit or their medical cer-
tificates had been falsified by their agent in Nepal. Workers in those situations may be 
forced to incur considerable extra cost—in both expenses and time—to obtain official 
documents before working, or could be forced to return home.
An Analysis of Sample Employment Contracts
The research team obtained 12 sample employment contracts in the course 
of the study. Some of these contracts were provided by a worker who had 
returned from abroad, some by workers about to depart, and others by 
recruitment agencies interviewed.131 In the latter case, the contracts had 
been approved by DoFE before granting a final work permit, but were not 
necessarily the contract received by the worker. The contracts were on the 
letterhead of either the employer or the manpower agency in the destination 
country.
In general, the contracts met the minimal Nepali legal requirement of setting 
out the terms and conditions of employment, including remuneration. They 
specified employment for a two-year period, free food, and accommodation, 
and guaranteed medical care and insurance. The contracts reviewed were for
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jobs as a taxi driver, cleaner, laborer, tile maker, tailor, and security guard, 
and these positions were clearly stated in the contract. Nevertheless, these 
sample contracts—all of which had been reviewed and approved by DoFE—
were deficient in several respects.
• Four of the contracts were prepared in English and Arabic, while the 
remaining eight contracts were in English only. None of the contracts 
were in Nepali as required.
• Most of the contracts (all of those in English) were less than one page, 
and while they described in clear and simple language the salary and 
conditions, they did not include key information regarding what would 
happen in the event of a breach of the contract by either party, dispute 
resolution or annual leave.132
• Seven of the 12 contracts were undated, and none clearly stated the 
commencement date of employment. This leaves open the possibility of 
delayed employment, preventing workers from being able to plan their 
departure and loan repayments, and leaving workers without enforceable 
rights under the contract when employment did not commence within 
the time frame initially promised by the individual agent/agency. 
• All contracts but two were ambiguous about the place of work. Although 
the country of employment could be identified by the letterhead and 
reference to the applicable law, only two contracts specified the name 
and location of the employer. This ambiguity leaves the workers without 
an enforceable contractual right when sent or moved to a place of work 
different from that initially promised by the individual agent or agency. 
• None of the contracts but one prohibited the employer/manpower 
agency from transferring the worker to another location.133
• The contracts did not contain clear guidance for the workers on how to 
resolve disputes with an employer. All contracts specified that any dis-
putes would be resolved by the labor law of the country of work. Only one 
contract had a more specific dispute resolution clause—namely that any 
complaints made by the employee are the responsibility of the Nepali 
recruitment agency (although the recruitment agency was not party to 
the agreement, calling into question the enforceability of that provision).
• Apart from the one example above, the Nepali recruitment agency was 
not referenced in the agreements and was not a party to any agreement. 
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• Only one contract, for work in Saudi Arabia, had a termination clause. 
That clause only addressed what would happen if the employee “refused 
to work”—he would have to return to Nepal at his own expense. It did 
not mention under what circumstances the worker could terminate the 
contract.
DoFE’s approval of those contracts held by returned or departing migrant 
workers, despite their failure to meet the requirements of the FEA 2007, 
is a matter of concern and suggests insufficient review before giving final 
approval for workers to depart.
Furthermore, the review raises an additional concern that foreign labor per-
mits are being issued without evidence that the prospective employee has 
seen or reviewed the contract. Only five of the eleven contracts stamped by 
DoFE were signed by the prospective employee. In all other cases only the 
employer had signed, or no one had signed. In two cases, the contract was 
blank with a list of ten or more workers and their salaries attached in a table. 
It could be that some of the employment contracts reviewed by DoFE were 
never seen by the migrant worker at all.
6.2 Harms Occurring in Transit
Some workers encounter problems while in transit from Nepal to their employment 
destination. These harms principally include lack of freedom of movement during tran-
sit, being stranded in a transit location, or being abandoned in the destination country 
before employment commences. 
These problems are particularly acute for migrant workers sent abroad outside 
the regulated channels by individual agents or recruitment agencies. The workers, most 
frequently sent through India, are highly controlled during their transit by handlers who 
are not necessarily the original agents. Verité reported migrants being held in hotels, 
not allowed visitors and not permitted to leave their room except to eat at a specified 
restaurant, and being constantly monitored by hotel owners at the behest of individual 
agents.134
On arrival in the destination country, even those workers who went through legal 
channels were sometimes not met by an agent or employer. Verité reported workers 
waiting in airports without money for up to several days.135 Similarly, a worker inter-
viewed for this study who had traveled to Qatar believing he would work as an electri-
cian explained:
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 The agent in Nepal had given [me] the number of the agent in Qatar. I called him upon 
arrival at the Qatar airport. It was evening. He said that he would come to collect me in the 
morning. I again called him in the morning and he said he would come in the evening. I 
stayed there for two days before he came to collect me.136
A number of cases reported to DoFE (see Section 8.1 on DoFE below) also 
described recruitment agencies defrauding migrant workers by leaving them stranded 
in a transit country. Among the 214 case files reviewed as part of this study, was a case 
of 21 migrants who alleged that the recruitment agency had left them stranded in Delhi 
and Tanzania.137 In another case, several migrant workers filed claims against recruit-
ment agencies for leaving them stranded in Bangkok, when they believed they were 
travelling to Canada.138
6.3 Harms Occurring in the Destination Country
The harms experienced by Nepali migrant workers in the Gulf have recently been the 
subject of much media attention, particularly the experiences of Nepali construction 
workers in Qatar.139 These harms range from labor violations such as non-payment or 
delayed payment of wages and long working hours, to more serious physical and psy-
chological harm (see Figure 4). The vulnerability of migrant workers to harm is often 
attributed to the kafala system by which a migrant worker is bonded to a sponsor (kafeel) 
and thus has limited avenues to challenge poor conditions without threat of unemploy-
ment and automatic deportation.
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FIGURE 4: Problems Faced Abroad by 43 Migrant Worker Study Participants 
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Labor Violations 
Common problems reported by workers interviewed for this study included: 
excessive working hours; wages lower than the stipulated salary; and failure to pro-
vide promised leave-days or food and accommodation. Workers also reported that their 
employers failed to provide them with medical services when they were sick and injured, 
or refused to reimburse medical expenses as had been promised in the contract. Along 
with violations of the contract, these harms may also have violated national labor laws 
in the destination country (although note that domestic workers are not covered by labor 
laws in most countries in the Middle East).
Of the 43 returned migrants interviewed for this study, 30 said they encountered 
conditions different from those promised pre-departure. In most cases, the employer 
simply did not abide by the terms of the contract signed in Nepal, but in some cases 
workers reported substitution of the contract with an entirely new agreement upon 
arrival in the destination country. Some migrants refused to take up the work offered 
in the destination country and came home as soon as possible. Others felt compelled to 
work regardless of the conditions because of the debt they owed in Nepal. 
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Confiscation of Documents
Another common set of problems in the destination country involved the workers’ docu-
ments. Around half of all workers interviewed who had reached the destination country 
(27 of the 43) had their passports confiscated by their employer upon arrival. Migrants 
in general believed confiscation was a common practice, and did not realize how prob-
lematic it was until they sought to retrieve their documents. One of the migrants said:
 They take away our passports as soon as we reach [the destination country]. They instead 
issue us an iqama [residence permit]. Whenever we have to go out, the iqama serves as the 
valid document that contains details such as our name, the employer company, our nation-
ality, our visa, and other things. They do not allow us to keep our passport with us because 
they are afraid we would run away from the company. In some cases, they do not even give 
our passports back to us when we complete our contracts.140
In one case, the agent in the destination country stole the worker’s passport and 
used it to travel back to Nepal, leaving the worker without any documents. 
Deaths
A highly publicized, and very serious, harm suffered by some Nepali migrant workers 
abroad is loss of life. The number of deaths of migrant workers abroad has increased 
over the years as the number of migrant workers has increased (See Figur e 5). 
FIGURE 5: Total Number of Deaths of Nepali Workers Abroad Reported to the FEPB
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Source: Foreign Employment Promotion Board
In both 2011/12 and 2012/13, the largest compensation claims for deaths abroad 
were from families of workers who died in Malaysia, followed by Saudi Arabia, and then 
Qatar.141 In 2013 alone, at least 185 Nepalis were reported to have died while working 
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in construction in Qatar.142 The government’s own figures record 151 workers dying in 
Qatar that year (See Table 4).143 An unknown number of other workers may have died 
but their cases were not reported to the FEPB, either because the family was unaware of 
the FEPB’s compensation scheme or the worker was undocumented and thus ineli gible.
The leading cause of death in cases submitted to the FEPB is cardiac arrests. 
Some argue that cardiac arrest is made more likely by unsafe working conditions on 
large construction projects, such as being forced to work in excessive heat or without 
appropriate safety precautions. For women migrant domestic workers, suicides are the 
leading reported cause of death, followed by deaths occurring when domestic workers 
attempt to flee terrible working conditions and abusive employers.144
TABLE 4: Nepali Migrant Worker Deaths by Country and Cause 2012/13
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1. Malaysia 14 11 4 34 12 2 0 176 251 2 253
2. Saudi 
Arabia
4 70 80 17 3 17 0 14 205 0 205
3. Qatar 81 5 0 15 4 4 2 40 151 0 151
4. U.A.E 13 6 7 3 4 2 0 12 46 1 47
5. Kuwait 0 5 0 3 7 0 0 7 17 5 22
6. South Korea 2 1 1 3 1 0 0 6 14 0 14
7. Bahrain 0 3 7 1 0 2 0 1 14 0 14
8. Oman 0 1 4 1 0 0 0 1 7 0 7
9. Lebanon 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 2 3
10. Japan 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 0 2
11. Israel 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 2 1 3
12. Russia 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 2 0 2
13. Sri Lanka 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
14. Italy 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
15. Afghanistan 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1
Total 116 103 106 81 32 26 2 259 715 11 726
Source: Foreign Employment Promotion Board
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Other Physical Harm
Female migrants who worked in private homes were particularly vulnerable to abuse 
by their employers and were unable to enlist help from friends and co-workers because 
of their isolation.145 The male migrant workers interviewed for this research primarily 
described experiencing labor law violations while most female workers reported verbal 
and physical abuse at the hands of their employer, usually for perceived “mistakes” by 
the worker. In some cases, the employer accused the worker of criminal behavior as a 
form of punishment. Abuse and/or accusations of wrongdoing were reported in 7 of 
the 43 cases examined in this research. In one case, a female worker alleged that her 
agency in the destination country (the employer institution) committed serious criminal 
abuse against other women placed by the agency, including wage theft, beatings, and 
torturing women who attempted to run away by pulling out their fingernails. One study 
estimated the ratio of female migrant workers who face abuse and illness compared to 
male migrant workers, irrespective of the country of destination and sector of work, as 
67:40.146
Isolation and Powerlessness Abroad
All of the statements given by migrant workers revealed a precarious existence in the 
country of work with little information, bargaining power or control over their environ-
ment. Many described being moved by their kafeel from location to location, consistently 
demanding to be paid but being ignored, and having little sense of what the future 
held or how to improve their situation. Some took action to protest non-payment of 
wages such as industrial action, or in the domestic sphere locking oneself in a room, 
but these actions were largely unsuccessful, and invariably resulted in the worker being 
deported or otherwise punished. Others found their own work, but this presented its 
own challenge as the worker was then undocumented and faced new problems includ-
ing susceptibility to detention and deportation. 
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Meena’s Experience
I worked in Kuwait and I suffered a lot there; I changed a number of houses. The 
first house I worked in I stayed for ten days before they returned me back to my 
agent. The second house I was sent to had another Nepali woman and we used 
to work together. There were about four young daughters in the house. One day 
there was a fight and the Nepali woman called me upstairs but the employer 
prevented me from going up to see her; they locked me in a room downstairs 
from where I called my agent. I don’t know what happened to the Nepali woman 
after that, my agent took me out. After that my agent sent me to another house 
where I worked for a while, but my employers would lock me in the house when 
they went on vacation. Once the building caught fire and I was locked in the 
apartment and had to be rescued by the police. When my employers returned 
I refused to work for them and I was sent back to my agent again. My agent 
promised to put me to work in another household and I stayed in the office for 
about 15 days, but after that they refused to give me any food and my agent 
disappeared. I then found my own work but it did not work out. A woman from 
Mumbai helped me to find work as a tailor, but the police caught me and I was 
put in prison, and then they sent me back to Nepal.147
Attribution of Responsibility for Harm
The migrant workers in this study invariably blamed pre-departure and in-transit harms 
on the individual agent with whom they had direct contact. In all cases it was unclear 
whether the individual agent was registered or unregistered. It was also unclear whether 
the individual agent was acting at the behest of a recruitment agency, and if so, which 
recruitment agency. The worker rarely if ever came into contact with the recruitment 
agency and so was unaware of the recruitment agency’s part in any harm suffered. In a 
number of cases, the migrant worker did not even know which recruitment agency had 
sent him or her. In other cases, the harms occurred before the migrant worker had been 
linked to a recruitment agency, for example where the individual agents had absconded 
with the recruitment fees that the migrant workers had paid upfront. 
In respect to harms encountered abroad, migrant workers also blamed their 
agents and recruitment agencies for misleading them about the terms of the work, but 
they also held their employers responsible for not abiding by the terms of the contract. 
In a small number of cases, as in the case above, workers identified the manpower 
agency in the destination country as the main perpetrator.
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Becoming Irregular 
Upon arriving in the Gulf, many workers found that the work was not what 
their agents had promised—the conditions were different, the type of work 
was different, and the salary was invariably lower. Although most migrants 
chose to accept these inferior conditions, some refused and left their 
employer. Others were forced to leave due to their position being terminated 
or the company shutting down. 
As soon as a worker left a sponsor, he or she became an irregular migrant in 
the country of destination. Working irregularly arguably gave workers more 
independence and ability to choose their work, but they were also more 
vulnerable to destitution, arrest, and deportation. A male returnee from Dha-
nusha District described the experience of working without papers in Saudi 
Arabia:
I worked on a farm in Saudi Arabia for my kafeel for two months. My kafeel 
used to scold and beat me and never paid me for my work. With the help of three 
friends, I ran away from there at two in the morning. Since my passport was 
with the kafeel, I began working illegally doing any work that came my way. I 
worked as a painter, an electrician, a manual laborer, and so on for three years.
As soon as my new employers found out that I was working illegally, they would 
stop paying and would threaten to call the police if I insisted on payment. I 
never worked for more than three months in any place. I was paid very little, 
only 50-100 Riyals per month, which I usually spent on accommodation. I used 
to eat very little because I could not afford more on my earnings. If I managed 
to save any money, the police used to take my savings when they arrested me—
they would keep me in the police station overnight and then set me free. I never 
managed to save any money.148

7 7
7. Laws Relevant to Foreign
 Employment
7.1 Nepal’s Legal System
Nepal has a unique hybrid legal system that combines a Hindu legal tradition with 
aspects of civil law from Europe as well as a strong common law influence from neigh-
boring India since 1950.149 For example, Nepal has a civil code based on the Napoleonic 
system that incorporates Hindu rules about treatment of members of different castes. 
At the same time, it has an adversarial judicial system based on the British common law 
system, which, among other things, allows courts to create binding precedent through 
their decisions. 
At the time of writing, due to ongoing post-conflict transition, Nepal’s government 
was operating under an interim constitution from 2007 (The Interim Constitution of 
Nepal, 2063 (2007)). A new constitutional assembly, elected in 2013, had begun the 
task of drafting a permanent constitution. Pending a new constitution, drafting of new 
or amended legislation has largely been suspended since 2008. 
Protections against many of the harms described by migrant workers in the previ-
ous chapter, particularly those experienced in Nepal, are included in the domestic legal 
framework, whether in the constitution, legislation, and subordinate rules. Interna-
tional treaties that Nepal has signed and ratified also contain a number of protections 
for migrant workers both at home and abroad. These sources of rights and the nature 
of those obligations are described below.
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The Interim Constitution of Nepal, 2063 (2007)
The Interim Constitution came into force on January 15, 2007, as a frame-
work to facilitate the transition from a unitary constitutional monarchy to 
a federal republic. As of early 2014, the first and then second constituent 
assemblies created under the Interim Constitution had not yet agreed on a 
new constitution, so the Interim Constitution continues to apply. It is the 
law of the land and laws inconsistent with the constitution are considered 
void, to the extent of the inconsistency.
Part 3 of the Interim Constitution contains “Fundamental Rights.” Rights 
relevant to access to justice for migrant workers include:
• The Right to Equality, including equality before the law and equal protec-
tion of the laws (Article 13(1)).
• The right to freedom from discrimination, on grounds of religion, race, 
caste, tribe, sex, origin, language or ideological conviction (Article 13(2));
• The right to employment and social security (Article 18);
• The right of women to not be discriminated against merely for the fact 
of being a woman (Article 20);
• The right of indigent people to free legal aid, in accordance with the law 
(Article 24(10);
• The right to obtain information of any matters of his/her own or of public 
importance (Article 27);
• The right against exploitation including trafficking, slavery, serfdom or 
any form of forced labor (Article 29);
• The right to a constitutional remedy by bringing a case in the Supreme 
Court, for the enforcement of any rights contained in Part 3 of the 
Constitution.
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7.2 The Foreign Employment Act 2007 and Foreign
 Employment Rules 2008
The principle law pertaining to migrant workers is the Foreign Employment Act (FEA) 
2007. This act was passed after considerable international and domestic civil society 
lobbying and replaced the Foreign Employment Act 1985 and its subsequent amend-
ments. It is supplemented by the Foreign Employment Rules 2008 (the 2008 Rules).
According to its preamble, FEA 2007 is intended to “make foreign employment 
safe, managed and decent, and to protect the rights and interests of both the workers 
who go for foreign employment and [recruitment agencies].” The law creates a new 
framework for regulating labor migration; it identifies the functions and responsibilities 
of various government agencies and private parties; sets forth administrative require-
ments for recruitment agencies; and creates an oversight and monitoring system. 
Although much of the act is directed at regulation of the foreign employment 
industry, it does include some provisions that specifically address protection of migrant 
workers from abuse and exploitation, and that are intended to establish transparency 
within labor migration procedures. It also includes protections against discrimination 
and child labor, including:
• A prohibition against sending a minor (defined as any person under the age of 
18) abroad for employment (Section 7);
• A prohibition against gender discrimination in the course of “sending workers for 
foreign employment,” unless an employer requests a specific gender (Section 8);
• A requirement that foreign employment institutions “provide reservation to 
women, Dalit, indigenous nationalities, oppressed classes, backward areas and 
classes, and people of remote areas” in numbers that the government may pre-
scribe (Section 9);
In addition, the act contains several provisions that, if effectively implemented 
and enforced, could provide workers with significant pre-departure protections within 
the migration process:
• Protection from confiscation of personal documents by Nepali recruitment agencies—if 
a recruitment agency wishes to hold the passports of migrant workers before their 
departure, it must seek government approval (Section 18). Criteria for granting or 
withholding approval are not specified. Note that this only applies in Nepal and 
does not prevent “employer institutions” from confiscating a worker’s documents 
once the worker arrives in the destination country.
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• Protection from delayed departure—recruitment agencies are required to send work-
ers abroad within the period described in the contract, or within three months of 
obtaining departure approval from the government if no period is specified. If the 
departure does not occur as above, the agency must reimburse any fees paid by the 
worker together with 20 percent per annum interest within 30 days (Section 20(2)).
• Protection from changed conditions prior to departure—if the worker decides not to 
depart because the terms and conditions of work are different from those adver-
tised by the agency and approved by the government, the recruitment agency 
must refund all fees paid by the worker, including the visa fee (Section 20(3)). 
• Protection against abuses at the hands of an unlicensed agent or agency—if an unli-
censed recruitment agency (Section 44) or individual agent (Section 43) either 
sends a migrant worker abroad, or fails to do so after taking money from the 
worker, the perpetrator is required to compensate the worker for all expenses the 
worker incurred, including all fees charged, as well as an additional 50 percent of 
fees paid.150 If a worker has already traveled, the agent must also repay expenses 
of travel.
• Right to an employment contract and a recruitment contract in Nepali—Before depar-
ture, the worker must sign a contract between the worker and the employer or its 
agent, setting forth the terms and conditions of employment.151 The recruitment 
agency must translate the contract into Nepali,152 and must ensure the worker 
understands the “terms and conditions and provisions of remuneration” before 
signing (Section 25). The recruitment agency must also sign a contract between 
itself and the worker.153 The recruitment agency must present a “copy of the con-
tract to be made between the employer institution and workers,” and “a copy of 
the contract to be made between the licensee [recruitment agency] and workers,” 
to DoFE prior to approval to send workers for foreign employment (Sections 15(g) 
and (h)), and prior to obtaining the permission for the individual worker(s) to 
travel (Sections 19(d) and (e)). The recruitment agency must provide two copies to 
DoFE, which must certify them and return one copy of the contract to the worker 
(Section 25(2)).154
• Insurance—Before departure, the recruitment agency must purchase insurance 
for the worker covering death or mutilation during the period of employment 
(Section 26). For more detail on insurance protection, see Section 8.4.
• Orientation Training Requirement—Before departure, all prospective migrant 
workers must attend an orientation training (Section 27).155 Under the 2008 rules, 
this must cover topics such as occupational health and safety, the laws of Nepal 
regarding foreign employment, and information about destination countries.156
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• Protection from over-charging—If a recruitment agency charges fees above the gov-
ernment–prescribed maximum, the agency must return the excess fees to the 
migrant worker and is subject to a fine (Section 53).
• Protection if employment differs from the contract—If the work in the destination 
country differs from the terms set out in the contract, the worker can at a mini-
mum receive a return of recruitment fees (Section 36). If the worker can prove 
intent to mislead on the part of the recruitment agency, he or she can recover the 
“shortfall in facilities or remuneration,” and the recruitment agency can be pros-
ecuted (Section 55). These provisions are discussed in more detail under Section 
8.1 Department of Foreign Employment. 
The DoFE and the Foreign Employment Tribunal, both created by the FEA 2007, are 
responsible for enforcing the above protections.
7.3 Human Trafficking and Transportation (Control) 
 Act 2007
In 2007, Nepal also passed a Human Trafficking and Transportation (Control) Act, (the 
HTTCA), which prohibits the two activities of “trafficking” and “transportation.”157 The 
HTTCA does not preclude prosecution under other legislation, and it is possible to 
bring claims involving labor migration under the HTTCA, as well as the FEA.
The offenses under the HTTCA are ambiguous regarding trafficking for labor 
exploitation. The offense of “trafficking” primarily addresses prostitution and sex-traf-
ficking related crimes.158 It does, however, also include the act of “buying or selling a 
person for any purpose” (akin to slavery), which could potentially include cases of labor 
trafficking within Nepal or internationally.159
The “human transportation” provision of the HTTCA also could be interpreted to 
cover migrant workers who are recruited and sent abroad for foreign employment by 
means of fraud or other acts of deception or coercion. The offense of “human transpor-
tation” includes “tak[ing] a person out of the country for the purpose of buying and sell-
ing” the person; or taking a person by any means, including among others, “enticement, 
inducement, misinformation, forgery, tricks, coercion” and taking the person to any 
place in Nepal or abroad, or handing the person over to someone else “for the purpose 
of prostitution and exploitation.”160 This offense, broader than trafficking, aligns more 
closely with the United Nations definition of trafficking.161
Advantages of using the HTTCA include a right to confidentiality (Section 5(b)), a 
shifting of the burden of proof from the worker to the accused to prove that the offense 
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did not occur (Section 9), a right to have a lawyer present (Section 10), and considerably 
higher penalties than under the FEA 2007. The offense of buying and selling a person 
attracts a punishment of 20 years imprisonment, and a fine of NPR 200,000 (Section 
15(1)(a)). The offense of human transportation for labor exploitation attracts a prison 
term of seven to ten years (Section 15(1)(g)). Furthermore, the prosecution can move 
forward on the basis of a court certified statement by the victim, and the victim need 
not appear in court following the taking of the certified statement (Section 6).
Trafficking cases are investigated by police and prosecuted in district courts. More 
information about using the HTTCA is set out in Section 8.3—Courts. 
7.4 Civil Code of Nepal (Muluki Ain)
Nepal’s Civil Code, essentially a combined civil and penal code, was most recently 
updated in 1963 and draws from Hindu legal principles as well as civil law principles 
of continental Europe.162 A recent draft criminal code includes a much wider range of 
offenses, including against children and women, but has not yet been adopted.163
The General Code prohibits taking a person out of the country for sale (Chap-
ter 11(1)) and also prevents slavery and bonded labor (Chapter 11(3)). The chapter on 
“Cheating” also includes several offenses that commonly arise in the context of foreign 
employment, such as fraud, deception, and misrepresentation.164
Migrant workers may seek to have foreign employment actors charged with these 
offenses by submitting a complaint to the police. The case would then be prosecuted 
in the regular district courts. However, it is possible that the district courts, as well as 
the Supreme Court, would find that in many cases of overlap, migrant workers should 
proceed under the FEA 2007—the Civil Code notes that if a specific law has been cre-
ated for any matter, cases should proceed under that law.165
Further, while compensation is available under the Civil Code, it is generally 
less than that available under the FEA 2007. For example, in cases where the migrant 
worker was cheated by an agent out of his or her fees, the code provides only for com-
pensation in the amount of the fees paid, whereas under the FEA 2007, the victim 
would receive an additional 50 percent of that amount.166
7.5 Gaps and Limitations in the Domestic Legal 
 Framework
Nepal’s FEA 2007 and 2008 Rules regulate the conduct of recruitment agencies and 
agents, and establish the roles and responsibilities of various government agencies and 
institutions throughout the labor migration process. They address many of the harms 
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most commonly suffered by migrant workers, and establish clear responsibilities on 
the part of recruitment agencies and penalties for failure to meet these standards. Nev-
ertheless, the act and rules remain limited in several important respects, discussed in 
this section. They are also not effectively implemented and enforced, as discussed later 
in this report. 
Absence of a Rights-Based Approach
An overarching limitation of the FEA 2007 and the 2008 Rules is the failure to recog-
nize migrant workers, or intending migrants, as rights holders. The word “rights” is not 
mentioned anywhere in either the law or rules except in the brief preamble. Although 
obligations on various parties are clear, they are not expressly linked to rights of Nepalis 
in the labor migration process. The tone of the act and the rules is one of regulatory 
efficiency, rather than of rights and protections for a relatively vulnerable population.
For example, the act and the rules do not mention the “right” of an individual to 
safe labor migration, or to make an informed choice regarding foreign employment. 
Furthermore, while the act and rules provide for redress and compensation, these provi-
sions are drafted as penalties and fines as applied to the wrongdoer, and not as the right 
of the individual worker to a remedy or other form of justice. Consistent with this, most 
functions of the various government agencies are expressed in discretionary (rather 
than mandatory) language, and with limited guidance as to their implementation. In 
respect to a number of government obligations, the lack of corresponding rights held 
by workers means the worker does not have a cause of action if an obligation is not 
fulfilled, making enforcement and accountability difficult to achieve.
Vague Contract-Related Obligations
The law is very vague regarding the specific terms that should be included in contracts 
between migrant workers and their recruitment agencies or employers. FEA 2007 and 
2008 Rules require only the “terms and conditions of service,” remuneration, and terms 
to be observed by the parties. They do not specify, for example, what terms and condi-
tions are acceptable, and whether those terms should include specifics as to the loca-
tion of work, the commencement date for the position, housing, hours of work, leave 
time, training required for the job, other health and safety factors, calculation of wages 
and method of payment, or other information that would allow a worker to make an 
informed decision as to whether to pursue and accept the position. Nor do they require 
contractual breach or dispute resolution clauses.
The lack of a clearly defined and mandated agreement clearly setting out a 
worker’s rights with respect to the recruitment agency creates a significant obstacle to 
workers’ access to justice, as discussed in greater detail below.
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Finally, the act and the rules provide no guidance on when the contract(s) should 
be provided (besides the general rule that they should be made available prior to the 
departure of the worker).167 This leaves the possibility open that workers will receive 
their contract(s) after they have already paid all fees and just prior to departure, as is 
common practice (see Chapter 6–Harms above). There is also no detail on when and 
how DoFE must provide a copy of the employment contract to the worker after certify-
ing it (Section 25(2))—an obligation that is not being implemented. 
Inadequate Attention to Vulnerable Groups
The FEA 2007 and the 2008 Rules fail to give adequate consideration to the needs 
of particularly vulnerable categories of workers, such as women and workers in an 
irregular status. Individuals who either migrate through informal channels, or who 
ultimately find themselves in an irregular status, regardless of whether they are at fault, 
are particularly vulnerable to exploitation and abuse (see 4.3 Irregular/Illegal Migra-
tion). Though they are not excluded from protection under either the act or the rules, 
they are not provided with explicit and tailored protections or redress mechanisms. For 
example, there are no provisions that account for the evidentiary challenges associated 
with bringing a claim on behalf of a worker in an irregular status, or for assisting irregu-
lar migrants to obtain replacement documents if their position was terminated abroad, 
or to clearly hold agents and recruitment agencies accountable for sending migrant 
workers irregularly and for assisting workers to regularize their status if still abroad.
While facially non-discriminatory, the failure of the act and the rules to address 
the specific needs of female migrants, the unique harms they suffer, or the unique chal-
lenges they may face in seeking to access justice has a discriminatory impact. Special 
measures to account for women’s lower literacy rates and levels of education, fewer 
financial resources, traditional discrimination against women, gender-specific health 
needs and concerns, concerns for children, pregnancy-related needs, and the stigmatiza-
tion of women migrants are needed to ensure a system of labor migration that fully pro-
tects the rights of female migrant workers, and ensures accountability and redress when 
those rights are violated. Furthermore, bans and restrictions on female labor migration 
to specific countries has resulted in a higher percentage of young women travelling 
through informal channels, increasing their vulnerability to exploitation and abuse 
while practically excluding them from protection under the domestic labor migration 
legal regime168 (see 4.2 Female Migrant Workers and 4.3 Irregular/Illegal Migration).
The HTTCA could fill some of the gaps in protection under the FEA 2007 and 
the 2008 Rules for female migrant workers and workers in an irregular situation. The 
HTTCA could be employed, for example, to hold individual agents and recruitment 
agencies accountable if female migrant workers find themselves tricked into prostitu-
tion or subject to sexual abuse abroad. It could also be employed for workers in an 
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irregular status where it could be argued that the workers were transported as a result 
of fraud, misinformation or coercion, and subsequently subjected to labor exploitation. 
The relationship between the HTTCA and the FEA 2007 is unclear, however—neither 
makes specific reference to the other, including when foreign employment cases should 
be referred to the police for a trafficking investigation, or when trafficking cases should 
be referred to DoFE.
Inadequate Guarantees of Transparency 
The law does not adequately promote full transparency within the labor migration 
framework, and specifically, in the regulation of recruitment agencies, agents, and 
employers. The FEA 2007 does take the positive step of requiring DoFE from time to 
time to publish the names of both licensed recruitment agencies, and agencies whose 
licenses have been revoked. While the Rules 2008 prohibit directors of formerly banned 
agencies from obtaining a license for a new agency (Rule 8(1)(i), in practice, directors 
and members of banned agencies reportedly often reopen a new company under a dif-
ferent name. Furthermore, the directors and members of the recruitment agencies are 
not publicly listed. Nor is a database of complaints made or prosecutions against par-
ticular agencies or the employer institutions with whom they contract publicly available. 
Similarly, embassies are not required to collate or provide reports about problematic 
employer institutions in destination countries. This lack of transparency denies workers 
and their advocates the opportunity to engage in due diligence and to make informed 
decisions prior to departure. 
7.6 The Role of International Law
The Preamble to the Interim Constitution underscores Nepal’s commitment to “fun-
damental rights, human rights, … and concepts of the rule of law.”169 Article 33 of the 
Interim Constitution obligates Nepal “[t]o adopt a political system fully upholding the 
universally accepted concepts of basic human rights,” and enumerates a series of spe-
cific rights reflective of those contained in different international human rights treaties 
and responsive to Nepal’s social and political history.170 Article 34(2) further identifies 
the protection and promotion of human rights as an objective of the state.171
International human rights law is incorporated into the domestic law of Nepal 
through the Nepal Treaty Act, 2047 (1990).172 The act establishes that international 
treaty provisions are enforceable on par with Nepali laws, and mandates that where 
treaty provisions are inconsistent with Nepali law, the domestic law is nullified and 
treaty provisions trump (Section 9(1)).
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Nepal has ratified most of the core UN international human rights treaties, as well 
as 11 of the International Labour Organization (ILO) conventions (See Annex 3 for list of 
treaty ratifications). It has done so with only limited reservations. It has also ratified the 
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, which governs the conduct of its consulates 
in destination countries, with respect to protection of Nepali migrants.173 Nepal is not, 
however, a party to several core international treaties that specifically address the human 
rights of migrant workers, namely the UN Convention on the Rights of All Migrant 
Workers and Members of their Families (1990), ILO Domestic Workers Convention 
2011 (C. 189), ILO Migration for Employment Convention (Revised) 1949 (C. 97), and 
ILO Migrant Workers (Supplementary Provisions) Convention 1975 (C. 143). Nor is it a 
party to the Palermo Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, 
especially Women and Children. Nonetheless, the treaties it has ratified directly gov-
ern several key rights and obligations applicable to Nepali nationals engaged in labor 
migration and provide a legal basis for challenging the role of the state in ensuring the 
protection, promotion and fulfillment of those rights, even where the rights violators 
are private actors (See Section 2.1, and Annex 3). 
In addition, Nepal is a member of the South Asian Association for Regional Coop-
eration (SAARC) and has ratified the SAARC Convention on Preventing and Combating 
Trafficking in Women and Children for Prostitution. The SAARC Convention, however, 
is more narrow in scope than the HTTCA and focuses exclusively on trafficking in 
women and children for prostitution, without recognizing other forms of human traf-
ficking for labor, including trafficking of men. The UN Convention for the Suppression 
of Traffic in Persons and of the Exploitation of the Prostitution of Others, to which Nepal 
is also a party,174 provides a slightly broader legal framework for combating human traf-
ficking in that it is not gender specific, but it remains focused on prostitution and not 
broader forms of labor trafficking. 
In addition to the domestic courts that are required to give effect to international 
treaties,175 the National Human Rights Commission (based in Kathmandu) has authority 
to “ensure the respect for, protection and promotion of human rights and their effec-
tive implementation.”176 It has broad duties and investigative functions under both the 
Interim Constitution 2063, (2007) (Article 132) and the Human Rights Commission 
Act, 2053 (1997),177 with respect to breaches of fundamental constitutional rights and 
rights under international human rights treaties to which Nepal is a party.178
Bilateral Agreements and MoUs with Destination Countries
Under the FEA 2007, the government is authorized to make bilateral labor agreements 
with countries where Nepali citizens have gone or may go for employment. Bilateral 
agreements in Nepal are considered a “treaty” under Nepali law and therefore are bind-
ing domestic law under the Nepal Treaty Act 1990.179
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Nepal has signed one bilateral agreement and two memorandums of understand-
ing (MOUs) for temporary labor migration with governments in the Middle East: Bah-
rain, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates.180 Each of these agreements was negotiated 
by the governments of the respective countries with very little public engagement and 
involvement.181 While the three documents differ in their detail, all are based on a 
commitment to cooperate regarding the sending and receiving of labor, and generally 
include the following:
1. The responsibilities of Nepal before departure;
2. Payment of a worker’s travel and employment costs;
3. Contents and form of a contract; and 
4. A method for resolving disputes between the worker and the employer, and 
between the recruitment agency in Nepal with the employer, or employer institu-
tion, in the destination country, and the applicable law. 
A comparative table of the content of each agreement is set out in Table 5.
Only one of the agreements, that with the UAE, mentions protection of migrant 
workers, but even this is minimal. It states: “Nepalese expatriate workers shall enjoy 
protection in relation to the placement of service, accommodation, social and health 
service as well as other facilities prevailing according to the rule and regulation in UAE.” 
(Article 4(2)). It also includes a “right” of Nepali migrant workers to remit their earn-
ings and savings (Article 8). The agreements do not, for example, mention anything 
regarding reasonable accommodation, recruitment fees, debt bondage, ability to hold 
one’s own personal documents, a right to information and training, or repatriation in 
case of injury or death.
In addition, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Nepal conceded that the agree-
ments are difficult for Nepal to enforce, both because of Nepal’s weaker bargaining 
power as a poorer nation and because Nepali workers will continue to travel to the 
country regardless of restrictions. An official noted:
 Although we sign bilateral agreements with governments of destination countries, we may 
not have the necessary influencing power to enforce implementation of the agreements. It 
is also meaningless to say that we will not send our citizens to work in their countries as 
Nepali migrant workers reach there through various unofficial channels.182
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TABLE 5: Bilateral Agreement and MOUs between Nepal and Middle East countries regarding 
labor migration
Agreement/
MoU
Pre-departure Costs and Fees Contracts Dispute 
resolution
Qatar– 
Bilateral 
Agreement
2005
Government 
of Nepal 
responsible 
for medical 
tests, acquiring 
passports or 
travel permits, 
and providing 
adequate 
information on 
conditions of 
employment, 
cost and 
standard of 
living in Qatar.
Employer covers 
round-trip 
travel expenses. 
Employer 
exempted 
from paying 
for return trip 
if the worker 
leaves before 
end of contract, 
or is dismissed 
for breach of 
contract. 
To contain 
employment 
conditions 
and rights and 
obligations of 
both parties 
(model contract 
appended).183
Must be in 
Arabic, Nepali 
and English. 
Four copies 
for worker, 
employer, Nepal 
government, 
and Qatar 
government.
Amicable 
settlement 
at the Qatari 
Ministry of Civil 
Service Affairs 
and Housing. 
If amicable 
settlement fails, 
to the courts.
UAE—MOU
2007
Unspecified. Employer is 
“responsible 
for placement 
and selection” 
of worker, 
though does 
not allocate 
responsibility 
for costs.
The rights and 
obligations of 
both parties, 
which must be 
consistent with 
UAE labor law.
Copies in 
Arabic, Nepali, 
and English.
Amicable 
settlement 
at the UAE 
Ministry of 
Labor. If that 
fails, referral to 
UAE courts.
Bahrain—
MOU
2008
Recruitment 
agencies 
responsible for 
ensuring worker 
is medically fit 
and “trained 
properly.”
Not specified. Name of 
employer, 
his/her 
establishment, 
term of the 
contract, type 
of work, agreed 
wage and any 
other details 
agreed.
Language not 
specified.
Disputes in 
which a worker 
is involved 
to be settled 
according to 
the labor law 
for the private 
sector. Disputes 
between 
recruitment 
agencies to 
be settled 
amicably, 
followed by 
recourse to 
Bahrain’s 
courts.
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Nevertheless, the requirement to have an employment agreement, the specifica-
tion of the minimum content of the agreement, and the articulation of a method of 
resolving disputes give rise to a significant set of implied rights for migrant workers. 
Also key is the requirement that employment contracts in Qatar and Bahrain be given in 
Nepali. A former ambassador to Qatar noted that the bilateral agreement had been very 
helpful in negotiations with Qatari officials, and that she had used it to ensure migrant 
workers were issued ID cards by their employers and to push for an increase in the 
minimum salary.184 The government of Nepal is currently considering labor agreements 
with Israel, Jordon, Lebanon, Malaysia and Saudi Arabia.185
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8. Mechanisms for Enforcing Rights
The previous chapters in this report set out the obligations of government and private 
actors and the rights and protections granted to migrant workers under the FEA 2007 
as well as other domestic laws and international law. These rights and obligations have 
little meaning to migrant workers unless there are accessible and effective mechanisms 
for enforcing them, and for providing redress when rights are violated. This section 
outlines the key Nepal-based mechanisms for enforcing rights and obligations associ-
ated with labor migration, consisting of:
1. The Department of Foreign Employment, which receives complaints of violations 
of the FEA 2007, conducts investigations, makes orders in respect to certain 
offenses under the act and imposes penalties, and registers more serious cases at 
the Foreign Employment Tribunal;
2. The Foreign Employment Tribunal, which adjudicates more serious criminal cases 
under the FEA 2007, for which the defendant could be imprisoned;
3. The Court System, which adjudicates criminal cases under the HTTCA and the 
Muluki Ain (Civil Code).
4. Compensation Schemes in Cases of Death or Permanent Disability, including the 
government-operated Foreign Employment Welfare Fund managed by the For-
eign Employment Promotion Board, and private life insurance. 
5. Nepal’s Embassies, which offer dispute resolution assistance between workers and 
employers abroad, and may assist migrant workers to bring cases in overseas 
forums. 
92  MECHANISMS FOR ENFORCING RIGHTS
In addition to these mechanisms, Nepalis use several informal methods for 
resolving labor migration disputes. 
This section reviews each of these potential pathways to justice against the criteria 
established in Section 2.2 on “Defining and Assessing Access to Justice,” identifying the 
relevant legal framework where applicable, the various actors involved, the procedures for 
filing a complaint, and perceptions of efficacy and accessibility. It draws on the experiences 
and perceptions of migrant workers and of the government officials responsible for imple-
menting and overseeing the mechanisms, as well as recruitment agencies and insurers, 
and the lawyers and civil society organizations who assist migrants seeking redress. 
8.1 Department of Foreign Employment Complaints 
 Registration and Investigation Section
DoFE is the principle agency in Nepal charged with handling migrant worker complaints 
against institutions (recruitment agencies) and individuals (unregistered agents). 
A special investigative unit within DoFE, the Complaints Registration and Investigation 
Section, investigates all complaints received by the department. It also has the power 
to make orders and impose penalties in certain cases brought against recruitment 
agencies, and to refer other cases to the police or to the Foreign Employment Tribunal.
This section outlines the DoFE procedures under the FEA 2007 and the 2008 
Rules. It also describes the operation of DoFE procedures in practice, drawing on inter-
views with officials at the department and other key informants including prosecutors 
and lawyers. To determine the perceived effectiveness of DoFE’s investigation and com-
plaint resolution mechanism, the section also draws on statements from six migrant 
workers who filed complaints at DoFE, as well as a sample of 214 cases filed with DoFE 
in 2011 and 2012, provided to the authors by DoFE and compiled by the authors in a 
database (see Chapter 3—Research Methods). 
DoFE Investigative Jurisdiction and Powers 
Although the offenses under the Foreign Employment Act 2007 are criminal offenses, 
the Act assigns jurisdiction to DoFE to investigate alleged offences.186 Those investiga-
tions are carried out by an investigation officer within the Complaints Registration 
and Investigation Section. Investigation officers are government lawyers, usually with 
a number of years of experience and seconded from other ministries. They are given all 
police powers to investigate the alleged crimes under the act, including:187
 Powers to arrest the person involved in the offence, search any place in relation to the 
offence, take custody of documents or other things related with the offence, record deposi-
tions and execute recognizance deeds’ (Section 61(2)).
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Investigative officers are not police, however, and have not undergone police train-
ing regarding use of these powers.
Complaints to DoFE can be made “by any person or in any other manner that 
an offense has been or is going to be committed in contravention” of the Act or the 
2008 Rules (Section 61). Complaints can therefore be submitted by the victim, a family 
member or any other person, and may be made on behalf of a single migrant worker, 
or a group of workers. The provision does not limit the ability to submit a complaint to 
workers who traveled in and maintained regular status.
For some of the key offenses listed in the act (such as carrying on a foreign employ-
ment business without a license, sending minors for foreign employment, and document 
falsification), a complaint can be submitted at any time. However, for other offenses, 
including those related to compensation, contract violations, and charging of excessive 
recruitment fees, the statute of limitations is one year from the date of the offense, or if 
the victim was working abroad, one year from the date of return to Nepal (Section 60).
A complaint consists of a first investigation report/application form together 
with supporting documents. The law does not specify which supporting documents 
are required to lodge the complaint. A labor migration lawyer interviewed for this study 
noted that the most important document is a copy of the receipt of payment made by the 
worker for foreign employment,188 which must include the names of the worker and the 
person or company who received the payment, and be signed by a witness. He further 
noted that the application must indicate whether or not the complainant is presenting 
the complaint in person, whether the witness to the payment is present, and whether 
identity documents are included. It should also identify the person/institution who sent 
the worker abroad, and provide the address of the person against whom the complaint 
is registered.189 He then noted:
 Only upon confirmation of the above [evidence] and if we feel that we can arrest the accused 
then we register the [complaint]. If we cannot get the person arrested, we do not register it. 
If other documents like agreements with the employer, flight tickets are available then the 
case is strong.
In many cases workers do not have original documents, only photocopies pro-
vided by agents. Although FEA 2007 does not require original documents, at least one 
lawyer believed that they were required.190
DoFE figures from the last three Nepali years suggest that slightly more com-
plaints are brought against individuals than against recruitment agencies.191 Note that 
not all complaints against recruitment agencies have specific victims; some may have 
been filed by another section of DoFE or another ministry in respect to more adminis-
trative violations of the law.
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A Review of Sample Complaints filed at DoFE
As part of this study, the authors obtained a random sample of 214 cases 
registered at DoFE (see Methods section). Though not necessarily represen-
tative of all cases filed with DoFE, these cases indicate the types of cases 
that reach DoFE, including a profile of the accused parties and the victims, 
and the types of harms alleged. Within the sample:
• The vast majority of complaints in the sample (85 percent) were against 
individuals rather than recruitment agencies. In 20 percent of cases 
against individuals, the accused and at least one victim were from the 
same home district.192
• Most victims appear to file cases directly, rather than going through a 
civil society organization or lawyer. Indeed only 10 case files mentioned 
the involvement of a civil society organization.
• Around a third of complaints involved only one victim; all others involved 
at least two victims. The largest number of victims in a single case was 
619. This case was filed against a recruitment agency alleging that it 
had taken recruitment fees promising to send the victims to the United 
Kingdom, but that it did not in fact send them. 
• The most common complaint (89 percent of claims) was under sec-
tion 43 of the act, accusing an individual agent of taking money from 
the prospective migrant worker, but then failing to send the individual 
abroad. These individuals never left Nepal; 71 percent of cases involved 
only pre-departure violations. 
• As a result, the most common remedy sought by complainants was 
return of the recruitment fee (98 percent of cases), and additional com-
pensation (90 percent). In 11 cases migrant workers sought return of 
their passport.
• Just 34 cases made claims in respect to treatment while abroad. These 
included work on terms different to what was in the employment con-
tract, termination of the contract, or, in some cases, physical abuse. 
• Forty percent of the cases were in respect to work in the Middle East, 
5.5 percent to Asia (primarily Macau), and the remaining 54.5 percent to 
other destinations such as Canada, Europe or the United States.
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Investigation of Migrant Worker Complaints and Arrest of Accused
The first step in an investigation following receipt of a complaint is to get the accused 
to make a statement responding to the allegations with the Complaints Registration 
and Investigation Section. If the investigation officer believes that the available evidence 
is strong and suggests that the accused has committed the alleged offense, the officer 
can call on the accused to come at a certain day and time, and may detain the accused 
(for a maximum period of thirty days, not to exceed seven days at a time) or release the 
accused on bail (Section 61(3)).
The process of investigation will vary depending on whether the accused is the 
recruitment agency, or an individual agent. When the accused is the agency, the inves-
tigation officer sends a letter to the company outlining the alleged offense and request-
ing that a representative come to DoFE for an interview.193 When a complaint is made 
against an individual, DoFE invariably orders the arrest of the individual. In practice, 
this means that the officer will write a letter to the local police in the district where the 
individual is believed to reside, and the migrant worker will be left to take the letter 
to the police and urge the arrest of the accused.194 In some cases, as noted in Section 
8.6 below on informal dispute resolution, the police may bring the accused to DoFE of 
their own accord if a complaint has been made against the person in their community.
The investigation officers explained that they do not have the human or finan-
cial resources to conduct a more in-depth investigation beyond reviewing the migrant 
worker’s documents and interviewing the parties to the dispute. For example, even 
though they have the power to search the premises of recruitment agencies, call wit-
nesses or confiscate documents, this is rarely if ever done. As of March 2014, DoFE had 
only one investigation officer to handle all complaints, and the department was seeking 
to recruit two more. 
The relatively superficial nature of the investigations may also be a result of train-
ing—the chairperson of the Foreign Employment Tribunal noted that the investigations 
she received were often incomplete because, in her opinion, the investigation officers 
were not trained as police. She believed that the police should be given a greater role in 
investigations of foreign employment cases.195
As a consequence of the limited investigations, additional parties are never added 
to the complaint, although they are frequently involved. A lawyer at the NGO People 
Forum noted that in almost all cases against a recruitment agency, an individual agent 
would also have been involved, and in many cases against an agent, a recruitment 
agency would have also been involved.196 However, these other parties would simply 
deny their involvement; proving otherwise takes considerable time and resources that 
DoFE investigation officers do not have.
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DoFE Jurisdiction and Powers to Make Determinations and Orders
As well as having jurisdiction over the investigation of all foreign employment cases, 
DoFE also has authority to adjudicate certain categories of cases in which the accused is 
a recruitment agency.197 Its powers include: to make a determination and to make orders 
for the payment of fines, suspension or revocation of a recruitment agency license, and 
in certain cases, to make a determination and order for compensation to be paid to a 
migrant worker by the recruitment agency. 
As Table 6 (below) illustrates, most cases resolvable at the department level are 
administrative in nature in that they violate a provision of FEA 2007 but do not cause 
direct harm to an individual. However, DoFE also has jurisdiction over several key 
offenses against migrant workers, the most important of which are:
• Excessive Recruitment Fees—Charging migrant workers above the government pre-
scribed amount, whereby DoFE can order that any excess fees be repaid to the 
worker (Section 53); 
• Fraud—Sending a worker to work in a position or on terms that were different 
from those promised in the contract. In these cases, DoFE can order that the 
recruitment agency compensate the worker for any difference between what was 
promised and what was received (Section 55). A lawyer interviewed for this study 
expressed the view that Section 55 requires intent to deceive or exploit on the part 
of the recruitment agency.198
• Failure to Pay Compensation as Ordered by DoFE—if a recruitment agency fails to 
follow a DoFE order, DoFE can take funds from the agency’s cash deposit or assets to 
compensate the worker, and impose a fine and/or license revocation (Section 51).
In addition to these offenses, DoFE also has authority to hold recruitment agen-
cies partially liable in the event that the employer in the destination country does not 
abide by the terms of the employment contract signed in Nepal (Section 36). This pro-
vision is significant and relatively unusual in origin countries, and provides what may 
be the worker’s only available redress for harms suffered abroad, given the challenges 
associated with pursuing redress within the domestic legal system of the destination 
country. The provision may apply even if there is no written contract between the worker 
and the recruitment agency, and even if the worker cannot demonstrate intention to 
defraud on the part of the recruitment agency. However, the amount of compensation 
that can be awarded is limited to the sum of costs incurred in going for foreign employ-
ment (namely, the recruitment fees), and not the full amount of the worker’s actual loss. 
This is in contrast to intent-based cases under Section 55, for which the fine is NPR 
100,000 in addition to compensation to the worker for any shortfall in remuneration 
or varied facilities or other conditions, excluding recruitment fee s.
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TABLE 6: Offenses for which DoFE Is Authorized to Make Determinations and Orders
Sec. Offense Fine and Other Penalty
48 If any licensee opens a branch office without 
obtaining permission from the department.
NPR 200,000 fine for each 
unauthorized branch office; and
closure of unauthorized branch offices.
49 If any licensee fails to publish an 
advertisement [for available positions] or 
publishes an advertisement without the 
permission of the department. Or if the 
licensee includes details in the advertisement 
that are different to what the department 
approved [during the pre-approval process].
NPR 50,000 fine for failure to 
advertise; or
cancellation of unauthorized 
advertisements; or
correction and reprinting of incorrect 
advertisements.
50 If any licensee fails to publish a selection list 
of workers, or publishes it but fails to inform 
the department.
NPR 50,000 fine; and
order to republish the selection list.
51 If any licensee sends any worker to any 
country that has not been opened by 
the Government of Nepal for foreign 
employment or obtains a visa from a country 
that has been opened but sends the worker 
to a country that has not been opened.
NPR 300,000–500,000 fine; and
3–5 years imprisonment.
Punishment halved if the person has 
not yet departed.
52 If any licensee sends a worker on an 
individual basis [that is, hiding the 
involvement of the recruitment agency].
NPR 100,000–300,000 fine; and/or
revocation of the license.
53 If any licensee collects a visa fee where the 
visa is free, or collects fees or costs in excess 
of the prescribed amount.
NPR 100,000 fine; and
return of the excess fees to the worker.
54 Failure by a licensee to observe the FEA 2007 
or any rules, orders or directions framed or 
issued under the act.
A warning in the first instance.
NPR 50,000 fine in second instance of 
same offense.
NPR 100,000 fine and revocation 
of license in third instance of same 
offense.
55 If any licensee, after making a contract with 
any worker for work in a company, engages 
the worker in work for remuneration in 
facilities lower than, or in another company 
for work of a different nature than specified 
in the contract, or does not engage the 
worker in work for which the worker has 
been sent but engages the worker in different 
work, or in work for remuneration and 
facilities less than the remuneration and 
facilities offered previously.
NPR 100,000 fine; and
compensation of the worker for the 
shortfall in such remuneration and 
facilities.
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For any offense for which DoFE is not specifically authorized to make findings 
and orders, including all offenses committed by individual agents, DoFE must register 
the case at the Foreign Employment Tribunal, after seeking legal advice from the Special 
Government Attorney (see section below on the Foreign Employment Tribunal).
Table 7 displays the number of complaints filed at DoFE and their processing 
since 2009/10. Of the 2,305 cases filed in fiscal year 2012/2013, DoFE resolved 552 
cases, and registered 178 cases at the tribunal. In the remaining cases, the complaints 
were “withdrawn,” indicating that the victim had written a letter to DoFE withdrawing 
his or her application. The “withdrawn” category was apparently removed in 2012/2013 
in recognition that a victim of an alleged crime cannot withdraw a complaint. DoFE 
indicated that cases previously withdrawn would eventually still be prosecuted, but 
given the shortage of staff at DoFE, they have not been prioritized leading to a sig-
nificant backlog. Further research is needed to determine the extent to which migrant 
workers have been threatened or coerced to “withdraw” their complaints, or whether 
they have in fact received the compensation they agreed to in the settlement.
MIGRANT WORKERS’ ACCESS TO JUSTICE AT HOME: NEPAL  99
Complaint Filed at DoFE
Investigation by DoFE 
Investigation Officer (IO)
Complaint deemed genuine
Resolved at DoFE
DoFE decision regarding 
fine & compensation
DoFE IO brings parties 
together for discussion
Special Government Attorney 
Office advises on prosecution
Insufficient Evidence
—Case Closed
Returned to DoFE
—additional 
investigation
Returned to DoFE 
for preparation of 
charge sheet 
DoFE IO registers charge 
sheet at the Foreign 
Employment Tribunal
Individual Cases 
(S. 43 of FEA)
Serious Institutional 
Cases 
(SS. 44–47 of FEA)
SGA 
recommends 
prosecution
SGA does not 
recommend 
prosecution
Less Serious 
Institutional Cases 
(SS. 48–55 of FEA)
FIGURE 6: Summary of DoFE Complaints Investigation and Handling Procedures
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Making Decisions and Orders for Compensation, Appeals
The FEA 2007 does not establish clear guidelines for evaluating claims or resolving a 
case at DoFE. While a subsequent directive has been issued describing the investigation 
process, two investigation officers interviewed for the study described a very informal 
process of reviewing the evidence (documents and statements) and making a decision 
about whether the complaint is genuine and an offense has been committed. 
For those cases deemed genuine, the officer will calculate how much he thinks the 
recruitment agency should pay to the worker, based on the punishment for the offense 
set out in the FEA 2007. The officer then will telephone the agency to discuss the case. 
One officer noted, “[i]f [the recruitment agency] agrees to pay back the money, then the 
case is solved immediately.” This, he believed, was most cases.199 Orders for compensa-
tion must be reviewed by the director general of DoFE.
If either party is unhappy with a DoFE determination or orders, that party can 
appeal to the Government of Nepal within 35 days of the decision but the law does not 
detail the form of an appeal. One lawyer noted that an appeal had to be made through 
a written letter to the Minister of Labor and Employment.
Enforcement of DoFE Decisions
If the agency does not pay the compensation awarded to the worker, DoFE may “get the 
compensation returned to the worker” from the cash deposit that the agency provides 
as a condition of its license (Section 51(1)).200 If the cash deposit is insufficient to cover 
the compensation owed, DoFE must give the agency 60 days to pay the shortfall, after 
which the amount can be recovered from the agency’s assets (Section 51(2)).
The law does not specify how compensation is practically recovered from the 
deposit or the agency’s assets or which government agencies ought to instigate and 
ensure the recovery. According to several lawyers interviewed, obtaining compensation 
from the deposit is a straightforward process that generally takes no more than a few 
weeks. An investigation officer also explained that if a recruitment agency does not 
respond to the claim or refuses to pay the amount ordered by the department, DoFE is 
authorized to temporarily suspend or cancel the agency’s license and/or fine the agency 
100,000 NPR.201
According to a DoFE legal officer and a private lawyer, in most cases the recruit-
ment agency will repay the amount in order to avoid these additional sanctions.202 It is 
unknown whether an agency license had been suspended or revoked for refusal to pay 
compensation. Interviewees, both lawyers and DoFE staff, could not recall any such 
case, and DoFE does not keep systematic records of the reasons for suspending or 
revoking licenses which could provide this information.
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Registration of Cases at the Foreign Employment Tribunal
Apart from the handful of matters that the department is specifically authorized under 
the act to resolve (see DoFE Jurisdiction for Making Decisions and Orders above), all 
other matters under the FEA 2007 are decided by the Foreign Employment Tribunal 
(Section 64). Cases must be filed at the tribunal by a DoFE investigation officer in his 
or her name after the investigation is complete—a worker cannot register a case directly 
with the tribunal (Section 61(4)).
All cases before the tribunal are “state cases” (Section 63). Therefore, before decid-
ing to file a case with the tribunal, the investigation officer must “get advice of the 
government attorney” (Section 61(4)). Until the end of 2013, this advice was provided 
by the Office of the District Attorney (DA’s Office), which prosecutes all criminal cases. 
On December 9, 2013, the Nepali cabinet created a new Special Government Attorney’s 
Office (SGA) to prosecute certain categories of cases, including foreign employment 
cases.203 The SGA Office’s “Administrative Labor and Foreign Employment Branch” is 
intended to have greater specialized knowledge that will allow it to improve access to 
justice for both victim and perpetrator.204 At the time of writing, the SGA Office was 
in its infancy but had already taken over advising on and prosecuting foreign employ-
ment cases. Information about SGA practices was not available at the time of writing 
but practices are unlikely to be significantly different from those of the DA’s office, 
outlined below.
DoFE provides the prosecutor with the case files and a decision chit, namely a 
report containing all of the facts identified during the investigation, as well as the inves-
tigation officer’s view of which witnesses are most reliable and a recommendation for 
what should happen in the case.205 The prosecutor’s review includes advising on pro-
posed charges and an opinion as to whether the evidence is sufficient to register the 
case at the tribunal. The DA noted, “a case can only be registered [with the tribunal] if 
the evidence is sufficient to support the claim of the victim.”206
Following its evidentiary review, the prosecutor sends a letter of advice to the rel-
evant DoFE investigation officer. If the prosecutor considers the evidence insufficient, 
DoFE has the option to either close the case or seek further evidence. If the prosecutor 
recommends prosecution, the DoFE investigation officer is then responsible for prepar-
ing the charge sheet and filing it at the tribunal (see next section). According to DoFE, 
however, very few cases have been rejected by the DA’s Office. Finally, if the prosecutor 
has identified grounds for other criminal charges not covered by the FEA 2007, the case 
could be referred to the police for investigation and tried in a regular court (although 
study participants could not identify a specific case in which this occurred).
It is unclear what value the prosecutorial review—a process in which the workers 
themselves do not participate—has played to date, given that most cases appear to be 
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automatically approved for filing at the tribunal, and that numerous reportedly fraudu-
lent cases appear to be making it through to the tribunal. However, moving the review 
to the SGA, which is intended to have more specialized expertise, may create a more 
streamlined and effective process of review that warrants the additional procedural 
hurdle. This will particularly be the case if the new review process at the SGA is clearly 
documented and more accessible to the worker and his or her representatives.
Negotiation of Cases Pending at DoFE
Officially, negotiation between the victim and the accused is not countenanced in cases 
before the department—both lawyers and DoFE officials stated that most FEA 2007 
cases are criminal offenses, and the punishment is clearly mandated by the act.207 Indi-
vidual parties are not granted authority to independently negotiate a settlement, and 
victims are not technically permitted to withdraw complaints that allege violations of the 
act. However, migrant workers and civil society representatives suggested that negotia-
tions at DoFE with both recruitment agencies and brokers are in fact common. 
The director of the legal department at DoFE conceded that negotiations have 
occurred, and he gave several explanations for this. In some cases in the past, he 
acknowledged, corruption had enabled the individual agent or recruitment agency to 
make arrangements with a DoFE investigation officer to convince the worker to accept 
a lower amount of compensation than was due. A negotiation would ensue about how 
much would be paid. 
In other cases, the legal department director noted, the appropriate amount of 
compensation was not clear. This occurred often in cases under Section 55 where a 
migrant worker accused the recruitment agency of sending him or her to a position or 
company that was different to what was written into the contract. The remedy in these 
cases, as noted above, is that the recruitment agency must pay the difference between 
the terms and conditions of work promised and received. Calculating differences in sal-
ary was simple if the migrant worker had the original contract and pay slips. However, 
calculating the value of the loss was much more complicated if, for example, the job was 
different to what was promised but the salary was the same, or the hours were longer or 
leave was denied. Indeed the department seemed skeptical that any harm had occurred 
if the worker was sent to a completely different job (for example where a worker was 
promised a job in a hotel but was sent to herd goats), but the salary was the same. In his 
view it was therefore inevitable that the victim and alleged perpetrator would negotiate 
an amount of compensation in these cases.
Third, the legal director stated that cases between a migrant worker and an indi-
vidual agent (under Section 43) are frequently negotiated, even though those negotia-
tions were not sanctioned by DoFE and, in fact, DoFE is not authorized to adjudicate 
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any cases against individual agents and must refer them to the tribunal. All six of the 
migrant workers in this study who had filed a complaint at DoFE filed the case against 
the individual agent and described the negotiation that followed. 
Though negotiation may result in migrant workers accepting an amount less 
than what they consider they are owed, a number of significant practical considerations 
incentivize workers to accept a negotiated settlement. Migrant workers often want their 
money quickly so they can repay high-interest loans. They also often cannot afford to 
pay the travel and living expenses required to get to and remain in Kathmandu (and 
the time away from work and family) while they wait for the long process of DoFE 
investigation, prosecutorial review, and then a Foreign Employment Tribunal decision 
to receive compensation. 
Further, in the case of individual agents, many migrants have to locate the agent 
at their own time and expense, and have him or her transported to Kathmandu with 
support from the Nepal police to be interviewed by DoFE. There is no guarantee the 
agent will attend further hearings (many brokers abscond) and so migrant workers feel 
some pressure to get an outcome at what may be their only opportunity.
Many of the stakeholders interviewed for this study viewed negotiation or media-
tion at DoFE with ambivalence. For example, a recruitment agency director described 
how it was often hard to determine from Nepal the real reason a person left their 
employment, but that the government would pressure them to pay, because it has “a 
negative attitude to manpower agencies.”208 Another recruitment agency described how 
DoFE would bring the parties together and then an agreement would be signed, but 
noted: “There are challenges in mediation, sometimes there is risk involved. The work-
ers who make complaints are not always of the same nature, some come in groups with 
a clear intention of using force.”209 Some civil society organizations viewed mediation 
more positively. For example, one non-government organization representative said, 
“mediation is a very good tool … we need to make sure that we do mediation through 
DoFE as the cases in those instances come under the government’s scrutiny.”210 Others 
believed it to undermine the purpose of DoFE and accountability under the act.
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Renu’s Case on Behalf of Her Brothers
Renu’s brothers were experienced cooks and wished to work overseas. They 
used an agent who was a relative, even though they were aware she [the 
agent] was not registered, to travel to Kuwait to assist a chef in a five-star 
hotel. When they arrived, however, one brother was sent out into the desert 
to herd camels, and the other was made to herd sheep and cut grass. They 
contacted their sister, Renu, and asked her to report the agent to the police 
on their behalf.
Renu was worried about reporting the case immediately, believing it could 
put her brothers at risk, so she instead worked to bring them home early. 
They arrived after three and six months respectively. The brother who had 
herded the camels had developed hearing problems from sand blowing into 
his ears and required medical treatment. After their return, Renu took her 
brothers to the police to make a complaint, and the police instructed them 
to find the agent. They did so with much difficulty, tracking her from their 
home village to Kathmandu. The police then arrested the agent and took her 
to DoFE, assisting the family to file the case. 
However, after the documents had been submitted and compensation was 
being negotiated, the agent filed a complaint that she had been wrongfully 
arrested, and then she disappeared. The case had not been resolved at the 
time of writing.
 
Even if the worker is willing to negotiate, an outcome is not certain. Only two of 
the six migrant workers in this study who sought to negotiate with their agent through 
DoFE successfully obtained an agreement. Further, in such cases, DoFE is not respon-
sible for ensuring the payment is made as it is outside of the formal process. Indeed, in 
neither of the two settled cases was the agreed amount actually paid by the agent (see 
the story of Renu above and Manish below).
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Manish’s Case
Manish, from Kathmandu, is a young carpenter with an elementary school 
education. He had previously worked in a furniture store in Malaysia, and 
after returning, applied to work as a carpenter in Qatar. Like many other 
migrant workers, he relied on a relative as an agent, who told him that he 
would be earning a salary of 900 Riyal and 200 Riyal in other benefits per 
month (although she asked him to sign a contract promising 1,000 Riyal). 
When he arrived, however, he was asked to sign a new contract of 700 Riyal 
per month. All of the new workers initially refused, but the agency locked 
them in their hotel room without food or water, and so they agreed to sign.
Once the contract was signed, Manish found that he had again been 
deceived, and that he would be working as a laborer rather than as a car-
penter, and that he would be moved from site to site as a contract worker. 
He was very unhappy, and asked to go home on several occasions, but his 
kafeel refused. Eventually the sponsor sent him back to Nepal after he said 
that his mother and wife were ill.
As soon as he arrived back in Kathmandu, Manish went to DoFE to submit 
a complaint. He returned five times, including to bring the agent to give her 
statement. However Manish and the agent could not come to an amicable 
agreement about what she should pay him as compensation. His mother 
then hired a lawyer to handle the case, and, when the agent refused to attend 
the department again, the police arrested her. Eventually, a sum of com-
pensation was agreed between the parties and the agent signed settlement 
papers. However, within a week she had fled Kathmandu and Manish and 
his family could not locate her.
Awareness and Accessibility of DoFE Investigation and Claims 
Resolution Mechanism
Since its creation, DoFE has received an increasing number of cases each year from 
migrant workers and their families, suggesting greater awareness and utilization of 
the mechanism over time. In 2012/2013, the department received a total of 2,305 com-
plaints. This compares with 2,172 in the previous year, and only 1,204 in the year before 
that. Of the 2,305 complaints, 1,245 were made against individuals and 1,060 were 
made against a recruitment agency. Yet given that more than 400,000 migrant work-
ers leave Nepal each year and a large proportion appear to experience problems, this 
remains a very small number of cases.
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Whether all of these cases relate to foreign employment is also unclear. Investi-
gation officers suggested in one recent media interview that up to 50 percent of fraud 
claims (under Sections 43 and 44) filed at the department are not foreign-employment-
related at all, but instead are attempts by local moneylenders to recover debts. The 
words “foreign employment” may be written at the top of the money-lending agreement 
to allow the complaint to be filed at DoFE, which has a relatively fast processing time 
compared to the local courts.211 Moneylenders also perceive DoFE processes to be more 
flexible regarding evidence than the courts.212
A factor that weighs heavily against accessibility of the DoFE mechanism is cen-
tralization: at present DoFE has an office only in Kathmandu with no representation 
in any other part of the country. This automatically limits awareness of its functions 
outside the capital, and access for those who do not have the time and resources to 
travel to Kathmandu to file a case and potentially return for the case to be negotiated 
and resolved, or to remain in Kathmandu for the entire duration of the prosecution. 
Another issue is the department’s treatment of claims from workers traveling out-
side the formally regulated system. Department officials were vague regarding whether 
the department would take claims from migrant workers who had travelled irregularly. 
One DoFE investigation officer said that the department does not handle cases of irregu-
lar migrant workers.212 Another noted if the case appeared to be one of trafficking, or 
where the migrant worker was taken through India (considered by many to automati-
cally amount to trafficking or human transportation) the case would be accepted, but 
would usually be referred to the police.213 More recently, lawyers and DoFE officials said 
cases of irregular workers would in principle be taken, but they rarely had sufficient 
evidence to support their case.
Nothing in the act appears to prohibit the filing of a claim by an irregular migrant 
worker—indeed the act says that a complaint by “any person” regarding a potential 
violation of the act will be accepted (Section 61). In many cases, the migrant worker 
may be irregular because of wrongdoing by the recruitment agency, such as not being 
licensed or preparing false documents. An irregular worker may nevertheless face sub-
stantial practical barriers if he or she did not receive a contract or receipt from a licensed 
recruitment agency. 
In terms of awareness and accessibility for particular types of claims, it is notable 
that only 24 of the 214 DoFE cases reviewed in this study related to problems that 
occurred in the destination country—17 regarding different terms and conditions of 
work to the contract, and 7 regarding other violations such as non-payment of wages 
and physical abuse. Anecdotal evidence of the high prevalence of problems abroad as 
compared to the number of cases filed indicates the existence of particularly significant 
barriers with respect to awareness of and access to DoFE procedures (as well as other 
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disincentives to filing complaints) for contract-related claims concerning harms that 
occurred while the worker was abroad.
Fairness of Procedures
DoFE procedures are not clearly delineated in the act or rules. While DoFE has issued a 
directive on internal operations that provides general guidance on case-handling, it does 
not provide specificity of timing and steps, such that it is difficult to assess the fairness 
of procedures in place.215 Interviews with migrant workers and experts suggest that the 
procedures are kept informal and highly flexible to enable the officers to handle many 
cases at once and to keep proceedings short, affordable and accessible. While this clearly 
benefits migrant workers in some cases, it also means that they are not easily able to 
challenge unfair procedures or outcomes.
Shortcomings in the procedures appear to be threefold. First, the number of 
DoFE investigation officers is far too few for the number of cases they receive. It allows 
only time for a handful of phone calls and meetings before a decision is made. The offi-
cers’ investigation powers appear to be rarely used, for example visiting the office of the 
recruitment agency, seizing assets or subpoenaing documents or witnesses. Investiga-
tions are therefore superficial at best. Written decisions are not provided and not made 
public, and the files reviewed by the research team were often incomplete in respect to 
dates and details of outcomes.
A second and related problem is that recruitment agencies appear to be rarely 
involved in the proceedings or held accountable for the actions of agents. A DoFE offi-
cer stated that in a case where an agent named a recruitment agency as involved in the 
case, the recruitment agency denied any knowledge of the agent and the recruitment 
agency’s word was taken. No further effort was made to examine the veracity of the 
agent’s claim, for example by investigating the recruitment agency’s records, or calling 
other witnesses.
Recruitment agencies’ ability to avoid liability, and a lack of meaningful and trans-
parent investigation into a recruitment agency’s role, serves as a direct barrier to a 
migrant worker’s ability to access justice. Individual agents are often more difficult 
to locate, and can abscond more easily than the recruitment agency, and themselves 
may not have the money to pay the compensation to which the worker is entitled. The 
recruitment agencies, on the other hand, have paid deposits from which compensation 
can theoretically be taken. Furthermore, the failure to pursue recruitment agencies 
working through unregistered agents greatly diminishes transparency and accountabil-
ity within the recruitment industry, and removes any disincentives to agencies’ continu-
ing reliance on unregistered individual agents. 
A third challenge is the incidence of negotiation and settlement between the 
parties that appears to result in cases not being prosecuted. Negotiated outcomes do 
MIGRANT WORKERS’ ACCESS TO JUSTICE AT HOME: NEPAL  109
provide migrant workers with more immediate relief and can have practical benefits 
(such as time-saving, and reducing the number of trips to Kathmandu to attend tribu-
nal proceedings), but they are also ad hoc and defeat the punishment purpose of the 
Act—foreign employment cases are criminal cases, and victims and perpetrators are not 
permitted to come to a deal. Whether unfair pressure is brought to bear on the migrant 
worker, or the outcomes of these negotiations are fair, is unclear. Due to the power 
imbalance between migrant workers and recruitment agencies, and the high-interest 
debts incurred by many migrant workers in the process of seeking foreign employment, 
migrant workers are likely to feel pressured to accept less than what they are due. 
Outcomes of DoFE Processes
According to DoFE data, around a quarter of complaints filed against recruitment agen-
cies are resolved at the department level (350 of 1060 institutional complaints filed in 
2012/2013 for example). In the sample of 214 cases reviewed in this study, 189 had 
progressed to a full investigation and 10 had been resolved by DoFE (all other cases 
were with the DA for review or set for transfer to the tribunal). The 10 complaints, all 
made against recruitment companies, included:
• Four cases of recruitment agencies submitting false documents to DoFE, includ-
ing three cases of false work permits and one of a false medical report. It is 
unclear if there were individual victims in these cases or if the false documents 
were spotted by DoFE officers and referred for investigation. In all four cases, 
the complaint was made under section 54 of the Act, which alleges only a failure 
to follow a DoFE rule or order, and not under the specific provisions for false 
documents. In those cases, the recorded outcome was simply that a warning was 
issued. 
• Three cases of fees being paid but the individual not being sent to the UAE as 
promised (in all cases excess fees were also charged). Two of these cases were 
prosecuted only under Section 54. The recorded outcome was a warning, although 
the workers had also requested compensation. In the third case, the file nota-
tion indicated the migrant worker sought punishment under Section 51 (which is 
unusual because Section 51 pertains to sending a worker to a country not opened 
by the government). The outcome was listed only as the accused was found guilty 
under Section 51 and punished accordingly.
• Two cases of workers being sent to Kuwait and Qatar respectively and finding the 
work was not as promised, and in one of those the agency did not reimburse the 
worker for expenses. The first case was brought only under section 54 but the 
outcome was not recorded. The second case was brought under section 55, which 
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alleges the recruitment agency intentionally misled the worker. The recruitment 
agency was fined NPR 100,000 (approximately US$ 1,000) but an award of com-
pensation for the worker was not recorded. 
• One case of a recruitment agency recruiting for work in Oman without obtaining 
DoFE pre-approval (there were no specific victims named in this file). The recruit-
ment agency was fined NPR 50,000 (approximately US$ 500) in accordance with 
Section 40.
It is difficult to determine from these few cases whether the DoFE process is leading 
to fair outcomes, given that so few cases are actually resolved, and the notations in the 
case files appear incomplete or possibly in some cases incorrect. A more extensive review 
specifically of cases resolved at the DoFE level would be highly recommended. The avail-
able information does suggest a number of challenges or shortcomings, however. First is 
incorrectly categorizing the case and/or relying heavily on section 54 which has the weak-
est of penalties under the Act—namely simply a warning for a first offense. In addition, 
although in two cases recruitment agencies were fined for the violation, it was not at all 
clear that they were ordered to compensate migrant workers for their losses. This would 
suggest that the outcomes are not necessarily benefitting migrant workers as intended.
8.2 Foreign Employment Tribunal
The Foreign Employment Tribunal (the tribunal) was established in 2010, as one of a 
number of specialized judicial bodies in Nepal that adjudicate specific types of cases.216
The tribunal is comprised of three members and is chaired by a judge of the 
appellate court.217 It is governed by the FEA 2007, which establishes its jurisdiction, 
and the Foreign Employment Tribunal Rules 2012, which provide further guidance on 
its procedures.
The tribunal is also governed by general judicial legislation, namely the Summary 
Procedures Act 2028 (1972). The Summary Procedures Act 1972 is intended, according 
to the preamble, “to provide for prompt disposal of small cases by following summary 
procedures.” The tribunal is therefore intended to be a fast and relatively informal 
forum.
Jurisdiction and Powers of the Tribunal
The jurisdiction of the tribunal is defined by the FEA Section 64(1) as: “For originally 
trying and settling cases other than those punishable by the department.” This includes 
all cases that fall within the following offenses under the FEA: 
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• A person operating a foreign employment business without a proper license;
• A person or recruitment agency using deceptive techniques for recruitment;
• Sending a person for foreign employment without DoFE permission;
• Engaging in fraud;
• Sending a minor for foreign employment;
• Sending a worker to an unauthorized country; and 
• Concealing or tampering with relevant documents. 
These types of offenses are not subject to the one-year limitation period for filing 
the complaint (Section 60), and all can potentially result in fines or a prison term for 
the individual agent or an officer of the company (Section 57).218 Table 8 below sets forth: 
the offenses to be tried by the Foreign Employment Tribunal; fines and possible terms 
of imprisonment; and compensation available to the worker. Note that only one offense 
applies to individual agents (highlighted), all others pertain to recruitment agencies.
TABLE 8: Criminal Offenses to Be Pprosecuted at the Foreign Employment Tribunal
Sec. Offense Fine, Term of Imprisonment 
and Other Penalty
Compensation to 
Migrant Worker
43 A person operates a foreign 
employment business without a 
license OR “collects any amount 
with intent to engage a person 
in foreign employment or sends 
a person abroad by giving false 
assurance or lures a person to be 
engaged in foreign employment”
300,000—500,000 Rupees
3–7 years imprisonment.
Any amount taken 
from the worker, 
and an additional 
50% of that amount.
Expenses occurred 
in traveling or 
returning to be 
realized.
44 If any licensee sends any worker 
abroad without obtaining 
permission from the Department 
or collects any amount by giving 
false assurance or showing 
enticement that the licensee 
would engage any person in 
foreign employment but does not 
send that person abroad.
300,000—500,000 Rupees
3–7 years imprisonment
Revocation of agency license.
Any amount taken 
from the worker, 
and an additional 
50% of that amount.
45 If any licensee sends any minor 
for foreign employment.
300,000–500,000 Rupees
3–7 years imprisonment.
None
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Sec. Offense Fine, Term of Imprisonment 
and Other Penalty
Compensation to 
Migrant Worker
46 If any licensee sends any worker 
to any country which has not 
been opened by the Government 
of Nepal for foreign employment 
or obtains a visa from a country 
which has been opened but 
sends the worker to a country 
which has not been opened.
300,000–500,000 Rupees
3–5 years imprisonment
Punishment halved if the 
person has not yet departed.
None
47 If any licensee knowingly 
conceals any document or report 
required to be maintained under 
this Act or the Rules framed 
under this Act or alters any 
matter therein or makes any false 
contents or causes anyone to 
prepare false details.
100,000–300,000 Rupees. 
6 months–1 year 
imprisonment. 
For a second offense penalty 
is doubled and agency license 
revoked.
None
Filing Cases at the Foreign Employment Tribunal
To file a case at the tribunal, DoFE—following review by a government attorney—submits 
a charge sheet to the registrar.219 The registrar, responsible for all administrative functions 
of the tribunal, receives the case files, and checks charge sheets and related documents for 
completeness.220 At the time of writing, all files at the tribunal were paper files and there 
was no computerized filing or case management system in operation.
If the charge sheet is complete, the matter is registered the same day. The tribu-
nal will communicate the case registration to the SGA Office and a prosecutor will be 
appointed to prosecute the case through the trial.221 If the defendant is present, his or 
her statement can be taken the same day, and a bail hearing conducted.222 If the charge 
sheet is incomplete, the registrar can reject it and inform the DoFE investigating officer, 
giving reasons.223
Detention, Bail and Hearings
Once the case is registered, the registrar will set the date for a hearing on evidence. The 
parties include the government attorney who prosecutes the case on behalf of the state, 
and the defendant.224 If the accused is a licensed recruitment agency, the employee or 
office-bearer who is accused of committing the offense will be the defendant, or the 
chief of the company if the relevant employee cannot be identified.225 The victim is not 
a party to the case, but may serve as a witness during the hearing on evidence and the 
final hearing. The hearings are relatively brief, usually no more than a day. The victim 
must attend on his or her own, as well as ensuring that any other witnesses presenting 
evidence in the victim’s case attend to give their statements.226
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Decisions, Execution, and Enforcement
In most cases, the judge or judges sitting on the tribunal will give their verdict on the 
same day as the hearing. The tribunal will eventually give the government attorney a 
copy of the full decision for the case file, but decisions are not published or otherwise 
made publicly available.227 Any party dissatisfied with a decision of the tribunal can 
appeal to the supreme court within 35 days of the verdict.228
If the victim is awarded compensation by the tribunal, defendants from recruit-
ment agencies may be ordered to pay a victim from the agency’s deposit. In cases where 
the deposit is insufficient, or the defendant is an individual agent, compensation must 
be taken from the property of the perpetrator.229 The tribunal does not have the power 
to enforce its decisions but rather the victim must make a separate application to the 
local district court to establish the available assets of the perpetrator and get an order 
for payment.230
This process is complicated, onerous, and time-consuming for victims and most 
are unaware of the requirements unless they have legal representation. A successful 
claim for compensation also requires that the defendant have assets, which many indi-
vidual agents, for example, do not. According to one legal officer:
 Implementation of decisions is the most difficult part when it comes to cases filed at the 
tribunal. The victim has to file another application to the execution section, requesting to be 
granted compensation from the property of the perpetrator. But if the perpetrator is unable 
to show property or does not have any property, then the victim will not be compensated. 
Therefore, even though the tribunal decides a case in the worker’s favor ordering that s/he 
be granted compensation, there is no guarantee that the victim will be compensated.231
Note that an application to the district court to enforce a court order is standard 
practice for all cases in Nepal, not just foreign employment cases. Nevertheless, the 
deputy attorney general noted that as a consequence of these procedures, “decision 
implementation has not been effective.” In his opinion, few victims obtain compensa-
tion from the defendant after a win at the tribunal.232
Awareness and Accessibility of the Tribunal 
Tribunal data suggests that the number of cases registered is relatively small. In the 12 
months of 2012/13, just 178 cases were registered at the tribunal. Of those, 164 were 
brought against individuals and 14 were brought against recruitment companies. In the 
prior three years 2009/10, 2010/11 and 2011/12 the tribunal registered 77, 97, and 196 
cases respectively. Given that all cases against individuals and some against recruitment 
agencies must be filed at the tribunal, and that DoFE receives several hundred cases per 
year, these figures seem remarkably low. 
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A review of the 214 case files examined as a part of this study also revealed a 
small number of cases progressing to the tribunal. Of the 187 files that had sufficient 
information, 158 claims had been accepted by DoFE and investigated (the remaining 
were rejected for various reasons, such as lack of evidence). Of these, 83.5 percent (132 
of 158) were forwarded to the prosecutor for advice, and 108 were then recommended 
for prosecution. However, only 10 were then registered at the tribunal. This means 
that only 5.4 percent of cases filed at DoFE were registered for a tribunal hearing, and 
another 98 worthy cases were left “pending” at DoFE.
When asked the reasons for registering so few cases, the legal director of DoFE 
blamed resource constraints. He also explained that many migrant workers sought to 
“withdraw” the case by writing a letter to DoFE to explain that they had already been paid 
compensation or some other reason. Although a victim cannot technically withdraw a 
case, he explained that this made the case less of a priority and so the prosecution of the 
offender would languish. As noted in the earlier section on DoFE, it is unclear whether 
victims are in fact paid sufficient compensation or whether they are threatened to with-
draw the case. It is clear though that failing to prosecute offenders for crimes under the 
act is a denial of justice for the victim of the crime. The process of investigation and pro-
cessing of complaints first by DoFE before referral to the tribunal creates extra hurdles for 
workers seeking to have their complaints prosecuted before the tribunal and to ultimately 
obtain compensation, and appears to serve as a barrier to accessing justice.
As with DoFE, the tribunal is located in Kathmandu, creating an additional bar-
rier to justice, in that victims are required to travel back and forth at their own expense. 
Workers also face potential threats to their safety. At the time of writing, no victim 
protection law was in place, so the victim’s security could not be guaranteed when 
testifying in a case against a recruitment agency or an individual agent, many of whom 
are personally acquainted with the victim or his or her family. This in itself could be a 
significant disincentive to seeking justice, and was raised as a concern by a number of 
lawyers interviewed for this study.233
Outcomes of the Tribunal Process
Because the decisions of the tribunal are not published it is difficult to analyze the out-
comes overall. Further, none of the six migrant workers interviewed in this study who 
had filed a case at DoFE had their cases registered in the tribunal (although all cases 
were against individual agents), so their perspectives were not available. However, in 
the course of this study, the authors obtained 12 cases forwarded to the tribunal from 
within the 214 sample case files. These cases are merely examples of the types of cases 
that the tribunal has determined, but they nevertheless support three observations. 
First, the cases that reached the tribunal were concerned with violations of Sec-
tions 10 and 43 of FEA 2007. As noted above, Section 10 prohibits an individual under-
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taking a business relating to foreign employment without a license, and section 43 
criminalizes such conduct. All cases pertained to allegations that the accused individual 
had collected money from the victim with the promise of arranging work abroad, but 
then failed to send him or her. 
To cite one example, in the case of the Government of Nepal acting on the com-
plaint of Indra Bahadur Raut v. Surya Bahadur Thing,234 the complainant (Raut) alleged 
that the defendant (Thing) took money from him with the promise that Thing would send 
him abroad to the UAE. The complainant also alleged that the defendant was carrying on 
the business of foreign employment without obtaining the necessary permit and license.
After investigation, DoFE referred the case to the district attorney, who deter-
mined that the evidence was sufficient to proceed to the tribunal. The district attorney 
advised that the defendants could be charged with violation of Sections 10 and 43 of the 
FEA 2007. The principle evidence in the case was a deed signed by both parties, which 
described the amount of money paid by the victim (NPR 80,000, approximately US$ 
800) and the promise to send the worker to the UAE. The deed was supported by the 
testimony of the victim. The tribunal found the accused guilty of having failed to send 
the complainant to the UAE, ordered him to compensate the victim the NPR 80,000 
and sentenced him to one year in prison. There is no information regarding whether 
the compensation was in fact paid. 
Second, very few recruitment agency personnel are being tried for more serious 
crimes at the tribunal. Instead, claims against recruitment agencies are being resolved at 
DoFE or are “withdrawn”. The DoFE legal director could recall only one case in the past 
year in which a recruitment agency director was prosecuted, namely for defrauding a 
large number of prospective migrant workers. The reason given for the low rate of pros-
ecution of recruitment agency personnel was that the cases that attract serious charges 
against recruitment agencies occur rarely (for example sending a minor), or migrant 
workers are reluctant to prosecute them. For example, where a migrant worker has given 
money to a recruitment agency but has not been sent abroad within the required three 
months, DoFE believed that most migrant workers would prefer to wait and hope the job 
materialized, rather than file a complaint—they understand the process takes time and 
know that prosecution will result in not being sent. However, the lack of prosecutions 
could also be due to intimidation by recruitment agencies that results in workers settling, 
and the case not being registered (as noted above regarding agents).
Third, in many cases, the issue before the tribunal is whether the money collected 
under the deed was in fact for foreign employment purposes as claimed, or for purposes 
other than foreign employment. As noted above, experts believe that many cases filed 
at DoFE do not pertain to foreign employment at all, but rather use the foreign employ-
ment system to resolve personal debt cases, for example for household goods, because the 
system is faster than the regular courts. However, the possibilities of threats or coercion 
against the victims by recruitment agencies or individual agents cannot be ruled out. 
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To cite an example, in the case of the Government of Nepal acting on the com-
plaint of Khagendra Bahadur Shrestha v. Ghanashyam Tamang and Gopal Tamang, a com-
plaint was filed by Khagendra Bahadur Shrestha stating that the defendants Ghanashyam 
Tamang and Gopal Tamang took money from him and promised to send him to Dubai for 
employment. After investigation, the prosecutor instituted a case against the defendants 
accusing them of committing an offence under Section 10 and Section 43 of the act.
During the proceedings, the victim testified before the tribunal that money was 
given to the defendants as a loan for household purposes and not as fees for foreign 
employment. That is, the victim had acted as a moneylender to the defendants, and 
the defendants had not repaid him. The tribunal decided that the monetary transaction 
did not occur for the purposes of sending the complainant abroad to Dubai for foreign 
employment and, therefore, the defendants were not guilty of an offense under the FEA 
2007. It is unclear why such cases are not filtered out during the DoFE investigation stage 
or the prosecutor review stage.
National Human Rights Commission and National Women 
Commission of Nepal
Nepal has two commissions specializing in human rights and women’s 
rights respectively. The National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) was 
established in 2000 by statute and, under the interim constitution, is a con-
stitutional body.235 The commission has powers to receive and investigate 
individual complaints, as well as to conduct investigations on its own initia-
tive. In recent years the NHRC has undertaken a number of activities related 
to migrant workers, including a conference in 2012, and a monitoring visit to 
South Korea and Malaysia.236 Interviewees noted, however, that no individual 
complaints regarding violations of the rights of migrant workers had been 
received or investigated by the commission.
The National Women Commission (NWC) of Nepal was established by stat-
ute in 2007 to advocate for the rights of women. Like the NHRC, the NWC 
comprises one chairperson and four other commissioners, all of whom are 
supported by a secretariat. The NWC is an autonomous body, and focuses 
its efforts on promoting gender equality and raising awareness regarding 
violence against women. To date, it does not appear to have taken up the 
situation of Nepali women migrant workers in depth.
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8.3 The Court System
In addition to the specialized tribunal, migrant workers can use Nepal’s regular system 
of courts to seek redress for crimes under the HTTCA or the Civil Code (see Chapter 7- 
Relevant Laws). District courts hear both civil and criminal cases. District court decisions 
can be appealed to an appeals court and/or to the supreme court based in Kathmandu. 
Criminal proceedings in the district courts usually begin with a complaint filed at a 
local police station. The case is investigated, and if the evidence is sufficient, prosecuted by 
a district attorney. Nepal’s courts are routinely criticized for being expensive, administra-
tively complicated, non-transparent, and inaccessible to the poor and other marginalized 
groups.237 These problems may only have deepened with delays in the constitution-writing 
process and on-going political tension and instability.238 Freedom House in 2012 found, 
for example, that policymakers were preoccupied with transition to a new constitution 
and were distracted from other critical infrastructural, governmental, and human rights 
issues.239 The conflict also substantially increased court backlogs and inefficiencies.240
One lawyer interviewed for this study noted that he had handled several foreign 
employment cases for “cheating” in the district courts—in all cases the migrant worker 
had initiated the case independently and then contacted him for assistance. However, as 
noted earlier in Chapter 7, the compensation available under the civil code is lower than 
that under the FEA 2007 for similar offenses, and thus he believed migrant workers to 
be better served by filing cases with DoFE.241 He was of the view that if a case brought 
in the district courts was appealed to the supreme court, there was a high chance the 
supreme court would find that the district court did not have jurisdiction over the case, 
and that foreign employment cases are solely within the jurisdiction of DoFE and the 
Foreign Employment Tribunal.242
Cases from both district courts and the tribunal can be appealed directly to the 
supreme court. The supreme court has broad remedial jurisdiction granted by the 
Interim Constitution 2007, Article 107(2).243 It can enforce rights under the constitu-
tion or any other right for which no remedy or an inadequate remedy has been provided, 
and it can settle constitutional or legal questions “in any dispute of public interest of 
concern.” It can, therefore, hear challenges of law and challenges related to remedies, 
including the amount of compensation awarded by a lower court/quasi-judicial body 
such as the Foreign Employment Tribunal. 
Nepal Supreme Court decisions are generally not published online, and the 
authors could not identify from interviewees or other sources whether many foreign 
employment-related cases have come before the supreme court. Several lawyers prac-
ticing in the field of foreign employment noted that a new foreign employment law 
was being drafted, and they did not want to file cases in the supreme court that could 
potentially delay any new law while the supreme court deliberated. 
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Trafficking and Other Criminal Cases at the Tribunal
Although rarely mentioned by participants in this study, some of the harms 
experienced by migrant workers (and prospective migrant workers) clearly 
gave rise to offenses under other statutes besides the FEA 2007. These 
include human trafficking or transportation under the Human Trafficking 
and Transportation Control Act (2007) (see Section 7.3-Human Trafficking 
and Transportation (Control) Act 2007) or other criminal offenses such as 
extortion, threats of violence or actual violence under criminal law. 
Legal experts explained that trafficking or other criminal cases are referred 
by the prosecutor to the police for investigation and hearing in the regular 
criminal courts, but acknowledged this happens rarely and only in cases 
involving sexual exploitation. Indeed, the American Bar Association has con-
cluded that cross-border trafficking for the purposes of labor exploitation is 
generally only charged under the FEA 2007 and is not deemed to be “traf-
ficking” as such.244
This may partly be due to neither the FEA 2007 nor the HTTCA defining 
trafficking in persons as it relates to foreign labor migration and the HTTCA 
equating much trafficking with prostitution, whether forced or not (see 
Chapter 7-Relevant Laws above). This potentially creates confusion among 
justice system actors about the legal classification of cases that involve the 
exploitation of Nepali migrant workers.245 One Nepali judge interviewed by 
the American Bar Association appeared to incorrectly believe that all cases 
having to do with foreign employment were under the sole jurisdiction of the 
Foreign Employment Tribunal.246 A lawyer interviewed for this study acknowl-
edged that some foreign employment cases could be trafficking, but stated 
he believed victims would not file these cases because either they did not 
understand the law, or they wanted a quick resolution which could not be 
obtained through a trafficking prosecution. A victim of trafficking in persons 
is entitled to compensation upon conviction of the defendant. The amount 
of compensation should not be lower than half of the fine imposed upon 
the offender as a punishment.247 He did not mention advising his clients 
about this option.248
Other reasons for migrant workers not bringing trafficking cases may be the 
lengthy delays commonly suffered in the regular court system, and the fact 
that trafficking is associated with prostitution and highly stigmatized, or is 
generally seen as a women’s issue not relevant to male migrant workers.249
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It is unclear how many cases heard by the tribunal involve elements of traf-
ficking.250 The authors are aware of at least one case of migrant worker 
exploitation heard in a Nepali court.251 Analysis of the overall number and 
type of such cases is not possible because Nepali government data on pros-
ecutions under the HTTCA does not specify whether charges were for labor 
trafficking, sex trafficking or non-trafficking offenses.252 From July 2011-July 
2012, the Nepali police recorded 118 trafficking cases—all were for forced 
sexual exploitation.253 Nepal Supreme Court data shows an increase in traf-
ficking cases being tried by the district, appellate and supreme courts—up 
to 748 in July 2011–July 2012.254
8.4 Compensation in the Case of Death or Disability
When a migrant worker loses his or her life or is seriously and permanently injured 
while abroad, he or she may have access to two sources of financial redress: private 
insurance and a public compensation scheme called the Foreign Employment Welfare 
Fund managed by the Foreign Employment Promotion Board.
Private Insurance
Recruitment agencies are required to purchase life insurance for a migrant worker 
through the private insurance market as a condition of obtaining government approval for 
the worker to leave the country.255 The law requires that the insurance cover migrant work-
ers for loss of life or mutilation (interpreted by an insurance company interviewee as a 
permanent disability) during the period of their employment contract, up to an amount of 
NPR 500,000 (approximately US$ 5,000).256 The insurance premium is then passed on 
to the worker. Workers travelling independently must purchase insurance on their own.257
Nepal has nine registered life insurance companies (listed on the DoFE website), 
four of which offer a specialized life insurance product for migrant workers.258 The 
registered life insurance companies do not need separate permission to conduct foreign 
employment insurance business.259 According to one insurer, this product differs from 
standard life insurance in that the premium is paid only once (instead of periodically) 
and a claim can only be made if the worker dies or is permanently disabled.260 Insur-
ance companies develop their own products, however, and set their own premiums, 
depending on the age of the worker and the duration of the coverage. Several recruit-
ment agencies explained that the amount of the premium depends on the worker’s age; 
workers aged 18–35 usually pay around NPR 1,800 (around US$ 18).261
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Recruitment agencies are not under any legal obligation to inform the migrant 
worker that he or she is insured, or to explain the insurance coverage. Several civil soci-
ety organization interviewees were of the belief that migrant workers are rarely if ever 
informed by the agency or the insurer about their coverage. One noted, “Migrant work-
ers do not have information on the process, they don’t even know why they paid NPR 
1,000 [to the Welfare Fund, see next section] or that they have insurance coverage.”262
Supporting this view, of the 27 former migrant workers who took part in focus 
groups for this study, 18 said they were not insured—indicating either that they trav-
eled irregularly and did not know about the insurance requirement, or that they were 
insured but unaware of that fact. Only 9 said they were given a receipt for insurance 
with their travel documents. 
Purchase of insurance is not limited to regular migrants—any individual plan-
ning to work abroad could theoretically purchase life insurance. However, civil soci-
ety organizations and others believed that irregular migrants are much less likely to 
purchase insurance, either because their agents are unlikely to inform them of the 
possibility, or because they depart through India (or another country) and so make 
travel arrangements there, or because they do not wish to spend the additional money. 
Consequently, irregular workers are usually not insured prior to departure.
Claiming Insurance
Data on insurance claims is limited. DoFE does not require insurers to submit data on 
numbers of policies purchased, or the number of claims made. As part of DoFE’s initia-
tive to reduce forgery of insurance documents, though, the department now requires 
insurance companies to maintain an online database of details of policy buyers for 
at least five years.263 A total of 936,697 migrant workers purchased insurance over 
the last 18 months and among them 1,159 insured parties have received claims worth 
NPR 683 million (approximately US$ 683,000).264 One insurance company interviewed 
reported that it sells between 600 and 700 migrant worker life insurance policies per 
day. Out of these, in fiscal year 2012/13, the number of claims received and paid by the 
same insurance company for deaths was 217 while that for injuries was 26.265 Another 
insurance company indicated that it received approximately 15–20 claims per month—a 
small payout rate compared with the approximately 20,000 policies it sells per month.
Those interviewed, including civil society organizations, recruitment agencies 
and an insurer, suggested that the claims process is straightforward. To file a claim for 
insurance, migrant workers or their families must present documents to prove that 
the death or mutilation occurred, along with the identity of the insured person and 
the claimant. According to a recruitment agency interviewed for the study, most insur-
ers require a letter from the recruitment agency, a death certificate from the hospital 
which is certified by the Nepali embassy, a cargo airway bill of the body, a letter from 
MIGRANT WORKERS’ ACCESS TO JUSTICE AT HOME: NEPAL  121
the embassy, an immigration letter, the worker’s passport and a relationship certificate 
(nata pramanit) verifying the worker’s relationship to the compensation-seeker. In case 
of injury the insured needs to submit a medical report from the hospital abroad and 
medical report from a hospital in Nepal for the payment.266
In some cases, the insured’s family will contact the recruitment agency directly 
for help in claiming insurance. The agency holds the policy and the receipt of purchase, 
and is usually required to provide a letter supporting the family’s claim. The FEA 2007 
and Rules 2008 do not place any obligations on recruitment agencies to assist workers 
or families to make insurance claims, so different recruitment companies may handle 
the requests differently. The director of one agency explained, “We do not play any big 
role” and described simply providing the insurance receipt to the worker or family 
member upon request.267 Another director said that his staff would manage the whole 
process for the claimants, particularly in death cases:268
 The process is quite simple so the families should not have any problems in accessing insur-
ance. In fact we do most of the process and they only go to collect the money. The family 
members only have to bring the nata pramanit letter [relationship certificate] from the village 
development committee [certifying the relationship between the insured and the claimant], 
other documents are arranged or collected by us. We have staff to work on the process.
Several civil society organizations also assist migrant workers to submit claims 
and one organization representative reported that most of his work was assisting work-
ers to file insurance or other compensation claims.269 He reported that if the migrant 
worker did not have the above documents, he would contact the recruitment agency, 
which generally cooperates in providing whatever documents it can. 
Recruitment agencies and civil society organizations interviewed generally 
believed that the insurance system is accessible and effective as a means of redress. The 
procedures are simple and most eligible workers receive a payment. Receiving insur-
ance also does not preclude workers from receiving compensation from other sources. 
As one recruitment agency director said:270
 I think the system is effective. Though the worker has passed away, at least his family mem-
bers get some relief. Recently, a worker who had gone through our agency passed away in 
the destination country. His family received NPR 1,200,000 compensation in total—NPR 
500,000 from private insurance, NPR 100,000 from the Foreign Employment Welfare 
Fund, and his employer paid the family NPR 500,000–600,000 compensation. If the com-
panies are good, they pay compensation.
The only complaint respondents made was that insurance appears to be limited 
to regular workers still within their contract period when the death or injury occurred. 
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Both civil society organization and recruitment agency noted that many migrant work-
ers have their contracts extended by their employer, but are not informed by their 
employer or agent that they need to purchase further insurance, or do not know how 
to do so, and thus they are no longer covered.271 Women migrants, who mostly travel 
outside of regular channels, are also invariably excluded from the insurance system.
Payment of Claims
According to an insurer and other interviewees, claims are rarely if ever rejected because 
fraud in life insurance cases is rare—death and permanent disability are difficult 
to falsify. 
The payment amount depends on the injury. In cases of death, families receive 
100 percent of the insured amount, amounting to NPR 500,000 for the death, and NPR 
50,000 to cover the funeral. The Nepali insurance company will usually also reimburse 
the family for the repatriation of the body from abroad up to NPR 100,000.272 In dis-
ability cases, the insurer will determine coverage based on the extent of the disability. 
In one sample policy, permanent illness, loss of a limb and loss of eyesight in both eyes 
would result in payment of 100 percent of the insured amount. Other injuries receive 
a lower level of compensation—for example loss of eyesight in one eye received 50 
percent compensation.273
In general, recruitment agencies and NGOs viewed private life insurance as a 
relatively straightforward method of obtaining redress for the unfortunate few who 
need to submit a claim. However, given that the insurance companies are largely based 
in Kathmandu, it is likely that travel to the capital to arrange documents and file the 
claim may pose a problem for some migrant workers and their families. Because none 
of the migrants who participated in this study needed to claim insurance, the authors 
were unable to obtain the perspectives of workers and their families regarding the 
insurance system.
Another shortcoming of the current insurance system is its limited coverage 
against deaths and mutilation only. In some cases classification of injury as permanent 
rather than temporary disability might take several months, delaying payment.274 More-
over, many workers experience medical problems, in some cases leading to voluntary 
or involuntary return, but without general medical insurance are unable to seek proper 
medical care either in the destination country or upon return to Nepal. 
The most significant gaps identified were the lack of information provided to 
migrant workers and their families regarding insurance, the lack of centralized data on 
insurance purchased and claimed by migrant workers, and the effective exclusion of 
workers who leave Nepal irregularly or who find themselves working outside the term 
of their employment contract. 
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Foreign Employment Welfare Fund
Another potential source of compensation for families of workers who have lost their 
lives while abroad, or suffered a permanent disability, is the Foreign Employment Wel-
fare Fund managed by the Foreign Employment Promotion Board (FEPB).
The welfare fund is a public fund that was established in 2008 under FEA  2007 
“for the social security and welfare of workers who have gone for foreign employment 
and returned from foreign employment, and their families.”275 Every worker leaving for 
foreign employment must pay NPR 1000 (approximately USD 10) into the welfare fund 
to obtain DoFE approval for departure.  
The FEPB is authorized to use the welfare fund to carry out programs and activi-
ties to improve worker welfare.276 This includes skills training for workers, employment 
programs after workers’ return, medical treatment for workers’ families, and establish-
ment and operation of childcare centers for children of female migrant workers.277 So 
far, the welfare fund has been used primarily for: 
• Repatriating workers who have been mutilated in the course of working abroad, 
providing compensation to those workers, and providing financial assistance to 
those workers upon return, or to their families;
• Where a worker has died while abroad and “his or her dead body is not attended 
by any one, bringing the dead body to Nepal and providing financial assistance to 
his or her family.”278
At the time of writing, the FEPB had initiated other efforts such as training for 
out-bound migrant workers and empowering returnee women, as well as seeking to 
increase the number and types of reintegration programs.279
Finances and Management of the Foreign Employment Welfare Fund
The welfare fund is funded by: the fees migrant workers pay before departure, and the 
interest earned by investing the deposits; license fees collected from recruitment agen-
cies and training institutions; any other amount received from foreign employment-
related institutions; and grants received from local or foreign entities.280 It is held by a 
commercial bank of the FEPB’s choice, and decisions to spend from the fund are made 
by a vote of the FEPB.281
Since its creation, the welfare fund has gained significant value. At the end of 
2009/10, the fund was estimated to hold NPR 580 million,282 and by March 2014 it had 
increased to NPR 2.14 billion.283 The FEPB has spent very little of the money available. 
One media report stated that the fund had gathered NPR 540.03 million between 2007 
and 2009, but only spent NPR 84.5 million, leaving it with a surplus of NPR 453.8 mil-
lion.284 Reportedly, many of the programs proposed to be supported by the welfare fund 
have yet to be implemented, and the fund has focused solely on rescue, repatriation and 
compensation in death cases.285
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In addition, the FEPB has been accused of mismanagement of the fund. For 
example, in 2010 a board member accused the board of approving items that were not 
allowed under the law, including refurbishing the office of the Minister of Labor and 
Employment, and for fuel and maintenance of his vehicles.286
Paying into the Welfare Fund and Awareness of the Fund
The FEA 2007 and Rules 2008 do not specify who is responsible for making the pay-
ment into the fund. In practice, recruitment agencies generally pay the NPR 1,000 
amount, and then charge it to the worker as part of his or her recruitment fees. Indi-
viduals traveling independently pay into the fund on their own.
Information about the welfare fund is provided to workers in the two-day pre-
departure orientation. Unfortunately, however, many workers do not attend this orien-
tation (see Chapter 9—Obstacles to Access to Justice). Similar to insurance, many civil 
society organizations were of the view that recruitment agencies do not inform migrant 
workers about the welfare fund, and do not explain that the fee has been paid as part of 
the overall recruitment fees. Not one of the 54 migrant workers interviewed or partici-
pating in the focus group discussions mentioned payment into the fund as one of the 
steps they took pre-departure. 
Procedures for Making Claims to the Welfare Fund
Claims for financial assistance can be submitted to the FEPB in cases of death or muti-
lation but only by workers who maintained regular status and who have paid into the 
fund.287 In cases of death, the nearest heir to the deceased worker may submit the 
claim.288 In cases of mutilation, the injured worker must submit the claim directly to the 
FEPB Secretariat. In both cases, the migrant worker or heir must travel to Kathmandu 
to submit the documents. To submit a claim the worker or family must demonstrate:
• The worker was a regular migrant authorized by DoFE to work abroad;
• The death or injury occurred abroad during the period of the worker’s employ-
ment contract; and 
• The petition is submitted to the FEPB Secretariat within one year of the death or 
injury.289
Documentation required to support the claim, as listed on the application form 
includes:290
• Worker’s or deceased worker’s passport;
• Employment contract;
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• Evidence of the worker or deceased worker’s citizenship; and
• Letter of recommendation from the relevant Nepali embassy.291
In addition, claimants for financial assistance in case of death must provide evi-
dence of their relationship to the worker, photographs of the next of kin, and the death 
certificate. Claimants in the case of mutilation must also provide evidence of the injury 
including photographs, a medical report292 and prescription for treatment from a Nepali 
government hospital after returning, as well as the return air ticket to Nepal.293
In both cases, the maximum amount of assistance is NPR 150,000 (approximately 
US$ 1500).294 This is a flat amount in cases of death. In cases of injury, the amount of 
assistance provided depends on the nature and gravity of the injury. According to the 
former Acting Executive Director of the FEPB:295
 Generally, it takes around half an hour to one hour from receiving an application to providing 
compensation. However, in case of disability-related compensation when the technical com-
mittee needs to determine the level of disability, it takes time. It may be difficult to determine 
the level of disability in some cases like mental depression etc.
Forms of Compensation paid out to workers or their families in 2013/2014 are 
set out below.
TABLE 9: Welfare Fund by Nature of Claim and Number of Recipients 2013/2014296
Nature of Claim Number of Recipients
Death 570
“Mutilation” 58
Medical Expenses 13
Repatriation of workers in distress to Nepal 25
Repatriation of deceased to Nepal 20
Transportation of deceased from Kathmandu to home community 254
Source: FEPB
Assessment of the Welfare Fund 
As noted above, awareness of the fund among migrant workers participating in this 
study was low. This lack of awareness could be attributed to the small number of work-
ers who attended orientation training, and the failure on the part of recruitment agen-
cies to inform the workers about the fund.
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None of the migrant worker participants had submitted a claim to the fund, so 
their perceptions of accessibility and fairness are not available. An FEPB official indi-
cated his belief that the process for receiving compensation from the fund is smooth 
and effective. As with the private insurance, however, lawyers and civil society organiza-
tions participating in this study noted a significant gap in protection in the exclusion 
of migrant workers sent irregularly, even if without their knowledge, who therefore 
may not have paid into the fund.297 This highlights another way in which difficulties in 
accessing justice for labor migrants are compounded when that worker travels outside 
of the government-regulated system.
8.5 Embassy Assistance for Nepalis Abroad
Many migrant workers who experience harms while abroad attempt to resolve their 
cases in the destination country, and many of those seek assistance from the Nepali 
embassy. Of the 54 migrant workers interviewed for this study, 32 (approximately 60 
percent) reported active interaction with embassy officials at some point in their journey.
This section outlines the services that the Government of Nepal provides through 
its embassies to citizens who wish to file a claim against a sponsor, employer or agent 
abroad. Assistance may include facilitated negotiation, connection with legal advice, or 
assistance in accessing the dispute resolution forums in the destination country such as 
labor courts. However, each embassy operates with relative independence and thus the 
embassy services depend on both the destination country context and the ambassador 
in that country at that time.298 This section draws mainly on interviews in respect to 
Qatar, where the largest population of Nepalis in the Gulf is based.
These interviews suggest that the core work of labor attachés and other embassy 
staff regarding migrant workers is assisting irregular workers to return home, for exam-
ple by arranging exit permits and temporary passports, and repatriating the bodies of 
deceased workers or workers in distress. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA) web-
site also states that “consular and legal consultation services” for migrant workers in 
destination countries include:
 [I]nvestigation, rescue and repatriation of injured migrant workers, deceased workers, 
stranded workers, workers without money, workers who do not receive work as per contract, 
workers who enter a destination illegally and become irregular workers; and provide com-
pensation, insurance, and remaining remunerations of deceased or injured workers.299
These functions that are often essential to protect the rights of migrant workers 
and their families are worthy of further study. However, they are not addressed in detail 
in this section, which explores the work of embassies in obtaining redress within the 
destination countries.
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Consular Services of Embassies
Nepal has embassies in all six Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries (Bahrain, 
Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates) as well as in Israel,300 
all of which offer some form of consular services to its citizens. Notably, Nepal does 
not yet have an embassy in Lebanon despite the significant number of female migrant 
workers in that country.
There are no regulations and no formal government guidelines outlining services 
provided to migrant workers by Nepali overseas missions. Some embassies do have 
labor attachés appointed by the Ministry of Labor and Employment, however, charged 
with general protection duties.301 The first labor attachés were appointed in late 2011 
after the MoFA and the MoLE agreed that the attachés would operate under the author-
ity of the ambassador.302 As of April 2014, Nepali embassies in four Gulf countries 
(Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates) have a labor attaché, and 
the government has plans to place labor attachés in Bahrain and Oman.303
The labor attachés’ responsibilities include research and advice to Nepal’s govern-
ment regarding the labor market in the destination country, and support to migrant 
workers. The latter includes dispute resolution, repatriation of workers who have been 
made “helpless,” repatriation of the remains of a deceased worker, and “providing neces-
sary advice” to workers including to “discourage them to do any work other than set forth 
in the agreement.”304 Interviewees confirmed that this comprises the bulk of the services 
embassies provide to migrant workers in the Gulf.305
Whether embassies are responsible for giving more concrete advice and support to 
migrant workers who face charges or have complaints against their employers is unclear. 
The law does not specifically task either embassy staff nor labor attachés with these func-
tions. Nor are they explicitly charged with gathering information on specific employers 
or agencies abroad, particularly those that have a poor reputation regarding treatment of 
workers. Indeed, a former Nepali ambassador to Qatar expressed the view that: 
 There are no specific mandate[s] for embassies to work on migrant workers issues. The pri-
mary aim of all Nepali embassies in all the destination countries is ‘economic diplomacy’—
how do you get the countries to invest more in Nepal. However, for countries like Qatar, 
where there are lots of Nepali migrant workers, you inevitably end up working on migrant 
workers’ issues just because of the sheer number of Nepali workers there.
However, another former ambassador was clearly of the view that embassies must 
provide services to migrant workers, indicating the range of different approaches that 
ambassadors may take. He noted: “It is the foreign missions who are responsible to 
protect the interests of our citizens.”
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Assistance Services in Practice
Despite the lack of official emphasis on access to justice for migrant workers, it appears 
that most embassies do provide some kind of ad hoc legal assistance. In Qatar under 
former ambassador Sharma, for example, the embassy’s services included directly nego-
tiating with employers on behalf of Nepali citizens if the worker wished to continue 
working, referring the migrant worker to other services such as the Qatar Labor Depart-
ment or the courts, or putting a worker in contact with affordable legal advice.306 
In some cases the embassy may assist groups of workers with a grievance against 
an employer, that is cases of industrial action. In one case, for example, 200 migrant 
workers arrived at the embassy alleging non-payment of wages and other violations. The 
embassy hired three buses to return the workers to the worksite, contacted the police, 
and then facilitated a compromise. However, the former ambassador noted that such 
cases were rare because the Government of Qatar discouraged embassies from getting 
involved in labor disputes and requested that disputes rather be referred to the Qatar 
Labor Department.307
The embassy in Doha does not have a lawyer on staff, but instead has an arrange-
ment with a Qatari lawyer who assists the embassies of a number of countries.308  If 
the migrant worker wishes to take legal action, the lawyer can represent the workers in 
return for a contingency fee of 20 percent of any compensation awarded. While clearly 
expensive, one former ambassador reported this was a lower rate than if the migrant 
worker had contacted a private lawyer independently, where a contingency fee of 40–50 
percent was common.
Former ambassador Mishra said that, during his tenure, the labor attaché would 
assist migrant workers to register cases with the labor court and provide advice and 
a translator. He noted, however, that the process was challenging for migrant work-
ers because they are generally not provided with food and accommodation by their 
employer during the proceedings (although that is apparently required under Qatari 
law) and the embassy does not have a long-term shelter. Accordingly, he said that most 
workers gave up on their cases and accepted only a return ticket home from their 
employers. For domestic workers, the challenges were greater because they are not rec-
ognized under Qatari labor law and so must go to the civil courts, a much longer and 
more expensive process than the labor courts.309
Amongst participants in this study, migrant workers who had contacted their 
embassy reported that embassy staff or the labor attaché (participants were unaware 
which person assisted them) took a range of actions, depending on the type of case and 
the individual staff member. For example, three former migrant workers reported that 
embassy officials, including an ambassador in one case, referred the case to the labor 
court and advised the workers (but did not arrange for legal representation) during the 
proceedings. Another three reported that the embassy directly communicated with the 
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employer to resolve the dispute, and one said that the embassy helped him to recover 
lost wages. Three others reported that embassy officials interacted directly with police on 
behalf of workers who had been arrested, but another stated that the ambassador advised 
him to turn himself into the police for having false documents in order to be sent home:
 The quarrel [with my sponsor] became very intense. I took legal steps. I stopped working and 
went to the embassy. I told my problem to the ambassador. He checked my visa and told me 
that I have a visa used for domestic workers, which I did not know about. I panicked then 
and cried. He told me to contact the Crime Investigation Department (CID) and they would 
send me back. I said that they will put me in jail and press charges. He told me to contact 
the CID and then he would do the follow-up. I went to the CID and they threatened [the 
employer] saying that since my contract is already over, the employer cannot stop me and 
should let me go. CID threatened him by saying that they will blacklist him if he does not 
come on track. After 10 days, the employer got me a ticket. I was deported and now I cannot 
go there for the next two years. Nepal embassy did not provide me any help. I did not do 
anything wrong for this. I feel I did not get justice.310
Some workers contacted the embassy while they were in what they referred to as 
“prison” (most likely immigration detention centers) in the destination country. Indeed 
a number of workers tried to get themselves arrested, as suggested by the statement 
above, so that the destination country government would deport them. After their arrest, 
the embassy would assist with processing documents.
Awareness and Accessibility of Embassy
Overall, Nepali migrant workers seemed familiar with the Nepal embassy as a source of 
assistance in GCC countries—in fact, the embassy was the only Nepali institution that 
most migrant workers were aware of. However, there was a significant gender differ-
ence in this regard; whereas all male migrant workers were aware of the embassy, only 
one female migrant worker out of nine focus group participants knew that the embassy 
existed before she left.  
Migrant workers were not provided with thorough information about Nepali 
embassies prior to departure. The orientation training curriculum, under Part 2, Section 
8, covers embassies under the title “Workers’ Behavior and Attitude, and Welfare, Rights 
and Responsibilities” and mentions that “the Nepali embassies abroad are primarily 
active for the welfare, security and necessary support to the Nepalis.” In countries 
where there are no Nepali embassies, “various other supporting agencies could be con-
tacted.”311  No additional information is included in the curriculum. The country-specific 
leaflets that are circulated by the Migrant Resource Centre (housed in the FEPB) provide 
the address and contact information of the embassies in specific countries, but do not 
provide any other information such as the nature of services provided or consular rights. 
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Even workers who know to contact the embassy for assistance encounter barriers 
to access. Two migrant workers who returned from Saudi Arabia, for example, cited 
their distance from the embassy as a barrier to accessing its services, though this is less 
of an issue for workers in smaller countries like Qatar. 
Other barriers include the lack of a clear legislative mandate to assist migrant 
workers, and lack of adequate resources to service the needs of migrant workers. All 
experts interviewed with knowledge of embassy services agreed that Nepali embassies 
were severely under-staffed and under-resourced to meet the diverse needs of migrant 
workers who sought assistance with their cases. One former ambassador noted that the 
number of people available to work on migrant labor issues was insufficient to meet 
the demand, and they were hampered by not having a lawyer on staff.312  For more 
on resources and training as barriers to accessing justice (see Chapter 9–Obstacles to 
Access to Justice).
Outcomes and Satisfaction with Embassy Services
Worker satisfaction with embassy services appears to be highly dependent on the 
individual officials who responded to the worker’s complaints. Some workers found 
embassy staff to be very helpful, particularly with preparation of new documents and 
arranging a flight home. Others, however, were dissatisfied with their treatment. Six 
(25 percent) of the 24 migrant workers in our sample who had contacted an embassy 
reported that staff did not actively help or refused to help them. Instead, they attempted 
to pacify or minimize their concerns. One returned worker reported that an ambassador 
told him: “Nepalis want to return to Nepal because they get nostalgic and not because 
of any problems created by the employers.” Another said that the ambassador told him 
simply to wait in detention until his case had been processed. One migrant worker even 
alleged that the official who visited him in a Saudi Arabian jail demanded a 200 Riyal 
bribe in order to help him. He paid this money and in return received replacement 
travel documents and an air ticket.313
Those who did receive assistance mentioned that it was after significant delay, 
and that they contacted the embassy several times before receiving a response. In other 
cases, the embassy was hamstrung in the assistance it could provide to workers, hav-
ing no legal powers in the destination country. And in at least one case, the embassy 
staff advised workers to get themselves arrested so their case would be processed more 
quickly. 
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Jagadish’s Experience
Jagadish had a BA in mathematics but could not find employment in Nepal. 
To support his family, he left in 2011 to work in Qatar as a foreman on a 
construction site. A relative in Nepal had arranged the position for a salary of 
1,500 Riyal per month, so Jagadish travelled independently, taking out a loan 
of NPR 300,000 to cover his expenses including obtaining a visa, labor permit, 
and insurance, from a travel agency in Nepal. However, he did not receive a 
contract before departure, and did not attend a pre-departure orientation. All 
he knew from friends in Nepal was that “If I suffer any problem, our embassy 
will work to bring justice to us.” He recounted:
As soon as I reached Qatar the company took all of my documents and I couldn’t 
access them again. The work was what I expected but we weren’t paid at all. We 
weren’t even given money to buy food and were often hungry. Also, we weren’t 
given secure lodgings but instead had to sleep in the reception of the company—the 
owner of the official lodgings wouldn’t let us enter because the company had not 
paid him for five months. 
After enduring this situation for three months, I went to the embassy. In the 
embassy, I filled out a form describing my problems and I talked to the ambas-
sador who was very helpful. But then the ambassador got transferred and all my 
hopes were shattered. The new ambassador was not sympathetic at all—he said 
that I was just homesick and wanted to get home. I told him that I wanted to work 
in Qatar if the company paid me. 
Finally, the ambassador wrote a letter to the labor court and I went there every day 
for seven days to follow up on my case. The court told me to bring the company 
owner to the court, but I could not make him come. On the sixth day, the court 
itself called the owner, but he did not respond. The court suggested I take my case 
to the high court, but this was not feasible for me so I went back to the embassy to 
ask for a better alternative. 
The ambassador called the owner but he did not respond again, and the embassy 
didn’t do anything else to contact him. In the end, I just decided to return to Nepal 
but it was complicated because I didn’t have my documents. There were many 
Nepalis like me, without any documents, waiting to return to Nepal. One day, luck-
ily, I found my employer and showed him the complaint papers I filed at the labor 
court. I told him that if he didn’t return my passport to help me return back home, 
he would land in jail. He agreed then to give me my passport and I came back.
I am not satisfied with what happened but I am glad I am home. All I wanted was 
my three months’ salary. The embassy did not seem to take my problem seriously—
all they did was write one letter to the labor court, but gave me no other help.314
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Broadly speaking, Nepal has taken important steps to improve services for 
migrant workers abroad, including creating embassies in many major destination 
states, and placing labor attachés in some of those. However, based on the experience of 
migrant workers in this study, embassies are not adequately advising migrant workers 
about their legal rights or supporting them to seek redress in the destination country. 
When workers encounter problems in employment, embassy assistance appears heavily 
weighted toward arranging replacement travel documents and returning the workers 
back to Nepal, rather than assisting them to obtain redress for the harms suffered. At 
least one civil society organization representative noted: “[Labor attachés] are totally not 
doing what they are expected to do. Although they render some help in giving migrants 
justice, they should do way more than what they are currently doing.”315
Nepali Networks in Destination Countries
A number of Gulf countries with large Nepali populations have cultural or 
social organizations that provide non-resident Nepalis (NRNs) with much-
needed support to fill the service gaps left by embassies. 
In Qatar, this assistance has become formalized through a cooperative agree-
ment between the NGO Pravasi Nepal Coordination Committee (PNCC) and 
the MoFA. PNCC has one staff member, a former migrant worker, based in 
Qatar who has been acting as a social worker to support Nepalis in distress 
since late 2012. He provides advice, counseling and in some cases accom-
panies migrant workers to various government agencies, and also assists 
them in communicating with the embassy. 
PNCC’s headquarters in Nepal also helps to coordinate assistance in desti-
nation countries with Nepali networks in those countries. As the organiza-
tion explained:
We are helped by various organizations in the destination countries. For instance, 
in Kuwait, the NRNs help us; in Saudi Arabia, not just the NRNs, but also asso-
ciations of migrants belonging to various Nepali ethnic groups also help us. Simi-
larly, there are various migrants groups organized around their home districts in 
Nepal, like Kaskeli Samaj (Kaski Society) and Palpali Samaj (Palpali Society). 
As all of our members in Nepal are returnee workers, they have connections of 
some form or another with workers in the destination countries. This helps sorting 
out the problems at the destination.’316
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8.6 Direct Negotiation and Informal Methods of 
 Seeking Justice
Despite the formal mechanisms available above, research conducted for this study indi-
cates that the vast majority of people who suffer harms within the labor migration 
process never access these mechanisms, and instead use informal channels to seek 
redress.317 This can be attributed, at least in part, to the numerous obstacles to access-
ing formal justice set out in detail in the next chapter. It can also be attributed to the 
diversity and sociopolitical history of Nepal. Nepal is an extremely diverse country, with 
125 caste and ethnic groups and 123 spoken languages.318 Most Nepalis live far from 
Kathmandu in remote communities. As a result, disputes of all kinds are often handled 
at the community level. For disputes related to foreign employment, this is particularly 
true when the dispute involves a local agent.
Methods used at the local level include (a) self-help in the form of direct negotia-
tion or confrontation; (b) reporting to local authorities, primarily the police; (c) using 
traditional bodies such as Gram Parishad or Panchayats; and (d) informal mediation. 
None of these methods is regulated, and thus determining a standard procedure is 
impossible. The use of informal methods was particularly pronounced in Dhanusha dis-
trict, a historically “excluded” region, with a weak government presence, and where the 
Madhesi communities have developed their own mechanisms for redress and justice. 
Self-help and the use of informal methods are not explicitly sanctioned by FEA 
2007. In fact, several interviewees expressed concern about the use of informal mecha-
nisms, such as informal mediation carried out by civil society groups. A review of these 
methods of dispute resolution and perceptions of their effectiveness reveals some of the 
benefits and challenges of avoiding more formal mechanisms.
Direct Negotiation
Some of the migrant workers interviewed for this study took up their complaints directly 
with the individuals they believed to be responsible for the harm. In Nepal, this was 
usually the individual agent who had recruited them (13 of 54), whereas abroad migrant 
workers often sought to directly negotiate with their sponsors to improve their situation. 
In the case of Nepal-based individual agents, the migrant worker usually had the 
agent’s contact details or knew how to contact him or her through family or friends. 
In most cases, the worker made contact with the agent after having returned home, 
either by telephone or in person. Most did not ask for compensation for what they had 
suffered abroad, simply the return of the fees they had paid at the outset. The agent 
usually refused to pay, however; in just two cases did the agent agree to pay any com-
pensation, and in one of those only half of the fees were refunded. Some of the male 
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migrant workers participating in this study then took the matter further and filed a case 
at DoFE (see description of DoFE processes above in Section 8.1). The female migrant 
workers participating in this study believed filing a complaint with DoFE was not an 
option because they had, in most cases, travelled irregularly.
Asha’s Case
Only one of the 54 migrant workers interviewed for this study, Asha, who 
was particularly persistent in pursuing the individual agent responsible for 
sending her abroad, was able to obtain even a partial refund of her fees 
after learning that the agent had deceived her about the nature of her work 
abroad. As another woman in Asha’s focus group noted, “People like Asha-
auntie who can speak up and fight with the agent are able to get their money 
back. But if you are quiet and do not say anything like the other sisters here, 
you will not be able to get anything.” Notably, Asha had no knowledge of 
any of the formal mechanisms, or how to access them, and saw the direct 
confrontation with the agent as her only option. 
I went abroad to Dubai and stayed there for 13 months, through a recruitment 
agency in Kathmandu. My agent told me that I would work as a domestic worker 
for 24 days each month and my monthly salary would be NPR 20,000 (around 
1200 Dirham at that time). However, I did not receive any contract that listed all 
this—I was only told verbally. All I had was my citizenship ID and my passport. 
I did not attend any training.
Before I went abroad, I was very excited thinking about the money I would be 
able to save. But when I reached Dubai, I was paid only 1,000 Dirham per 
month, not 1,200. After four months in my employer’s house, I went back to the 
recruiting office and stayed there for 16 days to wait for a new position. They 
transferred me to another workplace where 13 other Nepali women worked. It 
was a school and although the work and the hours were decent, again I was 
not paid enough. The school told us it paid the agency 3,500 Dirham over three 
months per worker, but we received only peanuts— just 700 Dirham each, and 
from that the agency deducted food, cooking gas, and accommodation costs, so 
we ended up with almost nothing.
Eventually [after disputes with the school] 11 of the women wished to leave so 
they went back to Nepal, one at her own expense. The three of us who remained 
could not leave, but we no longer had employment. For one month we lived 
without water or electricity. It was extremely hot, about 60–65 degrees [celsius].
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We did not know anything about legal processes, and I didn’t know there was 
such a thing as an embassy to contact.
So all I could do was call my agent from Dubai many times and yell at him, 
“How can you, being a Nepali, sell another Nepali like this? Aren’t you ashamed 
of yourself ? I paid NPR 75,000 and you better get me out of here or else…you 
know what’s going to happen to you when I reach Nepal.” The agent told me 
not to threaten him and hung up. I could not do anything to go back to Nepal 
without his help. But finally, finally, finally, finally, my brother helped me and 
I returned to Nepal. My brother had to pay about NPR 150,000 (about US$ 
1,500) to bring me back to Nepal. This was because I did not complete my two-
year tenure.
I went to meet my agent and insisted that he return my money. I said, “You need 
to give me my money back. Otherwise, I will burn this ‘manpower’ down. I will 
do everything possible.” After I said that, he could not even look me straight in 
the face. He then wrote a note saying that since “so-and-so” person could not 
work and has returned back to Nepal, he is returning the money. He wrote down 
a check for NPR. 65,000 but deducted NPR. 10,000 for the [departure] airfare.319
Migrant workers who experience harm within the destination country similarly 
may choose to first address their grievances directly with their employers. Of the 
54 workers interviewed for this study who reached their destination, 15 reported 
confronting their employer, usually demanding that they be paid according to the 
contract, and in some cases staging a strike with other workers. Primarily these were 
men working in construction. Women migrant domestic workers usually chose to leave 
their employer and return to their sponsor when they weren’t paid, or they accepted 
the lower wage.
Few of the migrant workers interviewed were successful in their efforts to negoti-
ate their conditions after they had arrived. Of the 15 construction workers who directly 
approached the employer, only two succeeded in entering into a negotiated settlement. 
However, even these two settlements were compromises and not what the worker was 
due under his contract. For example, one migrant worker was promised 800 riyal a 
month, but when he reached Saudi Arabia, he found his wage would be 400 riyal. He 
managed to negotiate an increase to 600 riyal.320
In the other case, the negotiated settlement was later ignored by the employer. A 
group of migrant workers protested their low pay and the company agreed to pay them 
a bonus of one and a half months salary. But after they returned to work, no bonus 
was paid, and the company denied the agreement. The company then intimidated the 
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workers into not taking the matter further by threatening to refuse to pay for their ticket 
home, leaving them stranded.321
Other efforts to pressure employers had even poorer outcomes. As one worker 
in Qatar recalled:322
  We were about 500 Nepalis in the camp and all of us staged a protest demanding a raise 
in our salaries by 200 riyal. We also demanded the visa fee be reimbursed. The recruitment 
agency had told me that the [employer] company would pay for my visa, but when we reached 
Qatar we found we had to pay a visa fee of 1,200 riyal ourselves. The protest lasted for 2–3 
days. I didn’t know anything about Qatari law or the legal consequences of protesting. All 
Nepalis were protesting so I joined in. But the police came to the camp and took us to jail. 
The company was not willing to reimburse our visa costs or increase our salaries and it told 
us we should leave if we didn’t want to work within their terms and conditions.
Despite not reaching a settlement through direct negotiation or action, very few 
migrant workers took further steps to seek recourse through other redress mechanisms, 
either because they were afraid of retaliation, or they did not know what steps to take.
Reporting to Local Police
Another strategy used by some migrant workers is reporting to local authorities in their 
communities.323 The law and rules governing foreign employment are silent on the role 
of police regarding migrant worker complaints. The FEA 2007 provides only that police 
are to “provide necessary assistance” to DoFE investigation officers who are investigat-
ing violations of the act (Section 61(5)), and to assist with the arrest of an accused if 
DoFE issues a warrant. Police may also arrest a suspected offender without a warrant 
and present him or her to DoFE (Section 62).324 However, the act does not authorize 
police to investigate migrant worker complaints on their own initiative.
All experts interviewed for this study were of the view that DoFE alone had juris-
diction to conduct investigations into foreign employment cases. The exception to this, 
they explained, was if the complaint included criminal matters that do not come under 
the FEA 2007 such as threats or violence related to a migration dispute. As a sub-
inspector in Janakpur explained:325
 Even though we receive complaints against agents or sub-agents, according to the law of 
Nepal, we are severely restricted from processing cases related to foreign employment at 
the local level. This is why we do not receive or register such cases. We do receive cases that 
are not directly problems of migrant workers, but are linked to the violation of peace and 
security. That is, police intervention occurs when returnee migrant workers or their families 
are involved in a dispute with local agents which could threaten peace and security.
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In practice, it appears that many migrant workers do in fact contact the police for 
assistance; 11 of the 54 migrant workers interviewed for this study contacted the police 
when seeking redress in Nepal (note that only 26 migrant workers sought redress in 
Nepal).326 Five of those complaints were made against individual agents for fraudulently 
taking their money but not sending the complainant abroad. In the remaining six cases, 
the migrant worker returned from abroad after finding that the work or conditions were 
different from what was promised. Workers primarily sought police assistance to get 
hold of the agents and get their fees returned.
Migrant workers who contacted police had widely divergent experiences. In five 
cases, the police referred the migrant worker to DoFE and, in some of those cases, 
assisted the worker to make the initial contact with DoFE. One migrant worker described 
how the police arrested the accused agent after a complaint was filed and then took the 
person to DoFE in Kathmandu for investigation:
 The police helped me a lot by arresting the agent. The police brought him into custody from 
Jhapa to Kathmandu and charged him at the Hanumandhoka police station. A month later 
he was taken to the department with the help of the police.
In another case, after some convincing, the police negotiated with the agent to 
obtain some compensation for the migrant worker, but did not refer the worker to 
DoFE; negotiation between parties to a criminal case is reportedly common practice.327 
The interviewee explained:328
 At first, the Nepali police did not take my problem seriously. But in Qatar, the Qatari police 
had given me a letter requesting the Nepali authorities to punish the agent. I showed this 
letter and other papers I had to the police and then they agreed to talk to me. They accompa-
nied me to the agent’s house and the agent assured me in front of the police that he would 
pay back the 400,000 rupees I was demanding.
Unfortunately in this case, the agent later reneged on the agreement, pleading 
poverty, and paid the migrant worker only NPR 100,000. 
Police would not always agree to help migrant workers. In one case, the local 
police refused to help a migrant worker who returned home after 18 months because 
conditions were inferior to what was promised. Instead, the police suggested, “[he] 
should have returned immediately if what the agent promised was different from what 
[he] got from the company.”329
The differences in police response may be due to differences and gaps in train-
ing regarding the handling of migrant worker cases, different perceptions of police 
authority or jurisdiction to handle migrant worker cases, lack of will on the part of the 
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police, or a reliance by police on more traditional methods, such as mediating disputes 
between the parties.  
Traditional Village Assemblies (Panchayats)
Panchayats are traditional structures of local self-governance in Nepal.330 Although pan-
chayats were replaced by local government VDCs during the reinstatement of democracy 
in 1990, some rural areas in Nepal still have active panchayats that operate alongside 
the VDCs.331 One of the three districts visited for this study, Dhanusha district, had 
panchayats at the village level that continued to hear local disputes.
Since panchayats are no longer formal institutions, they do not have official writ-
ten procedures for receiving or adjudicating a dispute in their community. Most com-
prise of around five villagers, usually elite and learned men of the village, of 21 years 
of age or older.332 Any person who wishes to seek the panchayat’s assistance approaches 
a panchayat member, and that member will then contact the other members and set a 
date to assemble. Both parties to the dispute will then come before the panchayat and 
the local community and present their case. The panchayat members make their deci-
sion and announce it.333 Village panchayats do not have any enforcement capabilities and 
there is no appeal mechanism.
Of the 32 migrant workers interviewed from Dhanusha, three went to their 
respective village panchayat to seek redress.334 One of the migrant workers approached 
the panchayat immediately upon return from the destination country, and the others 
contacted the panchayat when the local police refused to help them. All three described 
it as their perceived last resort, being unaware of DoFE and tribunal processes available 
in Kathmandu.
All three cases brought by the migrant workers pertained to conditions of work in 
the Gulf that were significantly inferior to what was promised by their agents. Two were 
promised work as electricians but found themselves working as building laborers for 
less than half the agreed salary. Another worked in a bakery but for significantly longer 
hours than promised and for a lower salary. The agents did not deny that the conditions 
were different, but in two cases blamed the migrants for their situations.
The panchayats took different approaches to this problem. In one case, the pan-
chayat ordered that the agent return the fees paid by the worker with interest. In a sec-
ond case, the panchayat ordered the agent to return the fees minus an amount to cover 
the worker’s flight, and an effective penalty because the worker came home immediately 
(it is unclear why this factor was judged to weigh against the worker).335 The amount 
ordered to be repaid was half the amount of the fees initially paid by the worker. In the 
third case, the panchayat decided wholly in favor of the agent. It found that the worker 
was forced to return to Nepal because of a fire at the bakery, so the agent was not respon-
sible. It did not consider the original deception regarding the conditions of work abroad. 
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The migrant workers’ responses to these outcomes were predictably mixed. The 
first migrant worker was pleased, noting: “I am more or less satisfied. At least [the 
agent] gave me the amount that I had invested. But he should have given me the interest 
amount as well. The panchayat helped me a lot in this. It is with the help of the pan-
chayat that I got my money back.” 336 The others were not as satisfied. In the third case, 
the migrant worker believed that the agent had swayed the panchayat, indicating the 
potential for local political and power relationships to influence proceedings. He said: 337
 A public hearing was held in the panchayat, but the attendees were all fellows of the agent. 
They gave him a clean chit and instead accused me of working there for 18 months and 
claiming compensation. The panchayat also said that it was not because of the agent that 
the company was burnt down, so he might not compensate us.
Clearly this is a very small sample and cannot be said to represent the decisions of 
panchayats more generally. But these examples suggest some general conclusions. Most 
significantly, each panchayat is different, and without common standards by which to 
come to decisions, they may make what appear to be arbitrary decisions. The panchayats 
weighed similar pieces of evidence differently and in some cases ignored arguments 
and evidence brought by the complainant. 
On the positive side, the workers had a sense of a having had a hearing before the 
community. In all three cases, the process was relatively quick, ranging from one week 
to a few months. In the first case at least, the agent did return the money at the behest 
of the panchayat (but he did not pay the interest ordered), although he had previously 
refused a similar order by the police. This suggests that the panchayats have unofficial 
enforcement authority at the local level and at least under some circumstances, their 
decisions are respected.
All three of the cases in this sample were brought by men; none of the women 
who participated in focus groups mentioned contacting a panchayat. This could be sim-
ply because the number of women in the study sample was small and did not include 
women who had used this option. However, it might also be attributed to a sense that 
the village leadership, all of which is male, would not listen to women’s concerns and 
speaking out before a community about experiences abroad may be very difficult for 
many women. It may also lead to shame and stigmatization, particularly for those who 
had traveled irregularly through India. For instance, a study conducted by Saferworld in 
three districts of Nepal concluded that “traditional justice mechanisms (which includes 
the panchayat) in general, particularly in Dhanusha and Panchthar, were found to sys-
tematically discriminate against marginalized groups—particularly women, the poor, 
lower castes and other ethnicities.”338 Migrant women workers’ access to traditional 
decision-making bodies warrants further research.
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Informal Negotiation and Mediation
The fourth means identified by workers to resolve disputes and/or seek redress outside 
of the formal system is through negotiation and mediation, usually conducted by a civil 
society organization or local official. Some organizations will negotiate on a worker’s 
behalf, or organize meetings between the migrant worker and other private parties, 
such as recruitment agencies or agents. Study participants generally referred to these 
strategies as “mediation.”
In general, organizations assisting migrant workers to resolve claims in this way 
first obtain the details of the case, and then help the worker gather documentary evi-
dence. The organization would then telephone the other party to present the claim, or 
arrange a meeting between the parties. 
The practice of mediating disputes was controversial among those interviewed for 
this study. Some, including other civil society organizations and government represen-
tatives, believed that mediation undermines accountability because it redirects claims 
away from DoFE and the tribunal. PNCC, for example, stated: “If they want to settle the 
case outside DoFE, we do not entertain such cases.”339 A Women’s Rehabilitation Center 
(WOREC) representative also said that WOREC did not mediate cases outside of DoFE 
process, although she later admitted that if cases were “less complex in nature,” she 
would call the recruitment agency directly and arrange a “simple mediation.”340 People 
Forum, a legal NGO that provides free legal aid to migrant workers, has been the most 
vocal opponent to informal mediation, and told the research team:
 Mediation is a wrong concept. Foreign employment cases are state criminal cases. Yes, the 
victim and perpetrator may be able to settle the issue through mediation and receive some 
compensation, but the crime is not addressed. This has implications for society—if a woman 
is raped and the rapist is set free by paying compensation, he could be a threat to other 
women too. The law says we must punish crimes, but mediation means there is a lapse in 
punishment because the police and judiciary are not involved. This is ethically and conceptu-
ally wrong.341
Others in the civil society and NGO community believed that informal mediation 
is more practical for many migrant workers. Most significantly, it is faster than formal 
mechanisms, providing workers with immediate redress if successful. It can also be 
undertaken at the community level if the other party is local, saving migrant workers 
the expense and inconvenience of traveling to DoFE in Kathmandu. Further, mediation 
is less confrontational than reporting a person to DoFE. According to some civil society 
organizations, migrant workers are often reluctant to report their cases to DoFE or the 
police because the agent is a member of their family.342 As Pourakhi, an NGO that works 
mainly with migrant women, explained:343
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 Most migrants do not want their cases to be filed at DoFE or any legal institution. Most of 
them want to solve their problems through negotiation. This is primarily because of the fear 
that [ filing a case] could create problems in their social relationships as most of the agents 
or members of the recruitment agencies are [part of their close social circle].
Pourakhi and Pro-Public344 also noted that migrant workers see the recruitment 
agencies as politically powerful, and so were reluctant to file a case against them, believ-
ing they had no chance of winning.345 GEFONT, a trade union, explained that most 
migrants needed payment quickly so they could repay their loan, and were unwilling to 
file a case at DoFE that could take several months.346 WOREC in Dhanusha also noted 
that many migrant workers did not have sufficient evidence to file a claim at DoFE and 
so mediation was their only real option.347
Organizations that mediated cases indicated they would offer to refer cases to the 
authorities if no solution emerged from mediation. Both Pourakhi and Pro-Public said 
that their staff would assist migrant workers to file a claim with the police or to go to 
DoFE if mediation was unsuccessful.348 Pro-Public in Dhanusha District, which receives 
50–60 migrant worker cases per year, said, however, that it had not yet referred any 
cases to its central office in Kathmandu. Instead it referred them to local police, who 
would also assist to mediate the case.
As well as being more convenient, civil society organizations that mediate cases 
believed that mediation often provides better outcomes than DoFE could achieve, because 
the recruitment agencies wish to avoid a claim being filed against them and will pay what 
is owed. Pourakhi cited a recent case of 15 returned migrant workers from Malaysia for 
whom it managed to negotiate a settlement with the recruitment agency, which it believed 
was better than what could have been achieved at DoFE. However, this does not apply 
equally to disputes with agents, where the closeness of the relationships may be a barrier.
Migrant workers in this study did not mention contacting a civil society organiza-
tion, nor did they seem to know about the services civil society organizations offer, sug-
gesting that the ability to seek assistance from a civil society organization may depend 
on the migrant worker’s location, social circle and the reach of organizations, which 
often does not extend to remote districts or small communities.
One migrant worker participant in this study undertook mediation through a 
service provided by the local government VDC rather than a civil society organization.349 
The worker had paid NPR 90,000 to go abroad where he was mistreated, and upon 
returning to Nepal, he approached the agent and managed to get NPR 30,000 of his fees 
returned to him. However, because the agent refused to pay him the remaining sum, 
he approached the VDC mediation center where his cousin was working. Eventually, 
not wanting to cause strain in local relations, the worker accepted a settlement of just 
NPR 8,000 of the remaining amount he was owed.350
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While only one migrant worker had used local government to seek redress, this 
avenue is gaining increased attention. One report submitted to three government min-
istries addressing governance and safety of migrants, suggested that legal bodies should 
be established at local (district, VDC, and municipality) levels.351 Similarly, the MoLE 
and HELVETAS Nepal have jointly initiated a Safer Migration Project, which aims to 
serve migrants and their families through local mechanisms, including by providing 
legal and paralegal advice—namely a referral service to People Forum in Kathmandu, 
in operation since 2011.352
In sum, the practices of civil society organizations are non-standardized and are 
carried out on an ad hoc basis by each organization. Without records of these media-
tions, it is difficult to assess whether they are providing workers with the redress to 
which they are entitled, and/or whether they are in fact providing redress to workers 
who would otherwise not receive anything. How mediation works in practice, the experi-
ences of migrant workers using mediation services, and whether it could and should be 
a recognized alternative to more formal methods, deserves further research.
8.7 Summary of Pathways to Access Justice for Nepali 
 Migrant Workers
Nepal’s foreign employment laws provide workers with rights against individual agents 
and recruitment agencies. There remains, however, significant room for improvement 
in the structure and operation of the institutions created to assist migrant workers to 
access justice and hold responsible actors to account. 
The Government of Nepal has created specialized mechanisms for enabling 
migrant workers to access justice. These include investigations by the Department of 
Foreign Employment in lieu of the police, adjudication of certain cases by DoFE, and 
of other cases by the Foreign Employment Tribunal. In many respects, this system is 
more accessible than the regular court system, which is costly to access and plagued 
by case backlogs, among other problems. However, unfortunately DoFE’s capacity is 
inadequate to effectively investigate and resolve its caseload—in terms of both staffing 
levels and training and expertise. This is aggravated by inefficiencies (for example, the 
significant backlog of cases waiting to be filed at the tribunal) and vague procedures, 
for example regarding appeals. Compensation that is awarded may be incomplete, and 
is often received after significant delay, if at all. These factors may explain the relatively 
small number of migrant workers using these mechanisms. 
Some workers and their families are accessing compensation for death and 
severely disabling injuries that occur abroad, either through private insurance and/
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or the FEPB-administered welfare fund, (accessible only to regular workers). For other 
harms that occur in destination countries, embassies are not yet providing adequate 
information and support services. Most workers who have grievances against their 
employers come home because they cannot afford to stay in the destination country and 
fight their case. As a result, for the significant majority of workers who are underpaid 
or made to work under different or exploitative conditions, redress remains elusive both 
at home and abroad and responsible parties are not held to account. 
Civil society activism on migrant worker issues is still relatively new, and while 
organizations have made significant contributions in other areas, their ability to assist 
migrant workers to access justice remains limited overall. This is worsened by disagree-
ment among civil society organizations on the nature of support that they should or 
should not be providing to migrant workers especially regarding use of the existing 
government mechanism as compared to private negotiated settlements. 
More detail on cross-cutting obstacles that affect all of the pathways and mecha-
nisms above is included in the next chapter. 
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9. Obstacles to Accessing Justice
Nepal has made considerable efforts to introduce laws, policies, and institutional mech-
anisms to secure the rights and welfare of its citizens engaging in foreign employment. 
Earlier chapters of this report have highlighted shortcomings in the design and opera-
tion of these frameworks, including in the operation of each redress mechanism. This 
chapter will discuss some of the major obstacles common to all of the redress mecha-
nisms that prevent workers from accessing justice and obtaining a remedy for harms 
they experience in the course of migration. 
9.1 Lack of Awareness of Rights and Redress 
 Mechanisms
One of the most common challenges raised by migrant workers was that they did not 
know about either their rights under Nepali law, or the mechanisms established and 
services available to enforce their rights and provide redress when those rights were 
violated. While most workers knew about their right to be paid what was promised, 
in other cases migrant workers were not aware that what they had experienced—such 
as overcharging of fees, or confiscation of personal documents by employers—was a 
violation of the law. 
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Further, few migrant worker participants had obtained the information they 
needed to seek redress either before departure or after return. More than a third (13 of 
31 interviewees) said they were not informed by any source before departure or while 
abroad about where to go if they encountered a problem. As a result, a number of 
migrants said they did not contact the embassy abroad or DoFE in Nepal because they 
were unaware that those institutions existed or that they could help migrant workers 
in their situation.
Participants of two focus groups explained that in the destination countries 
migrants knew only to contact their agent in Nepal if there was a problem, and that 
if one had a good agent, the worker would be able to leave a bad job and return to 
Nepal more quickly (although they also agreed that this rarely happens). None of the 
27 migrant workers said that they knew about options for redress in Nepal after they 
returned. This was given as the main reason that they took no action in Nepal to hold 
their agents or recruitment agencies accountable.
Pre-Departure Orientation
This lack of knowledge about rights and options may be partly attributable to failures in 
pre-departure orientation and information services for migrant workers and in particu-
lar the pre-departure orientation program. The two-day orientation training, conducted 
by private training centers licensed by DoFE, is required by law for all new migrant 
workers before departure (see Section 5.1—Key Actors in Nepal’s Foreign Employ-
ment Sector). Although the training is relatively brief, the state-mandated curriculum 
includes a small component on rights.353 The MoLE, DoFE, and FEPB jointly-issued 
manual for the orientation training allocates one hour to discussing “Behavior, Rights 
and Responsibilities.”354 The manual specifies 35 rights under international law held 
by migrant workers, but notably does not review rights under contract or Nepali law. It 
also provides workers with information on organizations that can provide the workers 
with assistance if they experience problems, including government agencies in Nepal, 
civil society organizations, recruitment agencies, trade unions in Nepal and abroad, the 
Nepali embassy and Nepali welfare organizations and societies. 
The orientation also includes a section on the foreign employment legal frame-
work in Nepal, and states that workers must be informed that they are entitled to the 
return of their recruitment fees plus an additional amount if they are not sent abroad 
in the time promised. The manual says other rights under the law should be discussed, 
but this is not mandated. 
Whether all of the training centers provide the entire curriculum is unclear as 
oversight is weak. Nevertheless, the orientation does appear to have some impact if the 
worker attends. Figure 7 provides a summary of the percentage of Nepali migrant work-
ers who face various problems in the Middle East, disaggregated between those who 
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had attended the government mandated pre-departure orientation training and those 
who had not, demonstrating fewer reports of problems across almost all categories for 
those who attended the orientation.
 
FIGURE 7: Problems During Migration and Attendance at Pre-Departure Orientation
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In addition to the orientation, women intending to work as domestic workers 
must undertake a much more extensive 21-day program based on the “Skill Develop-
ment Curriculum for Migrant Domestic Workers–2012.”355 In this training, 12 hours 
are devoted to safe migration and related information.356
The main problem with the orientation program is that evidence suggests few 
migrant workers actually attend. Of the 27 migrant worker focus group participants in 
this study, only three reported participating in the orientation training.357 Most were not 
even aware of the training requirement, having not been told about it by their individual 
agents or recruitment agencies. For example, a male returnee from Kathmandu said:358
 I went to Qatar in October 2011. I had no idea about the orientation training. All of my docu-
ments were prepared by the agents. The only thing I knew about Qatar is that it was very 
strict. I did not know anything except that.
Other workers do not attend the orientation because the cost and inconvenience 
is prohibitive.359 All 86 licensed training centers (as of mid-2013) are based in Kath-
mandu, so migrant workers must pay not only the cost of the orientation (NPR 700) 
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but also transportation and accommodation in Kathmandu.360 Other workers provided 
additional explanations for not attending—for example, one mentioned that she needed 
to visit relatives at the time the orientation was scheduled. 
Even those who do attend the orientation may not understand the content as it is 
only provided in Nepali, not in any of the many regional languages used in Nepal. One 
of the three migrant workers who attended, for example, was from Dhanusha District 
and spoke Maithili so was not able to follow the material.
As safe migration initiatives are gathering increased attention in Nepal, a num-
ber of other sources of information have been established for migrant workers. For 
example, the Government of Nepal, in association with the International Organiza-
tion for Migration (IOM), established a migrant resource center on the FEPB premises 
in Kathmandu in 2010. Female migrants are incentivized to visit the resource center 
through the refunding (by the FEPB) of the NPR 700 fee paid for orientation training.361 
Outside Kathmandu, several Nepali organizations have created networks or information 
centers for intending or returned migrant workers with international support. Some are 
public-private partnerships with local government and some are operated exclusively by 
the civil society organization. 
Some also have training to refer migrants to services in Kathmandu.362 The 
radio station Ujjyalo 90 FM Network also runs a weekly program, Desh Pardesh Radio 
Karyakram, which disseminates information on various issues pertaining to the migra-
tion process.363
These new services are a valuable and important development, but it is too early 
to assess their impact on migrant workers’ understanding of migration, or the steps to 
reduce vulnerability to harm. It is also unclear the extent to which these services will 
provide advice to workers about their legal rights and redress options, including the 
DoFE and tribunal claims processes, beyond what is provided in the orientation. Evalu-
ations of these programs would be valuable. 
9.2 Centralization of Redress Mechanisms in Kathmandu
The location of all formal Nepali dispute resolution services in Kathmandu presents a 
significant, and often insurmountable, barrier for many migrant workers. DoFE has its 
offices in Kathmandu and does not have branch offices or representation at the regional 
or district level. Similarly, the Foreign Employment Tribunal is based in Kathmandu, 
and although it has authority to sit in different parts of the country, at the time of writ-
ing, it had not done so.364
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Centralization of redress mechanisms is compounded by centralization of pre-
departure training. As noted above, this results in many workers outside the capital 
not attending the training and being unaware of dispute resolution mechanisms in 
Kathmandu. Instead, those workers rely on local police or, where available, panchayats. 
These institutions may or may not know to refer the worker to DoFE in Kathmandu.
For workers outside the capital who are aware of the DoFE mechanism, the time 
and expense needed to travel to Kathmandu is often prohibitive. As one civil society 
organization, AHRCDF noted:365
 If a man from Baitadi wants to fight a case for a compensation of NPR 80,000, how can he 
eat and live if he has to spend NPR [20,000] just coming to Kathmandu and returning back 
home? Who’s going to think about these issues?
In fact, among civil society representatives interviewed for this study, the central-
ization of redress mechanisms was consistently cited as the most significant obstacle to 
migrant workers seeking redress, and the issue most regularly cited as in urgent need of 
reform. One lawyer noted that legal aid services were also concentrated in Kathmandu, 
and that it was therefore very difficult for migrant workers to get accurate information 
about their rights and options unless they came to the capital.366 Expansion of legal aid 
services was recommended.
9.3 Lack of Documentation to Support Claims
The law does not specify the documents or other evidence required to bring a case at 
DoFE or the tribunal. Lawyers and DoFE officials explained that evidentiary require-
ments are flexible, and that DoFE requires only, at a minimum, the name of the recruit-
ment agency or agent, and ideally a receipt for money paid.367
Migrant worker participants in this study frequently did not have these few key 
documents, or the documents they had were incorrect. For example, only 17 of the 
54 workers mentioned receiving an employment contract (see Chapter 6–Harms) and 
none mentioned receiving a contract between the worker and the recruitment agency 
with the contact details of the agency included. The fact that very few workers receive 
their contracts at the recruitment agency office, but rather receive them at the airport 
or in their accommodation, is a further barrier to the worker being able to identify the 
recruitment agency used.
Further, receipts for recruitment fees, if given to workers at all, frequently under-
stated the actual amounts paid so that the worker could not support a case for overcharg-
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ing. Recruitment agencies’ failure to provide workers with these documents violates the 
FEA 2007. In addition to undermining workers’ ability to provide evidence to support a 
claim, the failure to provide accurate contracts contributes to workers’ lack of awareness 
of their rights and the responsibilities of employers and recruitment agencies, which 
may give rise to a legal claim if they are breached. 
 
9.4 The Pervasive Unregulated System of Individual 
 Agents
The use of individual agents is an entrenched practice in Nepal (see Section 5.1—Key 
Actors in Nepal’s Foreign Employment Sector). Although individual agents can facilitate 
migrant workers finding work and benefit recruitment agencies by vetting and control-
ling migrant workers, they are the cause of many harms to migrant workers (see Section 
5.3—The Migration Process for Most Migrant Workers). In addition, agents, and par-
ticularly unregistered agents, create numerous obstacles to migrant workers obtaining 
justice for harms in Nepal or abroad.
The first set of obstacles relate to accessing redress for harms perpetrated by 
individual agents, including common incidences of taking money for the promise of 
work and disappearing, fraud, and misrepresentation of positions abroad. As individual 
operators, individual agents have fewer resources than recruitment agencies and so 
usually find it difficult to repay migrant workers their recruitment fees in the event the 
agents admit wrongdoing or are ordered by the tribunal to compensate a worker. As 
unregistered individual agents, they do not pay a deposit to the government, so there is 
no other source of funds available from which to compensate workers. In several cases 
described by migrant workers, the worker felt reluctant to demand compensation from 
agents they knew did not have many resources, or community members spoke up in the 
agent’s defense. Some migrant workers did not want to strain community relationships 
by making demands on agents who were members of their communities.
Individual agents can also disappear, and numerous migrant workers spoke of 
extensive efforts to find their individual agent after their return, often to no avail. For 
example, the six migrant workers interviewed for this study who took their cases to 
DoFE all reported that the police (or they themselves if they had not yet reported their 
cases) had difficulty locating the individual agent which prevented the case from mov-
ing forward. In several cases, it was believed that the concerned agent had fled to India. 
Recruitment agencies can also be shielded from responsibility by using individual 
agents to handle all interactions with migrant workers. Some workers may never know 
which recruitment agency is sending them abroad, and may be unable to name the 
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agency in a compensation claim. Even if they are aware of the recruitment agency, agen-
cies commonly blame agents for any excessive charges or false promises made to the 
worker. In some instances workers may feel that the individual agent is more directly 
responsible because they were in a position of trust and therefore decide not to pursue 
the agency for redress. 
The DoFE case files reviewed as part of this study revealed that indeed most 
cases were brought against individual agents, not recruitment agencies, despite the 
likely involvement of a recruitment agency in at least some of those cases. The authors 
also reviewed two case files in detail in which individual agents named the recruitment 
agencies involved in sending the worker abroad but the recruitment agencies denied 
the relationship. In those cases, DoFE could not, or chose not, to investigate further but 
instead settled only on prosecuting the individual agent. A lawyer interviewed for this 
study stated that this was standard practice by recruitment agencies, and also worked 
the other way—namely where recruitment agencies were named as defendants, an 
unregistered individual agent would invariably be involved but would deny such involve-
ment.368
9.5 Threats or Fear of Retaliation
A handful of migrant workers interviewed for this study stated that they experienced 
threats or were afraid of retaliation from recruitment agencies or individual agents if 
they filed a case or pushed for more compensation than what was offered. One migrant 
worker who had been defrauded of his recruitment fees by an agent recounted that the 
agent called him and his wife a number of times threatening to kill them if they took 
the case to the police, but each time from a different number. In that case, the migrant 
worker succeeded in having the agent arrested but he was not prosecuted for making 
threats.369
The special government attorney believed that threats were a serious obstacle to 
migrant workers taking their cases to the tribunal. He noted that as soon as the case 
was registered, many migrant workers would be threatened (he did not specify whether 
from the agent or the recruitment agency), and would be approached by the other party 
outside of the courtroom and pressured to accept a settlement. As a result, those work-
ers would change their stories and lie on the witness stand.370
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9.6 Insufficient Resources and Training for 
 Government Agencies Assisting Migrant Workers
A common theme throughout interviews with officials in Nepal was that the princi-
pal institutions charged with assisting migrant workers were deeply underfunded and 
under-resourced. In addition, specialized training was rare, and personnel changed on 
a regular basis so it was difficult for officials with responsibility for foreign employment 
to develop expertise and build institutional memory.
DoFE clearly has insufficient staff to carry out its duties in a timely and effective 
manner. This includes investigating claims, determining those within its jurisdiction, 
and filing other categories of cases before the tribunal (see Section 8.1-DoFE). In its 
Complaints Registration and Investigation Section DoFE has capacity for three officers 
tasked with handling the several thousand cases reported by migrant workers each year. 
However, in March 2014, it had only one investigation officer and one director of the 
legal department on staff, both seconded from other ministries.371 A DoFE staff member 
described the department’s situation as a “resource crunch” that gave officers little time 
to focus on each case. It is unsurprising that investigations are generally superficial, 
that anomalies arise in the determination of claims, and that few cases are registered 
at the tribunal. The strain on the case-handling resources of DoFE and the tribunal is 
exacerbated by the number of non-foreign-employment-related cases that make it to the 
tribunal (discussed in Section 8.2). 
A lack of resources also reportedly limits the extent to which DoFE can effectively 
monitor and supervise recruitment agencies and individual agents, as well as carry out 
its other functions. DoFE had, at the time of writing, only 94 staff to handle the almost 
half a million migrant workers departing each year, as well as to supervise more than 
700 recruitment agencies. This is despite an increase in the DoFE budget from NPR 
23,085,000 in 2009 to NPR 63,890,000 in 2013—an almost 200 percent increase372 
over a period in which the number of labor permits issued by DoFE increased by 54 
percent from 294,094 in fiscal year 2009/2010 to 453,543 in fiscal year 2012/2013.373
Experts described similar constraints in embassies seeking to support migrant 
workers abroad. An official from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs conceded the following 
challenges to access to embassy services:374
 The number of staff in the embassies is very small compared to the volume of work. Hence, 
it is not possible to conduct detailed study and verification of the employers. Moreover, the 
embassy is located in the capital city whereas workers are spread throughout the country. 
Now we have six staff in the Saudi embassy. So there have been positive changes to address 
the problems. However, it is not an easy task to recruit additional staff in the embassy. The 
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need for fluency in the local language is also a problem and this necessitates local recruit-
ment too.
According to media reports, other embassies in the Gulf have reported severe 
pressures and an inability to meet the needs of migrant workers in their countries 
of deployment, leading to budget complaints from the Foreign Ministry.375 A former 
ambassador noted that her embassy only had six staff, in addition to a driver and general 
assistant and that they were so overwhelmed that everyone in the embassy worked on 
migrant worker cases; even the driver was called on at times to assist with office-related 
tasks. In addition, the Embassy did not have any lawyers on staff, and only had “a public 
relations officer, a Sudanese man who we hired locally. He also served as our ‘lawyer.’”376 
She also reported a lack of training on migrant labor issues:
 Before taking up the ambassadorial position, I was given a standard 10-day orientation which 
primarily discussed issues of diplomacy, etiquettes, etc., but nothing on labor migrants. 
There were four to five people who took the training with me that were going to labor-receiv-
ing countries but there was no information about migrant-related issues. I spent the first six 
months of my tenure just understanding the policies and other issues related to labor.
9.7 Corruption or Perceptions of Corruption in Foreign 
 Employment
Weak governance and accountability are a serious challenge across public and private 
actors in Nepal, and foreign employment is no different.377 Corruption has been found 
in the foreign employment private sector (such as through human trafficking, fraud, 
and falsification of certificates and other documents), in addition to public-private col-
lusion to speed up the migration/recruitment process (including forged work permits 
and bribery of officials), and purely public-sector-driven activities (such as nepotism and 
favoritism in the application of foreign employment rules).378
A 2010 report commissioned by the World Bank described a system whereby 
corrupt officials share bribes from the bottom to the top of the administrative hier-
archy—with an average bribe rate in the DoFE of NPR 1,000 (US$ 11).379 The report 
estimated the total cost of corruption to Nepal’s foreign employment industry to be over 
NPR 17.2 billion annually (US$ 194.7 million), with NPR 7.5 billion (US$ 84.9 million) 
from official channels and NPR 9.7 billion (US$ 109.8 million) from informal/unof-
ficial channels.380 Corruption has been identified at all stages of the migration process 
and appears to be systemic.
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Corruption has significant consequences for migrant workers’ safety and ability 
to seek redress. For example, DoFE officials have recently been accused of approv-
ing migrant workers to travel as individuals, even when they are being placed by a 
recruitment agency, so that the recruitment agency’s name will not appear anywhere 
on the worker’s documents.381 If the worker encounters problems during the placement 
abroad, he or she will never be able to prove that the recruitment agency was involved 
and will be unable to seek compensation from the agency. At least one DoFE investi-
gation officer has been arrested for allegedly accepting a bribe to dismiss a complaint 
against an individual accused of running an unlicensed recruitment agency. The case 
was transferred to the courts.382
The creation of a labor desk at the Kathmandu Tribhuvan International Airport, 
though established to examine labor migrants’ documents and reduce document fraud, 
has also increased opportunities for corruption.383 A study by the National Vigilance 
Centre in February 2014 found that both labor desk and immigration officials were 
pocketing up to NPR 2 million per day, usually from female migrant workers travelling 
with forged passports.384 One female migrant worker participating in this study reported 
that she was stopped at the airport because her documents were incomplete, but her 
agent told her he paid the immigration officer a bribe of NPR 1,500 and she was allowed 
to board the plane.385 This meant, however, that her incomplete documents were not 
reported, and she became an irregular worker both from the perspective of Nepal and 
the destination country. Later, when she experienced both physical and verbal abuse 
in the destination country, she was unable to obtain redress abroad for these harms 
because of her status.
Even if rumors of corruption and nepotism in the foreign employment industry 
may be unfounded in some cases, they create a perception that the system will not work 
to the benefit of migrant workers. Although evidence of entrenched relationships has 
not been published, a number of individuals interviewed in this study expressed a belief 
that recruitment agencies are politically connected and unreachable, and therefore it is 
difficult for migrant workers to ever succeed against them. According to one civil society 
organization, this meant that migrant workers were reluctant to bring cases because 
they believed they could never win.386 This included both submitting a complaint to 
local police, or traveling to Kathmandu and filing a complaint with DoFE. More research 
on the impact of corruption on perceptions of and access to justice would be valuable.
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9.8 Socio-Political, Economic and Gender-related 
 Obstacles to Accessing Justice
Many social and regional factors continue to obstruct access to the justice system in 
Nepal. Due to the predominance of the Hindu caste system,387 certain groups have been 
historically marginalized on the basis of caste, ethnicity, and religion, in particular, the 
Dalits, Janajatis, and Muslims. The impact of this historical exclusion continues to reso-
nate, with these groups continuing to lag behind socially and economically.388 This, in 
turn, restricts their ability to access justice due to a lack of financial resources to pursue 
claims, and/or a lack of awareness of legal rights and redress options. Further, the use 
of Nepali as the primary and only language of the legal system acts as a major barrier, 
particularly for the Janajatis for whom Nepali is not their mother tongue. 
Similarly, female migrants often face unique challenges in accessing the justice 
system in general in Nepal, which likely applies equally to the migration context. First, 
women confront stigmatization and the possibility of being ostracized when they press 
charges, especially if the case involves issues like sexual abuse and rape.389 This is 
exacerbated by the fact that existing laws in Nepal “do not protect the confidentiality of 
sexual assault victims in police investigations, legal proceedings, and the greater public 
discourse.”390 Second, the justice system in the country is overwhelmingly male–domi-
nated, creating the potential for influence of patriarchal norms and an environment that 
may not be hospitable to female crime victims. As of 2012, there were a total of only 
6 female justices and judges in the judicial branch; only 8 percent of all the registered 
lawyers were women; and only 23 of the 253 section officers in the judicial administra-
tion were women.391
A further impediment to migrant women’s access to justice is the fact that many 
women migrate irregularly to circumvent numerous discriminatory restrictions placed 
on female migrants by the Government of Nepal,392 an estimated 80 percent of female 
migrants remain undocumented393 (see Sections 4.2—Female Migrant Workers and 
4.3—Irregular/Illegal Migration). Female workers who migrate via irregular channels 
confront a host of obstacles to filing a claim before DoFE, because they rarely have suf-
ficient evidence to support a claim through the regular process (see Section 8.1—Depart-
ment of Foreign Employment Complaints and Investigation Section). 
These obstacles are amplified for many by the centralization of the foreign 
employment redress mechanisms in Kathmandu.394 For the poor and socially margin-
alized, seeking justice is a luxury they are unable to afford. 

1 5 7
10. Conclusion, Findings and
  Recommendations
10.1 Conclusion
Nepal’s migrant workers play a vital role in the country’s economy and development, 
with remittances accounting for nearly 25 percent of the country’s GDP. It is estimated 
that nearly half of all Nepali households have at least one member who is working or 
has worked outside Nepal. Despite this population’s economic and social contributions, 
pre-departure harms are routinely perpetrated against migrant workers by recruitment 
agencies, individual agents, and others. These include fraud, misrepresentation and 
even extortion. The government of Nepal has significantly strengthened the labor migra-
tion framework with the introduction of the Foreign Employment Act 2007 and Foreign 
Employment Rules 2008, as well as the Foreign Employment Policy in 2012. Yet it has 
not taken sufficient steps to prevent common harms, or to ensure adequate redress and 
accountability when they occur. Access to justice remains elusive for the overwhelming 
majority of migrant workers in Nepal.
This study identifies a set of critical gaps in the design and operation of the labor 
migration framework that contribute to the current lack of meaningful access to jus-
tice for Nepali migrant workers. Although the legislation is relatively robust, reform is 
needed in several key areas to: provide rights protections for migrant workers; to clarify 
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the relationship between mechanisms and potentially modify their jurisdiction and 
procedures; and, to strengthen oversight of recruitment and improve accountability of 
recruitment agencies and individual agents. 
Beyond legislative change, significant human and financial resources are needed 
to achieve the effective operation, and necessary expansion, of the key redress mecha-
nisms. Greater political will is needed to implement and enforce existing or revised 
legislation and to support Nepali workers throughout all stages of the migration process. 
The government must develop more systematic and transparent procedures in order 
to better fulfill its mandate to oversee and hold accountable all stakeholders in the 
private recruitment industry. And workers must be given the information and support 
needed to enforce their rights and access remedies for harms. All of this begins with 
the recognition, by the government and all other stakeholders in the system of foreign 
employment, of prospective, current, and former migrant workers as rights-holders 
whose protection is core to Nepal’s long-term development.
10.2 Findings
Governance and Oversight of Labor Migration and Access to Justice
1. Nepali migrant workers experience a range of rights violations at the hands of 
private actors from the moment of recruitment through to their return home. 
Many violations are inter-related and interdependent in a manner that the current 
legal framework fails to adequately address.
 Labor migration is facilitated almost exclusively by private actors whom the gov-
ernment is tasked with overseeing. These private actors, including recruitment 
agencies, individual agents, manpower agencies in destination countries, and 
employers, are responsible for most harms that workers experience in the course 
of migrating for work. 
 Certain pre-departure harms increase the likelihood that migrant workers will 
experience other harms before departure and while abroad, and impede migrant 
workers’ access to justice upon return. These include: the charging of excessive 
recruitment fees which put migrant workers in significant debt, misrepresenting 
the terms and conditions of migration and of employment leading to the employer 
not abiding by promised conditions, delaying or even cancelling departure, fraud, 
and failure to provide workers with correct pre-departure documents, including a 
receipt for actual fees paid and contracts of employment and recruitment.
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2. The existing legal framework governing labor migration treats migrant workers 
as subjects rather than rights-holders. This undermines workers’ ability to enforce 
their rights and access justice when harms are perpetrated against them.
 The Foreign Employment Act 2007 (FEA 2007), the primary statute governing 
labor migration, places numerous obligations on private actors in the foreign 
employment industry, and provides for fines and, in some cases, imprisonment 
when those obligations are not fulfilled. It also establishes mechanisms for over-
sight and compensation. 
 However, the act and rules are devoid of rights language and many obligations 
set forth in the act do not have a corresponding right. Further, procedures for 
obtaining redress when obligations are left unfulfilled are unclear. For example, 
although recruitment agencies are obligated to provide a contract, the law does 
not articulate any means by which workers may enforce their right to a contract, 
or obtain a remedy when it is not provided. Similarly, the law does not set out a 
procedure to compel the government to fulfill its obligations under the act. Fur-
ther, the legislation does not establish a general right to redress in the event that 
a worker’s statutory or contractual rights are violated.
 The act also does not reference Nepal’s obligations to migrant workers under the 
human rights treaties to which Nepal is a party (see Annex 3 for a list of these 
treaties) although, pursuant to The Treaty Act of Nepal, they are already a part 
of the domestic legal framework. Of particular concern, the law does not take 
affirmative measures to protect and fulfill the rights of vulnerable groups such 
as women migrating into domestic work as is required under CEDAW.
3. The Foreign Employment Act does not adequately regulate the recruitment 
industry. 
 a. The Foreign Employment Act does not effectively ensure accountability on the part 
of recruitment agencies and individual agents.
  FEA 2007 imposes significant obligations on recruitment agencies, along with 
fines and criminal punishment for non-compliance. However, penalties for 
the most common violations committed by recruitment agencies are relatively 
low and the act allows more common offenses to be resolved administratively 
by DoFE. 
  In addition, recruitment agencies are often able to shield themselves from 
liability in both law and practice, by using unregistered individual agents. 
Although the act requires all foreign employment businesses to be licensed 
160  CONCLUSION, FINDINGS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS
and prohibits the use of unregistered individual agents, it does not penalize 
recruitment agencies for using unregistered agents. As a result, efforts to 
register agents with recruitment agencies have largely failed, and recruitment 
agencies are rarely held accountable for the actions of agents on whom they 
rely. 
  Finally, oversight provisions in the FEA 2007 and Rules 2008 are vague, 
allowing recruitment agencies to operate without great scrutiny. Pre-departure 
checks are few and not comprehensive. For example, neither the act nor the 
rules require government oversight of contracts being given to or signed by 
workers, or of workers’ participation in the mandated pre-departure training. 
As a result, these steps appear to be frequently bypassed. 
 b. Contractual obligations and rights under the Foreign Employment Act are vague 
and ambiguous, and are unenforced by DoFE
  Written contract(s) are essential for migrant workers to access justice. They 
define the terms and conditions of foreign employment; identify the parties 
to the agreement and the responsibilities of each party; and form the basis on 
which the worker can pursue redress if the agreement is violated. Although 
FEA 2007 addresses contractual requirements, the provisions are ambigu-
ous, compliance by recruitment agencies is poor, and government oversight 
is weak.
  The obligations to provide contracts under FEA 2007 are unclear in three 
respects:
  • The number of contracts: Though certain provisions specify two contracts 
(one between the worker and the recruitment agency, another between 
the worker and the employer), other sections refer to “the contract” in the 
singular. 
  • Parties to the contract or contracts: The required parties to each agreement 
are unclear, making it more difficult for a worker to identify the parties 
against whom he or she may pursue a claim. It also creates ambiguity 
regarding DoFE’s enforcement obligations and the contractual rights of 
the individual.
  • Contract provisions: The act requires only that the most basic terms and 
conditions, such as remuneration, are included in the contract. It does not 
specify other key provisions including the location of the employment, the 
date of commencement, leave, benefits, and dispute resolution. 
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 DoFE pre-approval and pre-departure checks of documents are routinely failing to 
identify common non-compliance. Indeed, contracts between recruitment agen-
cies and migrant workers appear never to be provided—migrant workers were 
unaware of their right to such a contract, and recruitment agencies said they were 
not required.
 The FEA 2007 does not penalize recruitment agencies for not providing contracts, 
or providing inadequate contracts, and does not establish any rights or remedies 
for migrant workers who do not receive a contract as required. Migrant workers 
who complain to DoFE and demand a contract are likely to see the promised job 
evaporate or risk being blacklisted for future employment by the recruitment 
agency involved. 
4. The existing domestic legal regime fails to account for cases of serious harm 
and exploitation, debt bondage, and physical or emotional abuse in the course of 
migrating for work.
 The FEA 2007 allows workers to claim compensation if the terms and conditions 
of employment are different from those promised in Nepal. However such claims 
are in practice targeted at differences in salary and benefits. If they involve recruit-
ment agencies they are treated as low-level complaints resolvable by DoFE and 
are not heard by the Foreign Employment Tribunal (the tribunal). The law does 
not address compensation claims for more serious abuse and exploitation at the 
hands of agents, recruitment agencies or employer institutions.
 The Human Trafficking and Transportation (Control) Act (HTTCA) arguably cov-
ers cases of severe labor exploitation and abuse. However, the HTTCA is written 
and has been interpreted to primarily tackle trafficking of women and girls into 
the sex industry, and few cases of migrant workers exploited by employers abroad 
have been prosecuted under the HTTCA. Furthermore, although the HTTCA 
arguably covers a broader scope of worker exploitation, because of its association 
with sexual exploitation significant stigma is associated with HTTCA cases, which 
discourages workers from bringing claims.
5. The rights of migrant workers in an irregular status and female migrant workers 
are inadequately protected. 
 The FEA 2007 is silent on the rights of workers who have engaged in foreign 
employment outside of formal channels and are in an irregular status. In theory, 
migrant workers who depart Nepal irregularly should have equal access to all 
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redress mechanisms apart from the Foreign Employment Welfare Fund. In prac-
tice, such workers usually find themselves unable to access justice because they 
lack documentary evidence such as receipts and contracts to support their claims. 
The law does not provide any remedy for workers who unwittingly depart Nepal 
in an irregular status because of the actions of their recruitment agency and/or 
individual agents.
 Women make up a very small percentage of the total number of Nepal’s regu-
lar migrant workers, although it is believed many women travel irregularly in 
defiance of restrictions on women under 30 travelling to the Gulf as domestic 
workers. As a result, women have been largely invisible in public discussions on 
foreign employment, even though women appear to suffer more frequent and 
severe harms abroad than their male counterparts. 
 Nepal has taken some steps to protect women migrant workers such as including 
a non-discrimination provision under the FEA 2007, and reimbursing the cost of 
pre-departure orientations for women. At the same time, the act allows employer 
institutions to make gender-specific demands in the recruitment and selection 
of workers. Furthermore, Nepal’s restriction of certain female migration clearly 
discriminates based on gender, and ultimately pushes young women into more 
risky forms of migration, such as traveling through third countries, or traveling 
on false documents. This compounds their vulnerability and limits their ability 
to access justice when their rights are violated. 
 Neither the act nor the Rules 2008 contain provisions that address the unique 
situation of women seeking and engaging in foreign employment. Nor do they 
address the particular needs of returning women migrant workers, such as mater-
nal and child health services or counseling for women migrant workers who have 
been abused, or practical differential needs of women seeking to make compensa-
tion claims and access justice. CEDAW guidelines in General Recommendation 
26 on women migrant workers are not clearly reflected in the Act. 
Operation and Effectiveness of Redress Mechanisms
6. Nepal has created specialized mechanisms for investigating and adjudicating 
migrant worker claims against recruitment companies and individual agents. 
Limited integration and information-sharing between mechanisms frustrates 
access to justice.
 Nepal has created a number of specialized formal mechanisms for resolving com-
plaints by migrant workers against recruitment agencies and individual agents, 
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and providing redress in certain cases. These consist of a Complaints Receiving 
and Investigations Section at DoFE, a specialized Foreign Employment Tribunal, 
and a welfare fund in cases of death or mutilation of workers abroad. In addi-
tion, workers in some circumstances can use existing justice mechanisms such 
as the police and courts in Nepal and abroad. A number of migrant workers also 
reported using local traditional dispute resolution through the local panchayats 
or mediation through VDCs, or support from civil society organizations, though 
these are not recognized under FEA 2007. The relationship between the formal 
mechanisms and different categories of claims is set out in the table below.
 How these mechanisms work together remains unclear in law and practice. For 
example police appear to commonly receive complaints at the local level, but the 
law restricts their role and there are no provisions for police to refer a case to 
DoFE. Similarly, coordination of case-handling between individual embassies and 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Kathmandu, and between labor attachés and 
DoFE and the FEPB appears to be minimal. 
Case Type Mechanism Location
Theft of recruitment fees, 
fraud regarding terms and 
conditions of work, and 
other violations by agents 
and recruitment agencies 
under the Foreign 
Employment Act 2007
DoFE Complaints 
Receiving and 
Investigations Section, and 
the Foreign Employment 
Tribunal
Kathmandu
Labor complaints that 
arise in the countries of 
work
Overseas labor tribunals 
and courts. Embassies 
may provide limited 
assistance
Capital cities of 
destination countries
Death or mutilation 
occurring abroad
The private insurance 
system and/or the Foreign 
Employment Welfare Fund
Kathmandu
Human trafficking, 
particularly for sexual 
exploitation, and crimes 
under the General Code
Police and district courts District capitals
Local disputes with 
individual agents
Police, local mediation or 
dispute resolution services
Dependent on services 
available in locality
 Findings specific to each mechanism are outlined in Finding 8 below.
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7. Across all formal redress mechanisms a common set of barriers prevents migrant 
workers from accessing justice. 
 a. The redress mechanisms in Nepal fail to account for the socio-economic realities of 
persons migrating to the Middle East for work. 
  The population traveling to work abroad, and particularly traveling to the Gulf, 
is diverse. It comprises educated and comparatively wealthy individuals, as 
well as those from the poorest and most marginalized sectors of society. Work-
ers come from different parts of the country, and speak a range of languages. 
Women and men travel abroad, and do so through both regular and irregular 
channels. 
  Despite this diversity, protection and redress mechanisms are targeted mainly 
to those migrants who speak and read Nepali and are regular – automatically 
excluding many female migrant workers. Pre-departure training is provided 
only in Nepali. Similarly, DoFE and the tribunal do not provide translation or 
other explanatory services for migrants submitting complaints.
 b. Centralization of mechanisms in Kathmandu
  The redress mechanisms that specialize in foreign employment and the agen-
cies that administer them are located in Kathmandu (as a matter of practice 
rather than law). For example, all licensed recruitment agencies, as well as 
DoFE, the Foreign Employment Tribunal, the Foreign Employment Welfare 
Fund, and the private insurers are located in Kathmandu. Centralization, and 
the associated distance of many workers from redress mechanisms, creates 
significant barriers to access for Nepali labor migrants, including time, travel 
expenses, and awareness. The law does not require recruitment agencies to 
reimburse expenses if it loses the case.
 c. Lack of knowledge of legal rights and redress mechanisms on the part of workers and 
their families. 
  Awareness of legal rights and redress mechanisms among migrant workers is 
very low, particularly among women. This is partly because few workers attend 
the mandatory pre-departure orientation. For those who do attend, the training 
contains limited information regarding legal rights and options for obtaining 
redress and compensation for harms. Other services to provide migrant work-
ers with information are just commencing in certain parts of the country and 
their impact on access to justice has not been assessed.
MIGRANT WORKERS’ ACCESS TO JUSTICE AT HOME: NEPAL  165
 d. Lack of adequate resources on the part of government agencies
  The government has devoted insufficient human and financial resources to 
responsible departments for them to effectively carry out their mandate under 
the FEA 2007. Although Nepal ranks among the poorest nations of the world 
and is still transitioning from conflict, resources are available that could be 
deployed to strengthen the foreign employment system. The Foreign Employ-
ment Welfare Fund, for example, was reported to hold NPR 2.14 billion, as of 
March 2014, but has spent very little of that money and has yet to implement 
the variety of pre-departure and reintegration programs contemplated. Fur-
thermore, with remittances accounting for nearly 25 percent of the country’s 
GDP, Nepal is profiting significantly from the contributions of its citizens 
engaging in foreign employment. At present, the under-staffing of the DoFE 
Complaints Receiving and Investigations Section and many foreign embassies 
make adequate handling of all cases practically impossible.
 e. Lack of evidence to support complaints 
  Migrant workers frequently do not have the necessary evidentiary documents 
to bring claims through formal redress mechanisms due to failures on the 
part of recruitment agencies to provide workers with required documents, 
and oversight failures by government. Many migrant workers also have their 
documents confiscated by employers abroad, and are not able to recover them 
if they leave in distress. Although recruitment agencies may in some cases 
provide workers with replacement documents they are not required to do so. 
 f. Threats and fear of retaliation 
  Workers often fear pursuing claims against recruitment agencies or their 
agents because of threats ranging from cancelling of the job offer to physical 
violence. FEA Act 2007 and Rules 2008 do not contain anti-retaliation provi-
sions, and do not offer protection to workers who pursue claims before DoFE 
or the tribunal. The HTTCA includes a victim’s right to confidentiality and 
provision for the prosecution to proceed on the court-certified statement of the 
victim, but no similar protections exist for victims under FEA 2007. 
 g. Weak Governance and Accountability
  Corruption persists within Nepal’s civil service, including reportedly within 
DoFE. Alleged corruption in foreign employment includes collusion with 
recruitment agencies to avoid oversight and enforcement of the law and 
the payment of bribes by recruitment agencies to achieve certain outcomes. 
Whether corruption is real or perceived, it dissuades migrant workers’ from 
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testifying against recruitment agencies at the tribunal, and may impact out-
comes of migrant worker cases.  
8. Each mechanism has the potential to provide migrant workers with access to 
justice, but for structural and operational reasons most are failing to do so. 
 a. DoFE Complaints Receiving and Investigations Section
  DoFE has a broad mandate to provide migrant workers with remedies and hold 
recruitment agencies accountable for common worker harms. It has signifi-
cant investigative powers, as well as powers to award compensation to workers 
and to sanction recruitment agencies for offenses under the FEA 2007. Due 
to implementation failures, the promise of DoFE’s mandate has remained 
unfulfilled. In addition to the common challenges, such as resources, noted 
above, this study found that:
  i. Investigations of migrant worker complaints are superficial, rarely if ever 
going beyond the documents supplied by the parties, or joining additional 
potential defendants.
  ii. Investigation, case-handling, and decision-making functions are non-
transparent. Although DoFE has an internal directive, it lacks detail and 
does not clearly articulate the department’s claims-handling role or the 
rights and responsibilities of victim and defendant, or create a standard 
procedure. Gaps are evident across several areas:
   1. Investigation and decision-making powers are exercised in an ad hoc 
manner. Officers appear to shift between the roles of a mediator and 
that of a decision-maker able to impose its finding on the parties. 
   2. Standardized record-keeping and case management systems are lack-
ing. 
   3. The rights and responsibilities of the parties before DoFE are incon-
sistently applied. For example, parties’ rights to documents submitted 
by the opposing party, and to legal aid are not regularly implemented. 
   4. Compensation criteria are vague under the law and the DoFE Direc-
tive, particularly for losses other than non-payment of wages.395 Fur-
thermore, poor record-keeping limits the ability to identify trends and 
improve consistency. 
   5. DoFE decisions are not recorded or published in any systematic fash-
ion, and reasons for decisions are not provided to the parties. 
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   6. Procedures or criteria for filing or determining an appeal from a 
DoFE decision “with the government of Nepal” are not specified. It is 
unclear whether migrant workers ever use the appeal mechanism.
  iii. DoFE does not have jurisdiction to make decisions in cases against indi-
vidual agents, however all cases against agents must first be filed with 
DoFE. This creates an impediment to efficient adjudication of claims. 
Specifically:
   1. Very few cases approved by a government attorney for prosecution 
were actually registered by DoFE with the tribunal.
   2. Cases are often settled with individual agents before they are registered 
at the tribunal. DoFE’s role in the settlement of those cases remains 
unclear. It is also unclear if workers are aware of the opportunities to 
prosecute the agent and agencies, and what that process entails. 
   3. Allegations of a high proportion of fraudulent claims against indi-
vidual agents in the tribunal suggest that DoFE’s investigation process 
is not acting as an effective filter for unmeritorious and fraudulent 
claims.
 b. Foreign Employment Tribunal
  The tribunal is perceived to be faster and more efficient than Nepali courts. 
However, few cases have been prosecuted compared to the number of cases 
eligible (see above). The following factors reduce the effectiveness of the 
tribunal:
  i. The court is located in Kathmandu, and although it may locate itself in 
other districts it has not chosen to do so;
  ii. Victims of crime have little role in the proceedings aside from testifying 
(as is common across the criminal justice system);
  iii. The tribunal does not have an effective case management system for track-
ing the progress of cases;
  iv. Decisions of the tribunal are not published;
  v. The tribunal does not have the power to enforce its decisions, resulting in 
increased burdens and delays for migrant workers to obtain compensa-
tion;
  vi. A large number of tribunal cases (up to 50 percent, according to some 
sources) are found to be non-foreign employment related, because DoFE 
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is failing to filter out fraudulent cases and/or migrant workers are being 
coerced by defendants to change their testimony before the tribunal.
 c. Embassies
  Nepal has taken steps to strengthen embassy assistance to its migrant workers, 
including appointing labor attachés in some major destination states. Embas-
sies are often the only support mechanism of which workers are aware and 
are providing essential assistance to migrant workers in distress. Nevertheless, 
they not adequately support migrant workers to access justice in destination 
countries for the following reasons:
  i. Embassy staff have inadequate resources, training, and influence to genu-
inely assist workers when their rights are violated.
  ii. Embassies have not been given clear guidelines for assisting migrant 
workers with complaints against parties in the destination country, and 
therefore the level of assistance varies between embassies. 
  iii. Embassy assistance focuses on returning migrant workers to Nepal, 
including replacing lost documents, and repatriating deceased workers or 
workers in distress. Legal advice and support to Nepalis whose rights have 
been violated appears to be minimal in many countries. 
  iv. Two Gulf states do not have labor attaches assigned, and Lebanon, which 
has a significant Nepali migrant worker population, does not have a Nepali 
embassy presence.
 d. Foreign Employment Welfare Fund and Private Insurance
  The Foreign Employment Welfare Fund (under the FEPB), and private insur-
ance, which provide compensation to workers and their family members in 
cases of death and mutilation, are perceived to be working relatively effectively, 
providing compensation quickly and with minimal documentation. 
  However, awareness of both the fund and insurance was extremely low among 
migrant workers, and thus it is likely that many valid claims are not being 
filed. Both are also limited to receiving claims in Kathmandu, presenting a 
further barrier to access. Irregular workers, who did not pay into the fund, 
are explicitly denied access to benefits under it. Similarly, few irregular work-
ers buy insurance, and therefore are not covered under the private insurance 
scheme. The exclusion of irregular workers has a disproportionate impact on 
female migrant workers. 
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 e. Informal justice mechanisms
  Despite the existence of formal redress mechanisms through DoFE and the 
tribunal, most migrant workers outside Kathmandu rely on local services, 
where available, to resolve disputes, particularly with individual agents. These 
includes traditional structures like local panchayats, as well as civil society 
organizations or local government which can mediate disputes. Local police 
also sometimes play a mediating role between workers and individual agents.
  The use of informal justice mechanisms is controversial, particularly within 
civil society. Violations of the FEA 2007 are criminal offenses, and some civil 
society representatives felt they must be addressed through DoFE to ensure 
accountability. Others felt mediation to be a more practical alternative. Media-
tion appeared to provide more timely redress for some migrant workers, but 
was also subject to influence due to personal relationships between workers 
and individual agents, or between agents and local power structures. No data 
is available on the number or outcomes of mediations on which to assess their 
use and effectiveness.
 f. The Court System 
  Nepal’s regular system of courts, including district and appeals courts, are 
primarily available to migrant workers for prosecution of trafficking cases, and 
cases under the civil code. Although courts are located in each district, they 
are notoriously backlogged. Legal experts did not perceive them as a positive 
alternative to the Foreign Employment Tribunal where similar offenses can be 
prosecuted under the FEA 2007. 
 g. National Human Rights Commission and National Women’s Commission
  The National Human Rights Commission and the National Women’s Com-
mission both have the authority to receive and investigate complaints, but do 
not have meaningful enforcement powers. The researchers are unaware of 
any complaints submitted to either commission on behalf of migrant workers. 
Nevertheless, these institutions may play an important role in definition, over-
sight and implementation of Nepal’s obligations under international human 
rights law. 
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10.3 Recommendations 
Recommendations to Government
1. The government of Nepal should recognize migrant workers as rights-holders. 
 a. The legislature should amend the Foreign Employment Act 2007 to:
  i.  Establish enforceable rights that correspond with the statutory obligations 
of government and recruitment agencies under the act.
  ii. Specifically recognize a right to redress if a worker’s rights are violated.
  iii. Incorporate key human rights provisions in the treaties to which Nepal is 
a party as they relate to labor migration.396
 b. DoFE, the Foreign Employment Tribunal, the Foreign Employment Promo-
tion Board, the police, and the judiciary, should each develop and adopt poli-
cies that reflect migrant workers’ status as rights-holders in their handling of 
migrant worker cases. 
 c. The government of Nepal should ratify the UN Convention on the Protection 
of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, the ILO 
Domestic Worker Convention (189), and the UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress 
and Punish Trafficking in Persons, especially Women and Children. 
 d. The government should solicit participation from and consult with civil soci-
ety organizations and unions working with and on behalf of migrant workers 
regarding how it can better implement Nepal’s human rights obligations in 
its management of the foreign employment industry.
2. The government of Nepal should strengthen oversight of contracts provided to 
migrant workers. 
 a. DoFE should immediately strengthen enforcement of the rules regarding con-
tracts under the FEA 2007 including:
  i. Verifying that required contracts are signed by workers and are in Nepali. 
  ii. Ensuring a certified copy of both the employment contract and recruitment 
agency contract are provided by DoFE to workers as required under the act. 
 b. The legislature and DoFE should provide greater clarity regarding the con-
tents of both required contracts. Provisions to consider include the name and 
address of all parties; the position for which the worker is being recruited or 
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employed, such as the location, remuneration, and name of the employer; the 
consequences for breach of contract, including governing law, dispute resolu-
tion mechanisms and remedies.
 c. Recruitment contracts should be signed before or at the time a migrant worker 
pays the bulk of recruitment fees. Employment contracts should be provided 
at least several days prior to departure. 
 d. To address the common practice of contract substitution, the contract should 
state that any subsequent employment contract will only be valid if signed in 
the presence of a Nepali consular official, if the worker fully understands the 
terms of the new contract, and if the worker enters into the contract freely 
and without coercion. In the event of a dispute, the onus for proving lack of 
coercion should rest on the employer and/or recruitment agency.
 e. Embassies should be required to approve contracts before they are provided 
to workers, including verifying the existence of the employer institution. 
Consider also having a DoFE or FEPB officer present during the signing of 
employment contracts in Nepal, as is done in some other origin countries.
 f. The legislature should consider amending the FEA 2007 to require one tri-
partite contract between the employer institution, recruitment agency, and 
worker, incorporating a provision for joint and several liability between the 
employer institution and recruitment agency should there be a breach on the 
part of either party. 
 g. The MoLE should consider developing standard forms of contracts.
 h. DoFE should ensure that copies of all contracts and other documents submit-
ted for approval are stored in a system that is readily accessible to a migrant 
worker (and his or her representative). 
 i. The legislature should amend the FEA 2007 to create an offense, sanctions, 
and a remedy for not providing required contracts, with a parallel right of 
action for migrant workers to demand provision of contracts from the recruit-
ment agency. 
3. The Government of Nepal should improve transparency and accountability in the 
regulation of recruitment agencies and individual agents. 
 a. The legislature should:
  i. Amend the Foreign Employment Act 2007 to include sanctions against 
recruitment agencies that rely on unregistered agents to supply workers, 
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and hold recruitment agencies accountable for representations made to 
workers by those agents regardless of whether there is an official relation-
ship between the agent and recruitment agency. 
  ii. Consider allowing agents to register with more than one agency.
 b. DoFE and the FEPB should: 
  i. Create a more robust licensing system for recruitment agencies that 
requires prospective directors to demonstrate they were not previously 
affiliated with an agency that had its license revoked (within a certain 
period of time), and make a condition of licensing that the agency not have 
been the subject of repeated migrant worker claims before DoFE. 
  ii. Track relationships between overseas manpower agencies, recruitment 
agencies, and individual agents, and make all such information publicly 
available on DoFE’s website.
  iii. Use legislated “checkpoints” to identify relationships between agents and 
agencies—e.g., require an agency to specify whether it uses an individual 
agent when it applies for the labor approval sticker; require a worker to 
specify whether he or she used an individual agent and the identity of that 
agent when her documents are checked in the airport pre-departure;
  iv. Establish a more robust inquiry process regarding systemic wrongdoing 
in the recruitment industry, and transparent (and potentially mandatory) 
exercise of DoFE’s inquiry discretion.
  v. Conduct regular audits of all recruitment agencies, make the findings of 
those audits public, and develop a rating system for recruitment agencies.
4. The government should establish enforceable protections and remedies for work-
ers who suffer severe abuse, exploitation, debt bondage or trafficking. 
 a. The legislature should create new offenses under the Foreign Employment Act 
2007 that recognize serious harms, impose appropriate penalties on offend-
ers, and provide a complaints process designed to ensure both accountability 
and just compensation to the individual harmed.
 b. The legislature should amend the HTTCA to clearly prohibit and provide 
redress for all forms of labor trafficking, consistent with the definition set 
forth in the UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Per-
sons, Especially Women and Children.
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 c. DoFE should:
  i. Create a protocol with the police to refer trafficking or other serious crimi-
nal cases for prosecution.
  ii. Create protocols with community service providers to offer protection such 
as health services, counseling and reintegration services for trafficked 
workers.
 d. DoFE should develop guidelines for compensation that encompass not just 
differences in salary but also payment of medical costs and damages for physi-
cal and emotional suffering, as well as worker’s other reasonable expenses for 
bringing a claim.
5. The legislature and government should ensure enforceable rights and remedies 
for workers in an irregular status. 
 a. Amend the Foreign Employment Act 2007 to explicitly recognize the right of 
irregular workers to seek redress at DoFE and the tribunal.
 b. In cases where workers were sent irregularly without their knowledge and 
suffered mutilation abroad, the FEPB should allow access to the welfare fund.
6. The government should increase the visibility of women migrants, and improve 
protections and rights enforceability for women migrant workers. 
 a. Remove gender-specific restrictions on migration and make the ability to 
migrate through safe and legal channels equally available to all adult Nepalis.
 b. Ensure that migrant resource centers and other services provide empowering 
information to prospective women migrant workers including their rights as 
workers, and contact numbers for assistance abroad and in Nepal.
 c. Provide confidential, free, and voluntary health assessments for returning 
women migrant workers.
 d. DoFE should create a women’s desk to handle sensitive claims submitted by 
women, and to link women with other relevant services.
 e. DoFE, the tribunal and the Welfare Fund should disaggregate data by gender, 
and analyze the processing of women’s cases through their systems.
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7. Decentralize redress mechanisms and other essential labor migration services as 
a matter of urgency. 
a. DoFE should carry out plans to open and operate regional offices that can carry 
out the full functions of DoFE, including receiving and investigating complaints.
b. Consider expanding the roles and responsibilities of local government agencies, 
including local labor offices, to receive complaints from migrant workers.
c. Recommence registration of recruitment agency branch offices, and/or encourag-
ing recruitment agencies to base themselves at the district level, ensuring that all 
agencies or branches currently in operation have the authority to recruit migrant 
workers and to respond to complaints.
d. Arrange for pre-departure orientations at the local level. Consider partnerships 
with civil society organizations already providing information in particular dis-
tricts.
8. Facilitate systemic inter-agency and civil society coordination, and collaborative 
data collection on effectiveness of redress mechanisms. 
 a. The Ministry of Labor should facilitate information-sharing and coordination 
among different agencies and stakeholders involved in labor migration. For 
example, coordination to better identify problematic recruitment agencies and 
employer institutions, and to assist migrant workers to gather evidence to sup-
port their cases at home and abroad. 
 b. Encourage data collection and analysis across DoFE, embassies, police, other 
relavent government agencies and with civil society organizations, legal aid 
providers, unions, and migrant workers. Potential steps include:
  i. Collect data from returning migrants as they exit the airport regarding 
problems experienced abroad.
  ii. Collect and centralize data from Nepal’s embassies regarding types of com-
plaints filed against parties in destination countries, services provided, and 
outcomes for migrant workers.
  iii. Collect and centralize data from police across Nepal regarding reports 
made against individual agents or recruitment agencies, and actions taken 
by police to resolve those cases.
  iv. Maintain a streamlined case management system at DoFE and the tribu-
nal for tracking types of claims, time to resolution, compensation sought 
and awarded, and worker satisfaction with the process.
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  v. Create a complaints-reporting service through existing or new hotlines 
for migrant workers, free of charge in Nepal and abroad, that can receive 
complaints and direct migrant workers to services and that systematically 
records data on complaints (de-identified as necessary).
9. Within redress mechanisms, address the practical needs of vulnerable migrant 
workers, including women. 
 DoFE and the tribunal should assess the impact of socio-economic position, and 
diversity between different communities, on migrant workers’ ability to make and 
sustain claims for redress. Amend procedures to reduce disparities in access. 
10. Increase resourcing, transparency, accountability and efficiency within DoFE and 
the tribunal to improve enforcement of migrant worker rights and private sector 
accountability. 
 a. Significantly increase DoFE resources overall, and specifically for investigating 
and processing claims. The unit should be at least tripled in size. 
 b. Consider greater cooperation with police, including granting local police juris-
diction to investigate cases at the local level, and/or seconding to DoFE police 
with specialized expertise in financial crimes or human trafficking. Create an 
inter-agency MOU between police and DoFE for investigating cases.
 c. Set clear documentation requirements and facilitate workers’ access to those 
documents. Establish exceptions to the documentation requirements for situa-
tions of contract substitution or document confiscation, particularly where DoFE 
has not kept a copy of original documents (or cannot make them accessible).
 d. Clarify DoFE’s role in resolving claims brought by workers against recruit-
ment agencies (i.e. facilitator, mediator or adjudicator), and establish decision-
making criteria and processes that recognize the worker as a rights-holder. 
These should include explicit and publically available guidelines for determin-
ing compensation amounts for non-wage related harms, and potentially for 
reasonable expenses related to bringing claims. 
 e. Address the large backlog of cases deemed “pending” before DoFE by creat-
ing separate but coordinated procedures for pursuit of criminal prosecution 
on the one hand and provision of compensation to the worker on the other, 
recognizing the economic and other pressures workers face that often lead 
them to settle a claim or withdraw their cooperation in the investigation and 
prosecution of criminal claims.
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 f. Assess ways to improve migrant worker access to compensation awarded by 
the tribunal. Possible actions could include providing instructions to workers 
about collection of compensation, or strengthening enforcement powers of the 
tribunal. 
 g. Ensure the realization of a worker’s right to legal representation during the 
filing and adjudication of claims before DoFE and the tribunal,
 h. Require the provision of reasons for DoFE and tribunal decisions, and establish 
clear, transparent and accessible appeals processes that allow for the worker’s 
participation and input.  
11. Reform handling of cases against individual agents to achieve more timely pay-
ment of compensation. 
 a. Consider ways to streamline the process for filing and adjudicating cases 
against individual agents before the Foreign Employment Tribunal, which cur-
rently must pass through DoFE investigation and then prosecutorial review 
before DoFE can file a case in the tribunal, and to facilitate accelerated pay-
ment of compensation to workers. Delays in DoFE’s filing of tribunal cases 
appear to incentivize workers to accept a compensation settlement and then 
seek to withdraw from the prosecution before the tribunal. 
 b. Prioritize particularly serious cases (for example a large number of victims, 
large amounts of money taken and not returned, or serial offending) for reg-
istration at the tribunal.
 c. Remove the distinction between “individual” and “institutional” cases, and 
instead encourage joint liability between individual agents and recruitment 
agencies by expanding investigations against agencies named by individual 
agents, documenting past relationships between agents and recruitment agen-
cies and also referring to stored contract information (see recommendations 
regarding contracts).
 d. DoFE should take steps to shield workers from retaliation for pursuing claims.
12. Improve embassy support for migrant worker rights enforcement. 
 a. Amend the Foreign Employment Act 2007 to:
  i. Give embassies an explicit mandate to assist migrant workers whose rights 
have been violated.
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  ii. Set standards for employer institutions to recruit Nepali workers, against 
which a labor attaché must assess an employer or agency before it is 
allowed to recruit Nepali workers.
 b. Increase the number of labor attachés assigned to embassies within the Middle 
East, including posting female labor attachés in every country where female 
migrant workers are present.
 c. Maintain a publically accessible database regarding rights and responsibilities 
of workers, employer institutions, and recruitment agencies operating within 
destination countries.
 d. Maintain a database tracking complaints filed against specific employer insti-
tutions and employers, and the resolution of those complaints.
 e. Provide detailed guidelines to embassies regarding the scope of assistance to 
be provided to migrant workers with cases in destination countries, in coordi-
nation with DoFE and the Foreign Employment Promotion Board, and encour-
age each embassy to develop specific procedures relevant to the jurisdiction 
in cooperation with civil society organizations operating in the destination 
country.
 f. To the degree MoFA continues to negotiate bilateral agreements with key des-
tination countries, it must seek to include key rights for migrant workers and 
responsible persons within each government. 
 g. Work within SAARC to develop regional rights-based, protection-oriented 
standards.
 h. Increase coordination between embassies, the MoFA, DoFE, and the FEPB 
regarding the handling of transnational cases.
 i. Significantly increase resources for foreign embassies to assist migrant work-
ers in distress, and provide comprehensive training to all diplomatic staff 
regarding the rights and redress options for migrant workers before post-
ing. Ensure that specific gender-sensitive training is provided on the rights of 
female migrant workers and the barriers they face to accessing justice at home 
and abroad.
 j. Relevant actors should build on transnational models of assistance provided 
by PNCC and GEFONT to increase support services to workers in destination 
countries.  
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13. The FEPB and legislature should improve access to the Foreign Employment 
welfare fund and insurance for all migrant workers. 
 a. Increase outreach to workers and their families about rights to compensation 
under private insurance and through the welfare fund. For example, make 
information available at embassies abroad, at DoFE offices through brochures 
or information boards, and at the airport upon return.
 b. Create mechanisms for filing claims with the welfare fund at the regional 
or district level, for example through migrant resource centers or local labor 
offices. 
 c. Consider expanding the scope of compensable losses under the welfare fund 
and/or under private insurance, e.g., for uncovered medical expenses or for a 
broader range of injuries or serious abuse. 
14. DoFE and the FEPB should cooperate to improve the reach of pre-departure orien-
tation programs, and coverage of information on legal rights and seeking redress, 
building on existing non-government organization and union-led programs. 
 a. Revise the manual for pre-departure orientation to include more detailed infor-
mation about remedies for harms, and redress mechanisms.
 b. Encourage participation at pre-departure orientations by offering programs at 
the district level (see above) or immediately prior to departure when workers 
are already in Kathmandu.
 c. Review local information services, whether government or civil society-led, 
and identify and support replication of successful programs. 
 d. Continue to support and assess effectiveness of mass media programs that 
inform migrant workers about rights and redress options, and that combat 
stigma associated with failed migration, trafficking and abuse. 
Recommendations to Non-Government Entities
15. Civil society organizations, unions, and legal aid organizations should continue 
to develop programs, services, and strategies to improve migrant workers’ access 
to justice. 
 a. Create a collaborative network of organizations and institutions working on 
migrant rights to develop and advocate for a more rights-based legal frame-
work.
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 b. Expand legal aid services to districts around Nepal, in coordination with each 
other and with existing government services.
 c. Increase the visibility of migrant workers in Nepal, particularly female migrant 
workers, and facilitate their participation in policy debates.
 d. Facilitate access to formal and informal redress mechanisms by providing 
comprehensive information to migrant workers about rights and redress 
options.
 e. Supplement government oversight of pre-departure processes, orientations, 
and redress services for migrant workers by providing timely research and 
monitoring, drawing on the direct experiences of migrant workers.
 f. Consider litigating strategic cases to challenge discriminatory practices, to 
enforce rights and government obligations under statute, the constitution and 
international law, and to ensure adequate remedies for workers.
16. The international donor community should prioritize facilitation and improve-
ment of access to justice for intending, current and former migrant workers.
 a. Maintain support for infrastructure development, including effective, trans-
parent and accessible electronic systems such as for verification and storage 
of contracts and other documents required for DoFE approvals, case man-
agement systems for claims investigation and adjudication, and inter-agency 
data-sharing platforms.
 b. Mainstream information about rights and redress options in pre-departure 
materials and programs funded by donors; continue to assess and improve 
coordination between information programs to ensure consistency of informa-
tion given to migrant workers.
 c. Explore provision of technical assistance to the various redress mechanisms 
in Nepal to define and implement rights-based policies and procedures.
 d. Consider support for the following areas of further study:
  i. Options for ensuring workers’ more efficient access to redress before 
DoFE and the tribunal. Options could include streamlining processing 
of cases by DoFE that will ultimately be referred to the tribunal for adju-
dication; streamlining compensation procedures, and possible bifurcated 
procedures that would allow workers to obtain compensation in a timely 
fashion, while guarding against pressures to withdraw from prosecution 
for a reduced settlement sum.
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  ii. The role of mediation including its ability to provide timely and adequate 
compensation to workers.
  iii. The regulation of recruitment agencies, and their relationships with indi-
vidual agents, best practices, corporate codes of conduct, and other good 
governance models and mechanisms for ensuring justice in recruitment 
drawing on regional and global examples. 
  iv. Approaches for encouraging regular migration.
  v. Opportunities for developing the capacity of local institutions, such as 
VDCs, to enable redress at the district level. 
  vi. The nexus between social exclusion and access to justice, with the goal of 
identifying targeted ways to increase access for specific groups.
  vii. Mapping informal mechanisms available to migrant workers in a greater 
range of districts than was possible in this study. Consider, in particular, 
the treatment of women migrant workers and individuals from tradition-
ally excluded groups, and coordination between informal and formal jus-
tice mechanisms.
  viii. Access to justice in key destination countries and opportunities for greater 
transnational collaborations.
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Annex 1: Sampling of Interviewees 
and Focus Group Participants
The study sought to meet with a broad range of migrant workers who had experienced 
problems abroad in order to reflect the range of harms experienced and the range of 
pathways used by migrant workers to seek justice. The sample was limited, however, 
to migrant workers who had travelled or sought to travel to the Middle East and who 
reported experiencing a problem at some point in the migration process.
Snowball and purposive sampling were used to identify migrant workers who met 
these criteria. The research team began by contacting local influential individuals, such 
as political workers, social activists and business people who were familiar with the local 
area and had a wide network of contacts. Identifying suitable interviewees then took 
considerable time—most migrant workers who had reportedly returned with problems 
had subsequently migrated again. Others were reluctant to be interviewed, citing fear 
of retaliation or shame regarding their negative experiences. 
For all interviews, the interviewers explained the nature and purpose of the study, 
and interviews proceeded only with the consent of the interviewee. Ethical standards 
set by the University of New South Wales were used at all stages of the interview. Voice 
recorders were used except in the few cases in which the migrant worker or workers 
declined to be recorded. 
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Location and Gender
Of the 54 migrant workers who eventually participated, either as interviewees (31) or 
focus group participants (23), 45 were men and 9 were women. All 9 women par-
ticipated as focus group participants in Kathmandu (see Table 10, the total ‘27’ in the 
table below includes the four repeat participants in both in-depth interviews and focus 
groups). 
 TABLE 10: Focus Groups by Location, Date and Participant Gender
District Region Dates Participants
Female Male Total
Kathmandu Central 28 Aug 2012 4 — 4
Kathmandu Central 28 Aug 2012 5 — 5
Sinurjoda VDC, Dhanusha Central 8 July 2012 — 5 5
Sinurjoda VDC, Dhanusha Central 31 Aug 2012 — 4 4
Sinurjoda VDC, Dhanusha Central 1 Sept 2012 — 5 5
Sinurjoda VDC, Dhanusha Central 1 Sept 2012 — 4 4
Total 9 18 27
TABLE 11: In-depth Interviews by Location, Date
District Region No. of respondents
Kathmandu Central 18
Dhanusha Central 10
Tahanu Western 3
Total 31
Note: One respondent in the in-depth interviews was a female family member (sister) of two migrants.
  All the other respondents were male migrants.
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Country of Destination
Of the 54 total participants, only 46 were returnee migrant workers, whereas in the 
other 7 cases the placement had not eventuated due to various pre-departure problems. 
All 46 went to the Gulf region of the Middle East: 23 to Qatar, and the remainder to 
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Lebanon and Oman (see Table 12). As 
set out in Chapter 3 of this report, this is largely in line with the major destinations for 
Nepali migrant workers in the Middle East.
 TABLE 12: Destination Country for Returned Migrant Worker Participants in the Study
 Destination Country Individual FGDs Total
Saudi Arabia 6 2 8
Oman 1 0 1
Qatar 12 11 23
UAE 3 2 5
Kuwait 2 6 8
Lebanon 0 1 1
Total 24 22 46
Use of Formal or Informal Mechanisms
Of the 54 migrant worker participants, 49 had taken some action through either infor-
mal or formal means. Five had not sought any form of redress for problems experi-
enced. Some members of this latter group did seek to take action on their own behalf, 
though, such as directly negotiating with the other party. 
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Annex 2: Key Informant Interviews
Organization/Agency (when interviewed) Name
Kathmandu
1 Asian Human Rights and Culture Development Forum, 
Migrants Centre
Siddhi Chandra Baral
2 Department of Foreign Employment Hari Singh Dhami
3 Department of Foreign Employment Narayan Rimal
4 District Government Attorney Office, Kathmandu Gopal Lamichhane
5 Foreign Employment Promotion Board Girija Sharma
6 Foreign Employment Tribunal Deepak Kharel
7 Foreign Employment Tribunal Meera Khadka and 
Agni Prasad Thapaliya
8 Former Ambassador to Qatar Maya Kumari Sharma
9 Former Ambassador to Qatar Surya Nath Mishra
10 General Federation of Nepalese Trade Unions Nisha Baniya
11 Global Reliance Overseas Deepak Poudel
12 Himalayan Law Associates Shambhu Niraula
13 Manaslu Manpower Agency Raju Rayamajhi
14 Ministry of Foreign Affairs Bishal Bhattarai
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Organization/Agency (when interviewed) Name
15 Nabil Overseas Radhika Katuwal
16 National Life Insurance Company CP Dahal
17 Pardeshi Overseas Services Mohan Nemwang
18 People Forum for Human Rights Shom Luitel
19 Pourakhi Manju Gurung
20 Pourakhi Agni Gurung
21 Pravasi Nepali Coordination Committee Mahendra Pandey
22 Pravasi Nepali Coordination Committee J.P. Sapkota
23 Pravasi Nepali Coordination Committee Aviman Singh Lama
24 Saviour Law Associates Rewat Prasad Kharel
25 Special Government Attorney Office Tek Bahadur Ghimire
26 Values and Vision Overseas Padam Raj Poudel
27 WOREC Nepal Rupa Shrestha
Dhanusha
28 District Police Office Ravi Ghimire
29 District Administration Office Peshal Kumar Poudel
30 Pro-Public Mithileshwor Jha
31 WOREC Nepal Ram Pramesh Mandal
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Annex 3: Relevant International 
Conventions and Protocols 
Ratified by Nepal
UN Conventions and Protocols
Instrument Date of Ratification/Accession
1 International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (ICESCR), 1966
1991
2 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR), 1966
1991
3 First Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, 1966 1991
4 Second Optional Protocol to the ICCPR on Abolition of 
the Death Penalty, 1989
1998
5 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), 1979
1991
6 Optional Protocol to CEDAW, 1999 2007
7 International Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD), 1965
1971
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Instrument Date of Ratification/Accession
8 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman 
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT), 1984
1991
9 Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), 1989 1990
10 Optional Protocol to the CRC on the Sale of Children, 
Child Prostitution and Child Pornography, 2000
2006
11 Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 
(CRPD), 2006
2010
12 Optional Protocol to the CRPD, 2006 2010
13 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, 1963 1965
14 Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, 
2000
2011
15 Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in 
Persons, Especially Women and Children, 2000
not signed
ILO Conventions
Convention Date of Ratification/Accession
1 Weekly Rest (Industry) Convention, 1921 (No. 14) 1986
2 Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (No. 29) 2002
3 Right to Organize and Collective Bargaining Convention, 
1949 (No. 98)
1996
4 Equal Remuneration Convention, 1951 (No. 100) 1976
5 Force Labour Abolition Convention, 1957 (No. 105) 2007
6 Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) 
Convention, 1958 (No. 111)
1974
7 Minimum Wage Fixing Convention, 1970 (No. 131) 1974
8 Minimum Age Convention, 1973 (No. 138) 1997
9 Tripartite Consultation (International Labour Standards) 
Convention, 1976 (No. 144)
1995
10 Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention, 1999 (No. 182) 2002
11 Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, 1989 (No. 169) 2007
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Much attention has been directed to the exploitation of low-wage 
migrant workers in the Middle East, where harms are commonplace and 
severe, and access to justice is limited. But the story of labor migration 
begins and ends at home. The vulnerability of Nepali migrant workers to 
exploitation abroad is heightened by routine misconduct committed in 
Nepal during the pre-departure phase by individual agents, recruitment 
agencies, and other private actors.
Migrant Workers’ Access to Justice at Home: Nepal is the first comprehensive 
analysis of the Nepali mechanisms through which migrant workers may 
seek remedies for harms suffered during recruitment or while working in 
the Middle East. The study finds that despite Nepal’s efforts to protect 
migrant workers, it is generally failing to hold private recruitment 
companies and individual agents accountable, and the vast majority 
of workers remain unable to access compensation or other forms of 
justice in Nepal or abroad. The study reveals that the laws that govern 
recruitment and placement of Nepali migrant workers are relatively 
robust, but their implementation and enforcement are weak.
Migrant Workers’ Access to Justice at Home: Nepal aims to improve this 
situation by identifying clear pathways to improving the governance, 
operation, access and effectiveness of each of Nepal’s redress 
mechanisms, and to more effective regulation of migrant worker 
recruitment. The report presents detailed and empirically based-
recommendations for government and other stakeholders that can be 
implemented in the short- and medium-term, emphasizing the need 
for a rights-based approach that treats workers as holders of defined, 
enforceable rights.  
Migrant Workers’ Access to Justice at Home: Nepal will be relevant for 
other countries of origin in Asia and globally who have much to learn 
from each other’s efforts to address these common challenges.  It 
also provides much-needed guidance for Nepali civil society to better 
understand, use, and test migrant worker justice mechanisms at home. 
